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/Ck>;~rnm~nt and publ:i.c' opinion ha.s · bee~ ~f interesi to scholars 
!.,'in , .Arrterica ; sinc::e the nation was infant. The Founding Fathers t 
:: n~ Tocqm~vj_i].e}mdBryce, v,rote on the nature and .. importa.rice ····.or public ',·,' 
;:'·, opinion .·in Their works remain in -the philosophical · 
;:,:~olllld:i.llgs 6'.r contemporary orientation. iL the ti~e ()f thDs~ wriiiJib; 
::\.r··-.:-.. '. _, __ - . -. 
,:-/·however, about'\all that connected "governmehtn and "priblic" was an 
, - - I , 
:·. ,:··'\ . /:-i'.:.;_··::, ·_(::.:O::···,:.'::e: ·_. ,: :' '. _:·' : · . . :: <": '.<·· . _._/:i :.-.. : ) ·'·.' _'' ·.\·: /! .. ; 
>,·: 1occasionaL newspaper -or public speech. Today the powerful forces 
' ' 
Yhia~~s ,' ~ed.ia-radio and t~levisi.on as well as print-extend in ., a two-
/ w~y pat tern between . government and public. 
' This S"ll~Ject has recently come to the fo;eground because Sr 
;{::i()~ll.J.ari;at:i.6n. Of concepts such as McLuhan's analysis of the media, 1 
( McGinniss' ,•;c·ru:tiny or political use of the media and Agnew's 
1
icriticism of . the media's handling of political messages. 
. : . ',,'•, -
The medium is the message, Marshall McLuhan tells us, 
, ~e·ssage ''content" is secondary upon society to the medium employed 
' ' 
, J~e ·McGiriniss ·has recently popularized the notion in his .book 
·Seiling of th~ -President 1968, that the image projected over television 
more important to government or a political candidate· than what 
words are s 'aid; what counts is the received impression, depending most 
:\ upon how the· medium is handled. 
Vice-President Agnew has criticized both the mass media and their 
.: message. More specifically, he has made media coverage of government · 
a ·prominent issue. His charges of bias and editorializing aroused 
1 
counter-charges of government-control and manipulation of the media. 
After all.the debates, what appeared most obvious was that the press 
and the government operate.with conflicting goals; what must not be 
lost sight·•· of is that both· must serve the public. 
Research·upon government and public opinion, government and 
. media, media and public opinion, and even some. combining 
factors is in abundance. Both historicalandempirical.studies 
been done from the viewpoints of political science, journalism, 
· ··history, .rhetoric and public address or communications theory, 
mass media. In fact, there is a variety of research that is 
of synthesis to give focus to a broader understanding of the 
of government and mass media in influencing public opinion. 
bro,adly-based,• multidisciplinary integration of available knowledge 
about governmental communications would be helpful in giving organi-
zation to further research efforts. 
In 1961, James Rosenau articulated a "pre-theorytt of communication 
flow which may be useful as an hypothesis for a study on the relation-
ship of government and the mass media to public opinion. In his book 
Public.Opinion and Foreign Policy, Rosenau outlined four steps of a 
communication flow: 
The news and interpretation of an event are first carried 
by say, a newspaper; this is then read and adapted by opinion-
makers, who assert (step 2) their opinions in speeches on the 
subject that are reported (step 3) by the press and thereupon 
picked up by 'opinion leaders' in the general public---• who in 
turn pass (step 4) on the 1opinions through word-of-mouth. 
1James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: 
Random House, 1961), p. 8. 
An August 15, 1969, personal letter from James Rosenau 
tained the following statement in response to.my question concerning 
the amount of research that has already b.een conducted on the four-step 
theory: "Aside from the sources cited in my book (particularly the 
Katz and Lazarsfeld), not much has been done on thi
1
~ theory. Certainly 
· 118 \me has specifically investigated the four steps , that I suggested 
and I would think it most appropriate for you to do so without fear 
of duplication." 
Purposes of the Study 
The general focus of this thesis will be to promote a clearer 
understanding of the influence of government and the mass media on 
public opinion. Specifically, the purpose is to search but 
appropriate literature in order to determine what evidence can be 
found to support or refute the four-step theory. 
The method of · study is · to review and synthesize relevant literature 
on a multidisciplinary basis. Of "all communications" potentially · 
reported by the mass media, I have selected out for this thesis only 
those studies on what is written by government, about government, or 
that directly affects government. 
Definition of Terms 
These definitions give direction to the intended usage, but 
should not be considered to be in final form. In several cases, terms 
will receive further delineation when they are used in the context ·or 
a chapter. 
Attentive public refers to citizens who are relatively aware of 
important public affairs issues. They are distinguished from other 
citizens of the .public in that while their inclination and interest 
:-:-.-, . ·, ·. ' . . ' 
';in public affairs is high, their opportunity for participa.tion in 
forming public policy is low. 2 Members of this group 
' . 
. "come alive" when some particular image affects them. 
however, their opportunity to engage in policy-making is low,often 
because of the job they hold. 
By gatekeeper, this study refers to any personor group that 
regulates the flow of opiniono~ flow of new~ at any . poirit: At 
each potential stopping point, the communicationis eith,~r stopped, . 
changed, ·or passed on by a "gatekeeper." Regardless of how he 
...... .. . _ '. ' 
decides to communicate (or not communicate) an event, he has affected 
the flow of opinion. 
Mass media are the impersonal instruments for communication. 
The classification includes both printed and electronic media • 
. refers not only to an event, but to anything which 
ported in the mass media. News, then, includes reactions to events 
which are not events in themselve~, interpretations of events, and 
.human interest stories which are "news" because of their .special 
_. appeal to humankind. 
Opinion..:.1eaders are persons both in and out of government who 
exertinfluence upon those with whom they are . in direct contact .in 
regard to decisions ·from at least one area of life. Independent of 
·the occupation a person happens to hold, his personal . influence is 
2 ' 
~., PP• 39-41. 
on the·reliance people have for information and opinions 
because of certain personal traits. 
Opinion-makers occupy prestigious positions 
opportunity totransmit opinion (1) about any.issue to unknown 'r'\o,"'"'r,,,..,,. 
outside their occupational field or (2) about more than one type 
issue to unknown persons within their occupational field. 
not·necessarily wield.personal influence in their face-to-face 
contacts, .but often their. role naturally. draws the type. of 
whose personaLinfluence is strong. 
There are four recognized types of.opinion-makers: (1) Governmental-
officials responsible for decision-making, often functioning 
as opinion-makers; (2) Associational-involved in both special-interest 
associations and civic-interest associations; (3) Institutional-
derive their access to the opinion-making process from .the prestige.}. 
attached to their organizational position; (4) Individual-some 
personal quality or achievement has earned their access to the proc~ss. 3 
Personal media refers·to interaction by direct contact between 
speaker and receiver. It is usually.face-to-face in nature, and differs 
from mass media because of its personal tailoring. 
The public refers to.the mass of.citizens that lacks any special 
organization. Public opinion is defined in many ways. V.O. Key, Jr. 
defined public opinion as .. those opinions held by private persons which 
government finds it prudent to heed. 4 In a footnote, Key adds, "The 
3~., pp •. 42-73. 
4v.o. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 14. 
6 
· conception of public opinion advanced here, it is cheerfully conceded, ·· 
/;:is difficult to apply in research." The dictionary definition is just 
as difficult _ to apply: · "the collective opinion that -·is formed ·around . __ 
issue of .difference.i•5• The ·,question is, -what is the collective 
C. Wright Mills' disbussion of "public0 and"mass'~ is most 
:' - .i < · < .... 6 applicable to this thesis. Extracted from his observations, 
;•·.· , .:·.· ' 
,: .  / '"public" a.s follows: . the collectivity of persons whose .impressions 
. _- -··-- · --.-·.·-· ·. 
'of public affai~s ·are formed on the basis of c~ntact with ,opinion- -
·•/leaders and whatever <they enract from popular mass media. 
Limitations of the Study 
.- - • · , • . ' 
·. This study is intended to contribute to 
'. ;by ·discovering ;nd synthesizing those dat~ 
Rosenau's"four-step flow" concept. It is not 
·--,::'::\or _ndisprove" 
,\.< this would be an appropriat'e endeavor at a late; ti~e.T·'\A field 
< test of the theory is a necessary follow-up of this . development of 
.--,.. , 
the four-step flow. 
There is another significant limitation to this study which 
not ·as easily explained • . I have made no attempt to evaluate .who 
·,. influences decision-makers in the policy-making process. Theories on 
Hando~CH~~s!~r:~~ ·i9iiJ: ~~e9~~rican College Dictionary (NeW York: 
__ ____ __ 6c. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1956), pp. 303-315. 
: _ _ 7 A replication or' an empirical test on the two-step flow woulcl 
. be an interesting way to begin: Verling Troldahl, "A Field Test of 
A Modified 'Two-Step Flow of Communication'," Public Opinion Quarterly, · 
XXX (Winter, 1966-6?), 609-22 •. 
:·<toJ···•.f1-1~ · p11bl:i.c i'infJ.uehces ·•:de~i~·ion-rnakers •··· ·are ·· different 
'.'6h ·• the flo~ cif· iriforrnationand opinion back and forth between >the 
,; .: ' 
_\ g~\7"~:mment}:' thI~ media/ . and the public. ' For example' just 
·;,-·:.·: 
.not mea.n .that it,here was an equivalent flm./. of influence ·that 
,\policy • .. ··.· A.s•\ l~ng as ·_th~ ·two t~es of /theories are kept di~tinct 
·.~/ 
\ the · reader·, s rhi.nd, .thi s study_ will not be taken for something it is 
:/net t· 
' Orga.rrl.z~tion• of Rese~r6h . 
' 'Each 'chapter is ~< development of ' one ' s_tep of the four-step 
. ' . . 
\ theory. • F611owingrj_~ a pre~e~ of the divi~ion of mate~i~l . irit~ 
1 ' 
: •chapters• •·  ;; 
''Communication Stimulus" 
Q()rnrnunication usu.ally occurs as a response 
........... .., .... we call •the "exigence." 
"beginning :of the comrm.inication flow. '/ The ·general notion '1 ·s that 
government opicion-makers · often become aware of ·-~ eventi ("new~") 
through the mass media, 'and' that they respond to others i~bout 
. . . 
:happening on . th~ basis of ·what they read or heard. 
they are stimulated to communicate in re·sponse to the reality· created 
for them by icornmunications they have received. 
In view of the general .ideas suggested above, the chapter is 
' •·, - _, .. ·: .' •' I . ' 
' ' 
·dev~ioped ' in the following way. First, the underlying assumption.that . 
·government opinion-makers depend upon the mass media is shown; 
dependence exists for receiving information, receiving an image of 
other government opinion-makers and for giving out the 
. . \ . . . 
they feelwill maintain their own favdrable ::i.mage. 
With the realization that government does depend upon mass 
, media in several important ways, the next task of the chapter is to · 
show how the rhetoric that occurs on television or in the newspaper 
"is . responsible for stimulating response from government.i The ·media--
produced rhe_toric creates a "reality" which becomes the basis upon 
·which further communication is stimulated. 
Step 2 
"Government Response" 
With -the understanding from chapter one that government 
' . 
makers respond to rhetorical exigences created by the mass media, 
it is appropriate to examine more closely the nature of the response. 
/The mechanics of the response for conveying intended messages in-
clude such matters as handouts, news conferences, trial balloons, and 
news leaks. : It is significant that by those same means· the government 
also communicates unintended images. If they communicate ambiguity to 
·a ·reporter, for example, he is likely to relay on to.the .public 
. something as unintended by the opinion~makers ·as a "credibility 
Knowing this problem of the unintended message, government is 
' to take more and more advantage of public relations and media 
specialists; but in so doing, the message communicated to the public 
·· is affected. This time, although the message is intended, it can be 
.::·\'so ; ,~e'i~ciive or: the facts , the "reality" is again questioned. The 
'. .. ·>" .. ; , .. -_:_ ·:' . : .· ' ' :, ' .·'..: 
<kind of effect the mass media have upon government image must be 
'questioned/ both in 'terms ' of pursuing questions in this thesis' 
•. and ·ir11:i~·~s of th~ : ~ffect such variance h~s upon ·wha{ informatiori 
;)/.the '.public knows. 
. : ' ' ·:. : .. ,' ,: ·~· -··' ; ' 
"Media Treatment 11 ;• ·, 
· ·with th.e .' informa.tion that government opinion-makers 
/:~ome kind · 6f te;lity from rnas~ media, to which they respond 
. . messages irit~nded for dissemination to the .· public, the 
: '.,'.' ,.\:- , :- ·., 
' to ' 'investigate · how the media ·treat /the sto!'Y. This is 
.;. , :\_ ·::::::: -:- : _. . .::_:". -·: ·_>: -, : :_:: ·. · : 
':::: the • public because whatever they do with information about . government 
' '/ •\: 
j_~ generally what the public ultimately "knowsn about gov-~rnment. 
,,.• .. -, . _-- _-_ :,:_·:. ·. ,, ', 
· Three 'basic · concepts are discussed in this chapter. Fir'st, · the .· 
. : _ .. __ -_- . ' 
··.reporter's perception of his role in the government-public ·. information · 
>flow .is developed; is the reporter an arm of the public that protects 
the public interest? Or is he concerned onlywith providing enough 
uncontroversial material that ,· will be n approved" by his boss evenif 
., ,. , 
it be no more in depth than the one-sided view that government hands 
the reporter. 
The gatekeeper ' theory is explored in this chapter to give the 
.··. reader a feel for what can happen to a story on its pathway to the 
· . public. All along, it can be modified in ways that reflect any 
gatekeeper's biases, consciously or subconsciously. When this is 
. . 
-;,done, the story content is affected. There are at least three . 
· 10 
·different ways 'the content can be changed: possible omission, word 
choice and emphasis. Each of these areas is developed-does the 
editor omit a certain story or a certain point of view so that the 
·public's chance ·of knowing some aspect of reality is diminished? 
Does .he word phrases so selectively that the original intent is 
modified? What part of the story does.he put in the. first paragraph? 
_Where does he place a story iri the newspaper, and where does he 
·place it on the page? 
Step 4 
"Opinion-Leaders Influence" 
· However the media treat . ; a story, the opinion-leaders in the 
'. •. :. ·. ' .. ,·., 
_generalpublic interpret the information and pass on their opinions 
' , ·,· ' -·. , .. 
to others who ask them for information. According to the two-step 
:. fiow of communi~ation, .the opinion-leader uses his personal influence 
· to give . weight to whatever opinions he passes on by word-of-mouth 
, . ' ... 
· With the overwhelming access the mass public has to . media, it is 
significant to discuss ·just what influence people obtain from mass 
:;·media and what influence people obtain /from opinion---leaders. 
As the four-step flow is completed, the public .has received 
•image of .government. Most of the belief system people have about 
·their government is as "removed" as what certain informed persons tell 
. . ' . . 
·them is true. on the basis of what they know from having read and heard 
extensive information that isnothing more (usually) than a journalist's 
perception · of what government ~ ··· and what government is doing. All 
11 
along the way there is opportunity for less-than-accurate transfer 
of meaning, because at every level people can do nothing more than 
pass on a perception of what , the preceding person meant or what is 
· "behind" . his message 
CHAPI'ER 2 
The Communication Stimulus 
"The news and interpretation of 
an event are first carried by, say, 
a newspaper; this is then read and 
adapted by opinion-makers " 
Rosenau's first step in the four-step flow theory is 
with that part of the.communication situation which 
Specifically, this step is the beginning of the 
when someone in government (or an opinion-maker 
becomes aware of an event .to which he responds. 
ness is confined, for purposes of simplification in this 
what he reads or hears in the mass media. He could also 
of an event by first-hand experience or byword-of-mouth from 
Although those means of awareness are not included.in the 
of this chapter, the reader should realize that they are 
The opinion-maker might.later supplement what he knows 
information from mass media. 
event, a communication flow has begun. 
To say that the communication flow begins 
worker's response to the mass media implies that government 
some attention to the media. Thus, the first task 
to show how government does depend upon the media. A 
plication of saying that a flow generates from opinion-makers respond-
ing to the media is that media structures some kind. of. a reality '""'""'"H ... ,.,. 
which people communicate. Thus, the second. task of the 
show the nature of media-structured reality. How media 
reality by what. it communicates as"news" is the final 
12 
section. ·By the · end of the ch~pter it should be clear how the commun:i-
, cation flow gets underway and/ how not only an. event, but .also a media-
:.feJjort of an event or any media-rhetoric stimulates communication. 
Government .Depends on ·Mass 
There aie several . ways in which government workers , depend on ma.ss 
;i;: ';: :,.-· 
media: · · forreceiving information; _for obtaining 
, government opinion-leaders, and for portraying· a favorable image to 
and: to other parts •' of government. Each .of th~;e three ways 
on mass media is related to Rosenau's goverI1ment-public 
·communication flow; the general statement that government depends On j 
, . 
\: mass media is assumed by his pre-theory. 
some dependence actually occur for the theory to work, 
':°:priate that this point.be developed · and substantiated. 
Government reliance on mass media for information has 
. ' 
evident sinc0 Abraham Lincoln's administration • . Often after 
an ' interview with a press_representative, he is said to have asked 
the reporter what the people were thinking; he told them that they 
were in a better position to know public thought than he. Today, 
governmental leaders are known to obtain information not only from 
reporters, but from their morning newspaper at home over coffee, from 
·the press wire services at work, and from the evening television news. 
·- As former Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles related to a · New York 
· Times reporter in response to the question, "Do you know anything we don't 
today?": "Of course not, where do you think we get our information?"l 
1 . ' . ' 
Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Forei 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963 
Th·e press and other mass media are generally conceded' to be 
major source of news that cannot be obtained first..;.hand. Thus, its 
function as . ari' intelligence medium varies with the indi viduaJ.!s access 
' ' 
' to alternative sources of knowledge. Yet ·even .for top decision-makers ' 
in ·government, the press provides much material that is not available ·. 
so quickly from any other source. Some senators and representatives 
follow news tickers closely and have staff members send them clippings 
::. throughout ·the ·day, because they ·· are availab-le -almost iri~;tantiy. · 
. -·,. ' 
' • . • • I 
·one iState Department ._ official. said ·. that his office's · sources . run about 
;_:· ... :;:_.:,.:-\.·_·:.:-:.,:'·:·.·.·:  · _ • .. _':· . . ' . ' ' ' ' . 
·.:-: twenty-four hours behind 'the press. He added .that after office hours 
. ·when he is away from the tickers, he relies on the radio news . over 
. _-•_ .• . . . . _- ' . . . .. 
:ne~spapers beca~se of its competitive time advantage. · :Another 
official Cohen interviewed stated, "Your vision of the world comes 
••.·•_·•·· 2 ·to you from the paper, it hits you at breakfast." 
. . For most officials, the mass media provides information about · 
: ' . . . . . .. . . 
·., world happenings in areas other th~n the .one with which th~ir work is -
' . . . . . .. 
primarily concerned. Although many official reports would he avail-
able -• to them on every national and world problem, ·_._they·--could 'nO'tTO"Y> 
. . . . . 
·: devote the time it would take ·to read them, ·-··in ' additiorlto the 
of official reports they must .be familiar with in thei:r 'specialty. 
, Cohen concluded his analysis by suggesting that the greater the 
' distance between a man and the staff level in the State 
·for .: example·, the greater is his dependence on the press 
larger view of the world. 
The press serves an especially important function to congress-
.men whose alternative sources of information are fewer than in the 
2Ibid., p .. 211. 
executive. • c.ommittee members regularly use news clippings to 
authenticate points or to provide material for questioning wit-
nesses in testimony. But particularly, newspapers serve the function '.i . 
_ of keeping them abreast of their state cons_ti tuents' problems · 
.and issues Local papers are read for state political news, other 
new developments, and. editorial comment . upon congress and national 
policy. _ As Cohen stlited, 
There is great incentive, consequently, for the policy makers 
to turn to the newspaper to make sure that they know what is · 
about to become important to .them because people elsewhere 
think it_is~mportant-after their newspaper .implicit~ytold 
them it was. -- . 
•,_,' ' ··:·.··:;.,' : ::.; :' .··: _ _. ,· \ : :::>· . :··: ,:, 
. - _,. , _. ·· . .. •.• 
Cohen .. found that most men in Washington read the >New York Times// :' 
' • .': _-.· ' ·' .• _-.·i_ 
but when pressed for why, it was usually because they knew that 
others read .. it for information on what was important. 
Appleton, inhis text . on foreign policy, · put it this way, 
interested public ordinc3.rily lopks to the media _to define 
problemsand to formulate alternative means of dealing with them. 
Presidential reliance upon the media for information is character-
ized by differences from other government workers' reliance. Richard < • · 
·• Neustadt 's book Presidential Power, explains · that while most govern"'.'":): · 
mental officials rely on the press forinformation about world events 
and for information on other governmental agencies, :the president 
ready access to _the same data from virtually any source before 
mediated by a journalist. Furthermore, 
One difficulty with the press as an adviser to a President 
that he has enough to crowd his calendar and mind without 
attending closely to debate on prospects which for him are 
3Toid., p • . 229. 
4sheldon Appleton, United States Foreign •Policy -(Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, · 1968) , p. 297. 
past. · ••• Not even readers of New York Times-not even its 
columnists-move in pre3isely the same time-dimension as . the · 
man who [is President.] 
What this . means for Rosenau's theory .is that when a president 
or top official reacts to mass media content, he is reacting to 
' . . ·' 
reports he interprets a~ -feedback directed towards him .or his 
policies. Unlike opinion-makers . from the public, he is seldom 
responding with awe to something new he has learned 
events; he is reacting to comments and journalistic 
events with which he is ,already familiar. 
The type of dependence upon media described 
to a president's 
other than close trusted advisers. President Eisenhower 
a general indifference to his coverage at, aMay 11, 1960, 
conference when he was asked how he felt about ·unfriendly 
and columns; he replied that he really could not be bothered with 
them. · He stated that he studied only the "important" sections._ of 
the Sunday papers that review world events. 
President Kennedy said that he read at least five newspapers 
thoroughly each day to keep him informed of the mood of the 
and what others were regarding as the most important issues. 
What Kennedy felt was an interest •in accuracy, 
felt was over-sensitivity to everything except laudatory comments. 
In addition to obtaining information from the mass :media, 
5Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: " The 
New American Library, 1964), p. 130. 
'. 6 James E. Pollard, "Eisenhower and the Press: The Fina_l 
Phase," Journalism Quarterly, XXXVIII (Spring, 1961), . 182. · 
government agencies and individual workers obtain an image of 
governmental activities with which they are not directlyassociated •. 
Occasionally a freshman senator has more "dialogue" with the president 
through•newspaper interviews than.he ever could have face-to-face. 
Furt?ermore, his image of the president, obtained in part from what 
he hears and sees in the mass media, determines his manner of communi-
cation, just as people adjust themselves to the other's personality 
when in direct contact. Most Americansand_most "lower".government 
.. officia_ls. felt like they "knew" Eisenhower or Kennedy or Johnson 
because television made the men a part of their total image of public 
affairs. Similarly, government workers_depend upon the media to 
communicate their own image. Some image will always be 
others just by virtue of-having air time; most people's concern 
is in seeing that their.own image is as accurate or favorable as 
possible Putting forth a favorable image with appropriate in-
formation is essential for the survi vaL of. government programs in 
democracy. Douglass Cater wrote that often publicity consciousness 
must guide the course of a program. He cited two clear examples in 
which the importance of publicity for the survival of the programs 
was so.great that news was purposefully generated by supporters. 7 
That type of action has been generated by a felt need for communi-
cating through the mass media which is significant to Rosenau's 
first step because it supports the assumption of dependence upon 
the mass media. 
The first example Cater mentioned is George C. Marshall's claim 
7nouglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), pp. 5-15. · · 
18 
that the publicity of favorable response by European .leaders to 
his speech at Harvard in June, 1947, _saved his program (the Marsha~l 
Plan to aid Europe's recovery from the ·war)~ Otherwise, he feared :· 
that negative reactions to his program from leaders with publi_ci ty. 
in theMiddleWest would .have saturated the press and : possibly ,: ;:··.,; 
brought the, Plan to defeat. Negative comments were ~argely drowned : 
·. out in the, press, an~ _the. program achi~ved -the governmental. supporti ,· 
it ti appeared" _to have-according to what did appear in the press •.. >/:. 
V • • ••;:; 
Whether ._ there _ actually was a ._. causal 
•. .· __ ._, --i ··:_ .. · "· , ... . ·-., .. · ·· -: 
appeared i,n the press created that result) is certainly . questionab~e; .· 
the point, however, is that it was perceived as such by the govern-- }< 
mental ·leader. When it is perceived as necessary' it shapes beha~~t.· 
> • ' . • • '. -: . -_ . ·• - -, ::~; • < _. : ·• ·::.- ·,_:.·, 
in that the man thinks media coverage is important, and so seeks ··· 
, I · ' 
to have favorable cover_age • . 
In thisfirst instance, coverage was perceived as 
influencing the Congress to approve a certain plan. -!l'l th_e following > 
second example, mass media coverage was believed. necessary for ,in-
ternal competition _withinthe .executive branch and for "winning 
'-,::,·.. ·. · - , ' '· . .· . :;:·:· _-.. ·: ' ' . . 
the public{· • An Army Colonel was court-martialed for leaks. to the . 
press onthe Jupiter missile. 
Army Missile Program, explained the .leak in this 
.··:·_:.·.,1; 
The Jupiter involves several million dollars of the taxpayer's / 0 · . 
money. •\ One hundred per cent security would mean no information 
for thepublic, no money for the Army, no Jupiter. • •• The 
Army §as got to play the same game as .the Air Force and th~ · 
Navy. · ·. . . _-. , 
'. ' ·. : 
Apparently i .t was felt -that by giving the :Jupiter .. program 
_ publicity in :connection with the Army, it would then give that 
'··.i:_\.·: ;-' , /.' :: ·. : ' ' ,' .·.: : 
(i.e., tllat it ArmY:-material) to readers. -' The 
ceived as essentiaLto the success of the program. 
. ::: ·--_:-:.,._. ···; . .-•·. ; .. _. i, . __ -_:- .:-·-: .' >' . ' . , .. -.·-,.--: 
' ' 
To sum :UP the development of . Rosenau' s first step, · it seems 
· c_lear that _ government does depend upon mass media and that 
' , ·. -: :--,- • . · __ ..... ·_ .• - :-' . -··· , _· _,•.·._. : __ : 
- report_s areo.read by . opinion':"makers in gc,vernment. One .can 
conclude that what is read has some kind of effect 
opinion-maker is 
f .... ,- , :·_ •-,_._ . , .·., 
will be in . X:E3Sp()nse to what he has adopted>from the mass 
· The next -section is media-message become~ :reality. 
For Ros~nau's theory,."realityfrom mass media" means ' thatan 
· opinion-maker reads_ an. account of some -jc,urnalist' s perception of 
,_ reality and adapts it to his framework of understandil'lg, so that 
: .what emerges is his perception of what the · journalist was -- attempting · 
·· to Communicate, or his perception of the journalist's : perception-of .:", 
Reality __ and rhetoric are closely related-what is -in man' 
thoughts is what is reality to him, and that is. both the source and 
·. ,the constraint · of communication • . The two are related_ to each other _-
, within the p'sychologica~ constructs of the indi viduaL ' On a subject,', 
such ·as Vietnam, an ·individualcan be _ stimulated -to communicate _ 
that which he sees as the reality of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. 
Or a man communicates with his · wife knowing he can trust her; for ; .. 
- him, that is reality. 
Whatever a man believes is true is the way he treats his , 
environment. Kelly's· theory of impression formation explains 
different people construe the same environment differently~9.\ The 
. . ,, 
theory holds that within each person's mind a .set of persoriality ' 
constructs has developed; the constructs are the dimensions through C' ' 
which he views the world andsorts out ~he multiple stimul:k 
communicated to him. His reality . is based on the communications; ,, . ,., 
,:'.;' ... :·_:. ,. ·>·•. '' ·.·_. _: ·,_: . ' -< >i :>: ··.-_. ,: ::::.: · - ::··:_··::'.:;·::\ ,--.:, -·- :;:- '· 
that reach his mind and · ori the interpretation he places _11pon those '.( 
stimuli. In · other words, a man's actions and thoughts 'are ·no-t? ! . 
. based upon a1?solute reality, but upon his impression of: life a~d:·: , 
society. It . is . upon the differing impressions of the world abouf 
us thatwe ·communicate. 
application of Kelly's concepts to Rosenau's theory. 
Walter .Lippma~ wrote that many peoplewithin _a · 
several subcultures or several cultures) -actually live 
world, . but think and feel in. different ones 
element between man and his environment~ 
10 · 
"pseudo-environment." : M~n responds to. 
that he himself has created. He _reads a 
Vietnam, and. responds to the way he cons:t,ruesthe article from 
· own unique . perspective . brought to . bear upon the 
thinks the article says about the real world is 
· ·.•· environment" between the man and his environment • . 
9 George'\. Kelly, .:.:;A;...T;:.;h:.;;.;e:;.;;o;.;;..u....;;.,;;;;....;;;...;.;;;...;;;;...;..;.;..__,-"---.;;.;;.;..;;....;;~..,;.;;.;~~"----
Personal Constructs (New York: 
10 ·.. . · · 
Walter Lippmann, _Pu_b_l_i_c ____ .(New .York:.,,. 
~965), PP• . l}-15~ 
' ' 
"r~c1lity" Lippmann calls pseuder-environment, Kenneth ' 
. . .. .. "l l Hi . . th t . image. s view .is a every .man carries 
in his mind an image : of· things. : (pe:rsons, places, etc. ) >with whi<!h ( 
: .he has been. in contact. -'. 'A person can have an image of .the building::·'(' 
_. ;. ' .:., .. - ·: ,··-,:.::·-\=~.-- :-. ·: , .. ;: ' ,' :.: -.--_:: ,·:·:-\ \ ·:: '·: 
.. he . is in, as . well as the . whole ~ity he_ is in, although at the moment 
::-:.·. :.-:,_"·,_·.· "' .··,:·: ··: . ,_, _- ,:>' .. ' : :. ·,,.·,·_.., ·.:-:::.•,·, .· .... ·_ -_, . :-, ::.,:·, . 
he can see only the four walls of a room. ,similarly, a man ;arries· 
images of his life and>h.is ~ociety, and for him they are his "reality·.~, 
. . -· - - . . . .. -
A person also carries images about people and places in pis 
.. ,,i,-:.-.' '° .. ;, .·i-;;.1 
_,:.'i: -i; 
- . . . -. 
society with whom he has not come in direct contact. For example, 
many . a non~Vietnam veteran has an image of . ~hat war; most Americans •· 
:: . . -h~ve an'. ·ima~e .· of President Nixon and Vi~e-P:re~ident Agnew, .·.: even' ·. '.u_{:< 
' ... . . ,· . .·.. . . .. .. ·-· • - _ .... ' . . 
<though theYhave not met .them. Students at Berkeley have a~ image 
:_ ·ot :,the mos\ recent student revolt on campus, even though they were 
\'./i a; removed from "the action." Boulding' s analysis is supported : ' 
by :Lippmann: , ffThe only feelf:ng that anyone can have about an . : _:) ?·•:· 
···event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental 
event." 
12 
;,:·· , .;_,_::q, ·.•.,,: .. · '" ,._.,· ... ·-_·_,_ ·: :' ... . .. .-:. 
Kelly,<Boulding .an~ -~ippmann hav~ been used ,to demons~rate ho~· 
act and ·interp:ret events canst.rued from the world about ,them .: 
basis of images or pseudo-environments. · Images . are formed · 
opinion-maker hears which influences his interpretation 
\ . ' .. : ; 
of an event • .. ' Similarly, his c~mmunication re~p()nSe 'is affected; 
-literally, :h.e is stimulated to communicate in a manner . consistent . • 
with his view of reality • . 
11Kenneth E. Boulding, The Image .(Ann: Arbor, Miqhigan:_ University ,· 
· ,of tfichigan, 1956), PP,• 3~18. . . .. ,, ' ,. ·· 
12L· . 9 ippmann, p •• 
According to Walter Lippmann, there is a 
that results from what is described in the 
further . effect on how a·• person ·• is stimulated to 
to Lippmann\and many writers since his 
men form images and opinions 
than we could ever count thus, men are forced 
generalize,picking out samples and treating them as 
way, _reality is frozen in.the minds of people. 
mention of·•·· an opinion-makers "adapting"• a message 
_the notion that he brings his stereotypes to bear upon 
terpretation. of the messa'ge. 
ways of categorizing data are projected upon information 
record raw, untouched data. He can observe his world 
his colored glasses Since the actual sensation 
conception occupy.· consciousness at the same time, 
person looked at red ·through• blue glasses 
explained stereotypes in this way: 
They are an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the 
world, to which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our 
comforts and our hopes have adjusted themselves. They may -
not be a complete picture of the world, but they are a pic--
ture of a possible world to which we are adapted In that 
world people and things have their well-known pl!§es, and 
certain expected things. We. feel at home there. > : 
Stereotypes allow the perceiver economy of effort inexplaining 
the world about him. But they are not. merely "short-cuts;1t. they 
are charged with feelings and emotions because they. are. projections · 
on the world of our sense of value; they are the means. for our.hiding 
13J.Qis!., p. 63. 
; , l : • '.:_:•/' 
'\/and .feeling security · in whatever position we· hold; they provide 
ic ()rJef t() ol!1'imprekkfons of reauty from the multiple stimuli ·in 
;:, 6tlf , envirolililent; . and they largely . determine the facts a person 
:· all()WS · himself' to see, and· in · ~hat .light he shall see · them.· 
}\'.;;)'; f t~t~ot~ing was. o~e .~f. Robt~ Lane's · obse.rvations t extensi vJ ·. 
>::i~terviews·with fifteen •· men. 14 \· Although his s~bjects were >"common 
{men'' rather th~n "opinion-makers"' as referred to in Rosenau 's ' 
::(.theory, . the -'."r~sults' show human traits • char~cteristic ... of ahy 
\'.~pinion.;.maker. · Lane · found two operating principles in >stereotyping: 
,' ,,'; . :;. :'•.·. .·.: .. ··. ,"·' . ·•.:,'. •.- : .. .. • ... • .'! 
Ii,:(1)' .... lack o:r a.l:tferentiationusually•· made ·· t~e •·.·man' s stereotypes ·  much 
:blU!lte:r than : reality and(2) constructs are 'shaped to fit prejudgni~nts 
.: 1• - . ·._.·,;:,, ·. . ,. , ,, ·,. ' .. '. 
;:, ~o that the interpretation of any messageis ·a biased perception. 
, ,,.·.' 
;/.! 
?.tane found that the men held blunt Stereotypes ( "blunted dif-
·.·.:.:. ' : .. :.•" ' . · ' 
,;: £erentiation") because they operated on the basis of insufficient 
;_:inforrnatio~, with _an emotional block · in some areas and with a sense 
'~(of remoteness :from political events in others • . Regardless of 
( what the issue is, some · opinion-makers will bring those . :feelings 
·, . .' ·, ·:·, ,', :· '· : ... ·, ' ' ·~·-: ' . ..- :_., '; 
(described .above) to bear; ahd they will always employ their pre-
dispositions '· while reading and adapting communications about an 
The information presented so far in this section has Shown how 
men do carry an ·image of their world·which is their "reality." In 
. words more parallel to Rosenau' s, news and interpretation of an event . 
: are carried· by, say, a newspaper which is read and adapted by an opinion-
1½obert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The MacMillan 
Company, 1962), pp. 359-63. 
whose view of the world: ha$ b;~ii •affecte~i by corrirrriir'lications in · · 
the mass 
'. 
next question is how mass media 
' '-: j_;~ge _._ of the .world. 
' . C. Wright · Mills developed 
': i . : .,· . , . . - -~ 
·;,.{ah approach to the question of 
.. image of the world. 
:·:· •• .-.:-.·:::_.·:::.:::··, 
;·,:i:t-, ,,, 
· He developed a characterization mass media 
·><he . inteil~ied tcf refer to all .· persons in society except 
:: :· /:elite" (deci~{~n-makers . in large corporat:i6ns or th0 m:i.i'itary, 
~-- · ..-.'<\';,·\ .. ; . ' . '. . . '' . ''' . 
. :~th excessiini wealth). First, Mills said tha.t the 
:.'/of mass media is found in the ratio of receivers of opinion to ~ver_s 
. - . . 
'. or ~pinion; mass . society' . which would incl.uci~ Ro'senall':, s 'opinion-
• . . '· . _',: . ' .. . ··, ,• . 
makers, , he said is a mere media market, including far more who re-
ceive opinions than who givethem. His second point was .thatpublic 
communications are so organized that there is ' little chance for the 
· :'public to answer back immediately or effectively. Even ,if 
be given, he said it' is doubtful that the opinionwould be effective 
,. 
' · in shaping any decisions of powerful · consequence. Lastly, he said 
· • ·that there is a structural problem which allows "elitist" control 
1·,· 
,·over publiC 'c.hannels of communication. 
15 · C. ·. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford ,University . 
Press, 1956), p. 311. 
All of these points are consistent with Hosenau's theory, 
.the p()ssible exception of the . first. If Mills' idea would be carried 
to extreme, one could say that structuraL problems of society would 
make it so .that even though a person received a message .from mass 
media, h~ .. could not respond. However, I believe Mills is accurately ; >· 
·. interpreted ?Y adding \''effectivelyn • • • when a person receives a_· 
message, he can respond .to his friends . and fellow opinion-makers·, 1) 
;~ ·-> ,' 
but h8.will _ not necessarily _have effect upon decision~makers. 
theless, as long as political structure allows some response, 
communication flow has begun; from chapter one, we re~all that the 
flow of influence is dif1E}rent from the communication flow, and that 
· the four-step theory concerns only the latter. Thus, there 
; . ' 
flict .between Mills' theory and Rosenau's four-step flow. 
Mills carried his argument another step further in showing 
mass media affects one's view of reality. 
facilitate a psychological illiteracy: "We do now have reason to · 
believe tha~ these media have helped less to enlarge and animate . 
· · the discussions of primary publics than to 
of media markets in mass-like society. 1116 There are certain 
types of loyalty, experiences of meaning, 
that are _ so engrained in mass media news treatment and network 
pleasure-programs that people slowly beginto. accept those things 
their own • . _Daily repetit.ion of media-content becomes a form .of media ·' 
control, according to this theory. · 
16Ib.d --2:,_•, P• 311. 
This whole aspect of how media affects one's view of 
brings to mind. the stories of Californians who stay home to 
the Rose Bowl on television because they can "see it better". 
Or the witnes9 to an accident who rushes home from work to 
the news on·. television so . he can . see 
the Chicagoan who watched·. Democratic National Convention 
coverage because he did not want to see the riots 
the employee in the Governor's outer office. who listens 
six o'clock news to hear the 
Governor's inner office. 
For Rosenau's theory, 
only source of information for the opinion-maker. 
obvious restrictionstothat statement. 
of a labor union is less likely to receive his opinions on 
activities from the media than a car salesman not associated 
unions. But the union man will probably . rely . more on the lU\.;\.A,..L.U. 
for information.on a new model car than the car salesman who 
literature. from the manufacturer. In other words, a person with 
close, authoritative information sourceusually relies less on 
the mass media for information on that particular topic. 
Media - Produced Rhetoric As An 
Exigence for Further Rhetoric 
If the mass media creates reality for its public, and if that 
reality is a kind of image or. stereotype, then what type of event is 
reported by mass media? In other words, what makes news? One. might 
27 
begin to answer by thinking of everything that makes an event news-
worthy-timeliness, novelty,.humor, conflict, human interest, etc. 17 
Lloyd Bitzer cautions that the critic must be aware of what is a 
"reallf event reported in the media: "Real situations are 
distinguished·from sophistic ones in which, for example, 
18 exigence is asserted to be real." In terms of. Rosenau I s 
events need.to be distinguished from others for critical 
show how media structures and creates an individual' 
reality. An opinion-maker, or recipient of any media message, 
should be able to distinguish the events in his environment that are 
real from those that were-created to seem real. 
Boorstin's book The Image is a critical approach to distinguishing 
real events from those "contrived ones". that he .labels. "pseudo-
events." He defines a pseudo-event by listing its four characteristics: 
(1) It is not spontaneous, but comes about because someone 
has planned, planted, or incited it. Typically, it is not.a 
train wreck or an earthquake, but an interview. 
(2) It is planted primarily (not always exclusively} for the 
immediate.purpose of.being reported or reproduced. Therefore, 
its.occurrence is arranged for the convenience of the report-
ing or reproducing media. Its success is measured by how 
widely it is reported. Time relations in it are commonly 
fictitious or factitious; the announcement is given out in 
advance "for future release" and written as if the event had 
occurred in the past. The question, "Is it real?" is less 
important than "Is .it,newsworthy?" 
(3) Its relation to the underlying reality of the situation 
is ambiguous. Its interest arises largely from this very 
17Robert O'Hara answers the question "what makeS news" in Media ' 
for the Millions Timeliness, proximity, prominent names, probaw::e-
consequences of an event, special tests such as reader curiosity, 
sex, novelty, humor, human interest, and conflict. (New York: Random 
House, 1961), pp. 205-18. 
18110yd F. Bitzer, "The.Rhetorical Situation", Philosophy and 
Rhetoric, J (January, 1968), 11. 
ambiguity. Concerning a pseudo-event the question "What does 
it mean?" has a new dimension. While the news interest 
train wreck is in happened and in the real ...,..,_ .... ,_,...,,_,n.._,..., ..... ..., .... ,IJ 
the interest in an interview is always, in a sense, in 
whether it really happened and in what might have been the 
motives. Did the statement really mean what 
out some of the ambiguity a pseudo-event 
interesting. · · 
(4) Usually it is intended to be a self-fulfilling Y"\1"/"'IT"\l"lOn-cr 
The hotel's thirtieth-anniversary celebration, by saying 
the .. e~ is a distinguished institution., actually makes it 
one •. ·• ....... · .. . .. .· 
:> ::·::,: :: ·-· : . .·_:::/:_:_: . <' ': :-· ·i ::: ',:.:i•: :--,::. ,·:.:_:i<: ::_· _,_·:/.·',:_:;. '_-- : . , 
In.order to, understand why pseudo-events are common today, one. 
should trace historical attitudes toward news. The attitudes refle~t: 
on the content of media. The first American newspaper (Boston-J..690} ':'' 
promised monthly service, unless something 0newsworthyn happened in/!>, 
i''· .. ::-_i_ 
the meantime. News reports were limited to covering spontaneous events. 
Gradually the philosophy changed so. that people did not . seem to ex- · · 
pect a·· 1imi.ted number of ''news events." People began to .. · expect· a 
multi-page.document, filled with interestingly-written news, twice< 
daily. In Boorstin's words, ."We need not be theologians to see 
that we h~ve shifted responsibility for making the world interesting 
from God to the newspaperman. n 20 With the advent of electronic .,.: 
.media, we began to expect hourly news reports and special,news bulletins 
when necessary throughout the hour. 
Coping with an overwhelming demand for news, .reporters ... left a>:. 
gap if.they covered only real. events. Spurred on bycompetiti,on from: 
other media, and responding to.what.they perceived publi,c •.·· ··• 
'· ·: ,·, 
19namel J. Boorstin, The Image (New York .Harper & Row, 1964), 
pp. 11-12. 
20Ib.d 
--1;_·' P• 8. 
1_1, , l 
demand, twentieth century reporters.began covering "synthetic · 
21 \,., 
happenings to make up for the lack of spontaneous eyents." :-
In congruence with t,his, histo~ical trend, this i sectiori . fro~ his ·.: ·· 
book ingicates: how pseudo-ev;ent~ haye come to over-power E>porit,~eous :_ 
events inthe, reportingofnews • 
. (1) Pseudo-events are . more dramatic. A television '""'-''.J'-'-'-''"' 
between candidates can. be planned to be more suspenseful 
(for example, by .. reserving questions which are then ,..,.,.,., ......... ,,~r-1 
suddenly) than a casual encounter or vvJ,,....,,.,...,\.LV_,_ 
speeches planned. by .each separately. 
,. ;· ' . . ' . ' . ' ' 
(2) Pseudo-events, being planned for dissemination, 
to disseminate and to make vivid. Participants are 
for their newswor-thy and dramatic interest. 
(3) Pseudo-events can be repeated at will, 
imp:ression can be re-enforced. 
(4) Pseudo-events cost money to create; hence somebody has 
an. interest in disseminating, magnifying, advertising, and 
extolling them as events worth watching or worth believing. 
They are therefore advertised in advance, and rerun in 
.to get .money's worth~ : 
(5) Pseudo-events, being planned for intelligibility, 
intelligible and hence more reassuring. Even if we cannot 
discuss intelligently the qualifications of the.candidates 
or the complicated issues, we can at least judge the 
ness of.' a . television performance. How comforting to 
.Politicc:L:l. matter we can g~cisp! 
(6) Pseudo-events are more sociable, more conversable, 
convenient to witness. Their occurrence is planned for 
convenience. The Sunday newspaper appears when we have 
mOrning for it. Television programs appear when we are 
ready with our glass of beer. In the office the next morning 
Jack Pa,ar's (or any other star performer's) regll.l.ar ·late-
night show at the usual hour will overshadow·in conversation 
a casual event that suddenly came up and had to find its way 
into the news. 
(7) Knowledge of pseudo-events-of what has been reported, 
what has been staged, and how-becomes the test. of being ; 
''informed." . News magazines provide us regularly with 
21Ib. "d. 9 
.. --1:_•' P• • 
questions concerning not what has happened but concerning 
"names in the news"-what has been reported in.the news 
magazines •.•.•• 
(8) Finally, pseudo-events spawn other pseudo-events in geometrtc 
progression. They dominate our consci~~snesssimply .because 
there are more of them, and ever more. · ··· · · · · · · · · · · · · 
It be concluded.that the answer to.the question:ttwhatis 
j! 
news?" is as varied as all the stimuli reachingnews disseminator13. 
Events and pseudo-events of every variety stimulate communication. , 
in our free society, thus creating reality for the receivers.of .the 
communication. 
At this point it is necessary to introduce Lloyd Bitzer's 
concept of exigence; after a brief explanation, part 
idea above will take on more meaning in relation to 
flow.theory. 
According to Bitzer's theory, the exigence is the most importari~ 
part of a rhetorical situation because it stimulates comments upon 
something that is "an.imperfection marked by urgency."23 A 
rhetorical exigence is something which has the two qualities of (1) 
being something other than it should be and(2) being something 
.:;/.'· ',;: ·,, ,:'-/--::_:'..:: ... , 
which can.be modified. Bitzer's criteria should be easily met by, 
much public discourse today. He gives the example of death as not 
meeting. his criteria; however, .after the assassination of Presiden~ ·. · 
Kennedy for example, the news reports, eulogies, and assurances to 
22Ib_d:. 
---=-·' PP• 39-40. 23 · Bitzer, p. 7. The author defines two other factors of a rhetorical 
situation: the audience and the constraints. The audience must be 
, capable of mediating the · change produced by the discourse; ''constraints" 
refers to attitudes, etc. which hold back action that would modify. 
exigence. 
were exigences. Although the death itself 
been changed,> the kind of circumstances that 
· the feeling~ . of people;about the death, etc. 
events is th~t :not only are .events .and reports of.spontaneous . 
· •. ~vents exigences for further rhetoric, but also pseudo---events 
stimulate rhetoric~ , In effect, . pseudo-. 
events . become "events" in themselves when they are treated as such. · 
reference. to the first step of the four-step flow theory, the 
stimulates communication may 
·.· Two examples . will be · given 
. . , in5upportof this idea-one having to do with Agnew's • rhetoric 
, .. and the other having to do .with violence at .the Chicago Democratic 
Convention--both showing how rhetoric . from an exigence stimulates 
rhetoric, which in turn acts as an exigence that · stimulates 
communication, etc. 
In a sense, Agnew's speech criticizing the mass media (for 
,. its instant·' analysis of Nixon's speeches, its elitist ownership, 
its biased coverage) became important b.ecause of the .coverage it. 
' ,received in the mass media! In accordance with Boorstin' s theory 
• of. one pseudo-event spawning another, Agnew's speech ~ook on 
· greater importance as more and more people's reactions t? ;it 
broadcast by the media. For instance, the November 24 Newsweek 
. devoted most of its coverage of Agnew's speech to reactions by other i • 
prominent persons in the media and in government; a part of its 
space was spent in editorial reply to Agnew. The three major 
television networks used their time in similar fashion-making 
the effects of the speech even bigger by their reactions and 
editorial defense of their own position. Agnew's pseudo-event was 
repeated; his initial speech, delivered at the .regional meeting ·. 
of the Midwest Republican Committee in Des Moines (November 20, 
1969), was followed one week later. by a speech in Montgomery to the . 
Alabama Chamber of Commerce in which he extended his·. earlier 
criticism to the press, mentioning specifically the New York Times 
and the Washington Post. Once again he received the headlines 
At the local level, Kansas University Chancellor Chalmers .. contributed 
to the effect in a talk.to the Kansas Association of.Radio Broad'"'.". 
casters-· . -the only major field which Agnew had not covered. 24 
Even this author was asked to speak on Agnew and "contribute a · 
little more rhetoric.tr The point is that one event or.pseudo-
event covered by the media can have great repercussions by stim- ... 
ulating further communication. This fact gives special meaning 
the type of "news and interpretations" · that the. newspapers carry 
the opinion-makers read and adapt in the first/step of the four-
.step flow. In fact, the person whose reactions to the initial 
event . are picked up by.the media can. later react to media-coverage, 
of his own·. statement. When the media then report those reactions, . 
the snow-balling effect is on its way. 
The second example of rhetoric from an exigence stimulating 
24For the content of his speech, see "Chalmers Issues Radio 
'Criticism',tt Lawrence Daily Journal World, November21 1969, 
>further rhetoric is probably more urgent because its consequences 
are potentially more powerful. The concern .is basically whether 
the ~edia s! r,vt3; as a c;talyst for the staging of yiolent '11 spec- ? 
. ' ' , · .. · ·, ... ·, , , -
taculars. '.' · The official report to the National Commission on · · 
the Causes and Prevention of Violence addressed itself to . the 
• questi::;"'~iJ~~ch~~ws was staged and manufacturedby~~monstrators 
andnewsmen\ in .. the 1968 , Chicago Democratic Convention/ :. It is 
. .-·,,·, 
that there . was much violence directed to the news .correspondents. 
Out of thre~. hundred whq wer13 assigned to cover parks and streets 
·-- .:,, ,,,: ·_·· :' • .. _; 
the :cit;,' ~ore < than twenty percent were injured, had ~quipment 
damaged, or ;were involved in incidents leading to their arrest 
Sixty-three were attacked by police; photographic or recording 
equipment wa$iintentionally damaged in thirteen . of those .. . instances .• 25;\ · 
There is some explanation forthe media-directed violence. 
Camera crews on at least two occasions did stage violence 
and fake :injuries. ·. Deomonstrators did sometim2~ step up their activities for the benfit of TV cameras. ··· · .. · · 
When violence is staged, it can be called a pseudo-event, just ·.: · 
: . ..:/:-·.··_:_:_::·_/ ;:- ' :·: _ _.:-: t · ·:..,-:·_ : _-: ,., 
as the staging of .· a fifth . anniversary celebration for .the · local , ': 
, .. , _ .··· . -. . _._-. __ · 
Any _happening, when stru~tured for the purpose of, recei~rig 1 
publicity, is a pseudo-event. In these instances, it .appears 
<-·;\ ... ·_, :_ ' . . ' ' .... .: : ' ' ' ;. :: . i' ~-- ''i· '· ' .: '' ' ,; 
that the communication stimulus could be the desire for .publicity. 
·. The writings of some contemporary activists demonstrate . this 
. ·- - . . . . . 
:. more than what. the commission re;orts have been able to prove .· 
25Daniel Walker, Rights in Conflict, Report · to the National: 
Commission on the Causes and Prevention o_f Violence, .November 18, 
. 1968 (New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1968), p. _xvi and 
· pp. 255-96. • . 
26Ib~d., P• xxv. 
this date. For example, Abbie Hoffman (ironically writing under · 
the pseudonym, °Free") almost brags about times when his behavior 
was prompted by . the . presence of cameras · .. and microphones, . and he .. 
was able to ~'Make News .n 
· The media is the message. Use it! No fundraising, no full- . · 
page ads inthe New York Times, no press releases. Just do : 
your thing; the press eats it up. MAKE NEWS. 
:,,'. '·:,_. :·:,:··. :..:. Quote: · 'Pot feels good, it's fun to turn on.' 
They print it, not aware of the disruption they cause. The -:' 
press spreads the word, tells them where the action is ·and .· \; :· 
·. they leave America. They stream to its two shores, can't 
go ~f further, up against the ocean, what to do, dowr1 an,d : _::: <: 
out • . - · .. . -:_ . ·c ".•. · . .-. · 
Hoffman; recounts times when he has MADENEWS by doing ov,uv,1.1..1...1..J.J.F,, 
for . the press which he .. would not necessarily have done otherwise· 
The presence of mass media representatives 
stimulus for communication, or an exigence 
an }'event". which is the substance of press content; 
is performed!£!: the press, it is a pseudo-event. · 
These . ideas are important because ._ they raise 
question.of whether rhetoric 
•should be cutoff when there are threats 
:_ violence. Or, : is it undemocratic to cut 
_cation flow _ just upon threats of violence, with the effect 
hindering rhetorical exchange. Regardless . of what is done, 
· situation with threats of violence, . the fact remains that the 
I 
presence of media acts as an exigence to stimulate further •.communi- ·./ 
cation, whether it be limited to rhetoric about the threats or 
w~ether it be _the rhetoric of disruption. 
27Free [Abbie Hoffman], Revolution for the Hell ·of It _ (New •::York:· •: · 
The Dial Press, Inc., 1968), P• . 37. 
CHAPTER 3 
Gov.ernment Response 
' . . . . ' . . ' 
news and interpretation of an event are first 
carried by, say, a newspaper; this is then read and 
adapted by opinion-makers, who assert their opinions 
in speeches on the sub.ject · • • · • " 
The first step of Rosenau's theory showed how mass.media 
structures people's reality and·. then stimulates rhetoric. As 
anopi:nion-leader in the public.or government responds 
or an event reported in the mass media, a communication flow 
.begun. This second step of Rosenau's theory picks up .on the 
given by government. 
If one would take Rosenau' s words literally, th.ere would. be 
a very limited government response. Namely, the .opinion-makers would. 
"asserttheir opinions in speeches on .the subject," as Rosenau is 
quoted· above·. in his pre-theory statement. Certainly · the giving of 
speeches is one possible response,.but it is.not the.only.possible 
response • . In addition to giving speeches that will be heard directly: 
by some and .~eard about by many thr.ough the mass med;a, government 
workers can hold news conferences, prepare handouts and maintain 
informal relations with the press which can stimulate media coverage. 
They can give out "factual" news, such as data on the Appello flight, , 
or they can ·leak information or send up a trial balloon for motive~ 
beyond provision of news. When government responds to a.communi-
cation stimulus by providing copy (or being the s11bject of .copy) · 
by any of the means just mentioned, it communicates an image or' itself 
which must also. be considered in the theory as by-product of the\:· 
response •. · 
35 
Government 
Theoretically, there .is a government-media conflictwhich 
affects the . relationship of the two · .Inherently, the::seis 
· which government would often prefer to withhold that the press 
,,_.i ,--··=:.. 1· . ' • -_ ·-_--_:· ·_ . _ . • • .. __ . : -:·-'·_. ,:•_:.·: ! ' . ':·. . . . :. ·--.<. . ·<; 
prefer to publicize. . Washington, ·.· D • . C. workers are • often 
about certain f'nosey" reporters who •. would get their lead 
almost any . means, even if they had :tosµrvey wastebasket~ 
working hours! . Especially when the press corps cpnsiders 
extension of the public and the ref ore strives to keep 
"honest" by exposing itEi activities, . the ·conflictbetween the 
bodies is. significant 
In general, however, the Washington press corps dealing with.:. t9p \/: 
officials isa relatively small group of devoted persons who 
-·:: _- - -__ :, , .··: ', .. .. .. :.->;._:·_··.. ·:, .-__ ,·_ ·. .. . _- .: ,·. -· ; ' ' . ,.: .·._: ._ : _ ; ,' :;: ·:··_:··.·:.-.._,..::: .. '.ii_: 
· .function wi~~. a deep understanding of the need for lizni,tation? 
' . __ -.·.·; •:::·:• -·_,•- ·:. i ' 
• upon exposure. For example, . Bernard Cohen made the following · 
. statement in l'.'~gard to one . segment of the Washington press corps.: 
Despite his professional interest in storming the walls of 
secrecy that surround the operations ' of government, virtually · 
every foreign affairs reporter acknowledges at least in an · · 
abstract .way the need · for secrecy in the conducti. of inter-
national diplomacy and of national security mattel'.'s. ·He is , 
likely, to point out that there are . some important / judgments. 
to . be made .by the reporter about the relative priorities of ... 
secrecy as against the public's "need to know;" yet the ,,: 
Executive's right to conduct some of its operations in .> 
private, and to let ·the press and thus the rest of the 
~olit~ca~ system ~n"afte: th1 event,0 ,is freely granted, .. both in principle and in practice.. . . .. 
Against · this . background of secrecy-exposure conflict, government O. 
p~ovidesthe mass media with information. It is in the government's ' 
· , interest to do so, because then there is more control over what· 
1BernardC. Cohen, The Press and Forei~ Policy (Princeton, ,. 
New Jersey: : Princeton University Press, 19 3), p. 22. , · , ·  
information.is given out when. This is a mutually.satisfactory 
relationship, because in an era when. the media must turn out two 
or more.· daily papers and. hourly news broadcasts, the.· reporter 
be hard. pressed to come up With enough copy he had sought out 
by attending and reporting events. 
government information officers employed· 
every level, the scope of subjects for•government·cornmunication· 
is vast---proposals and plans and findings are written up for the , 
press on subjects as "remote" as peanut oil.uses or toy safety, 
subjects as pressing as. drugs or youth. crime. Assuming .that these 
governrnentcommunications are in response to some rhetorical 
exigence, the question is how government goes about disseminating 
such an enormous quantity of information. 
As Rosenau mentions in his. brief pre-theory statement, 
way in. which government opinion"'.'"makers respond to an exigence 
giving speeches. Every department has persons employed whose job 
it is to give speeches to the public and to help priyate organizations 
\ ... ,. 
plan programs, conventions, etc. in behalf of some cause in the 
government's interest. Departments have persons who give speeches 
l'in the field", trying to solicit feedback to report back to their 
governmental department. Often such speeches are given to selected 
members of the academic and business communities, from whom.they 
desire personal feedback. 
Often.speech-giving has an intended audience beyond the hearers 
of the message. Advance copies of the speech are given to the press, 
or a reporter is expected to cover a speech so that its actual 
audience. inc.ludes everyone . who hears or reads about the speech ~n: th:~ 
mass media. Thus, speech giving is one. means for government .t9 · 
respond directly to a particular audience, yet without sacrificing . 
:national coverage when desired. 
Franklin Roosevelt was the first president to use .. the 
extensively and .effectively for giving speeches 
to almost every American. He used the new medium in a .way 
.· brought his personality into people's iliving rooms 
chats, broadcast worldwide, brought an audience more vast 
previous political •. speaker's. Although they averaged only two 
year (to avoid over-exposure), they were timed for delivery 
' the banking crisis, the outbreak of thewar, and Pearl Harbo.r. · 
' . ·, ' 
:Perhaps as important as the content of the chats was their, _________ _ 
building aspect. The President's calmness, frankness, 
and frequent use of 0 we" invoked the end result he sought. 
·_. chats were largely designed. to report, review and 
the public. ·· Several were built around the thesis 
you not better off than you were in 1932? 
employed _on ·occasion to encourage certain legislation, his_use 
· any technique to arouse support for some specific 
subtle, and usually just a passing reference. 
Roosevelt's letter to the President .of 
casting Company in 1933 highligh~s his interest ., 
.· radio for reaching his public as directly as possible: 
' •' ' . .!, . ' 
I need not tell you that in my opinion radio now is one of the 
most effective mediums for .the dissemination of information. 
It cannot misrepresent or misquote. It is far reaching and 
simultaneous in .releasing messages given it for transmission 
to the Nation or for international consumption} 
Opinion-makers since World War • II also have had available the · ' 
. meqium of television for reaching the public directly,. ,:, A president ' 
is us1.1ally,. .given time upon requ.est to, spe.ak to . the nation directly, ·}{::· > 
. . : ·· .. , ' : :.:,:: ·.; ,· : ·· . . :'.·-.. :\_ ': .·-.. ; 
.. while lower: government workers will usually have segments of speeches 
, - ,:'·, .:·::, __ · "•': -: ·: ·, .' :-' :.' > '. i , . . :' ': 
broadcast to . the . nation as news clips. By its very nature,' the mediurr,t :
1 
gives . an opinion-maker his most concentrated contact with .. the pu.bli~.• ' -:_·_-\ '-··.·.:-·:-·. · . . ·· ··.:< ·.. ; 
. For speciali'z.ed segments of ,the public, ~irect speeches can · best bJ~/}, ,. 
utilized, and for personal inquiry on. individual questions, face-· 
to-face conversation or personal letter. is the most directmeansof 
· communication. 3 
means of government dissemination of news is · 
the press or ne.ws conference City, state4 and federal officials 
will call a news conference when they have something to announce; by / · 
reading a prepared statement or by talking informally with .the · ·.·.•: ;:;:if/ 
media repr.esentati ves, they can communicate ,indirectly to the public'i ; 
(assuming · tllat their copy is used in . the media .or over the national , : 
press wires). If an announcement is intended for a specialized or 
regional audience, officials can limit the list of reporters . who i. ·</:.· 
are invited to the news conference. 
· . ··•· ~er E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion• • 
. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 255. 
. . . ' ·.' ._· . _· ·.· : ,· ·_" 
3For a case study of Roosevelt's replies to individual~ ~y mail, . 
see Leila Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," Public Opinion 
Quarterly,xx (Spring, 1956), 5-16. 
4A 1968 study of state . governors found that · fourteen governors . at ·. · 
that time had news conferences more than once per week, while eighteen . 
. called a conference at least once per week. Only three "hardly evertt 
held conferences with the press. Thomas F. Baldwin and Lowell Newton, 
"State Governors and Broadcast News," Journal of Broadcasting, .XXIL · 
(Spring, 1968), 147-153. ' , .. 
40:·· 
Although. officials at many top levels of government·· can. call 
a news conference, the presidential conferences which have, become · 
"institutionalized" are the most.· top-level access reporters hav~ .• ~o 
national policy-making information. The conferences are institutional-· 
ized in that they are.expected; still, .the. president calls news:•·. 
conference only when he.wishes. By maintaining this control, the 
executive can time press .. exposure. At a press conference,; ~he i. 
president can give information on public affairs; he can bring a 
'... •. : ' .- ' 'j' -.,,- '<i 
certain issue to national attention; he can set amoodinregard' 
to an issue by the degree of gravity he attaches or the sense. of 
urgency with.which he explains his action. 
Although the possibilities for dissemination 
the general'format for doing so remains constant, different' 
administrat~ons have very different relationships with the 
depending upon .the individuals' personalities, the ~resident's 
concern for publicity, his understanding of mass media, . etc. 
brief history of presidential news. conf.erences shows : some.• of 
differences,and therefore shows for Rosenau's theory some of 
variables · operating as the top . government. opinion-maker·. asserts 
his opinion. 
Roosevelt was the first president of the modern-media 
empathize vrl.th,· and respond to, the need of newsmen for copy. 
Reporters were summoned to his office at least twice weekly. 
he .took the Washington correspondents into his confidence to 
them informed even when he felt the public should not be informed. 
When necessary, his "off-the-record" replies were explanationsir/ 
depth of why he could~ discuss a particular subject. His 
philosophy ,was that when .reporters under.stood public. problems' 
as he did,they would report the news from an accurate perspective, 
withholding information they knew.should.be.withheld. Roosevelt 
assumed the role of teacher with the presson all significant matters; 
including fiscal and foreign policy, just as. he did over.the radio 
with the public. With the assumption that he ~ould trust certain 
newsmen, he categorized comments to them so that they would know 
specifically what was expected of them in their news reports to the 
public. On some statements, Roosevelt would tell the reporters 
that a direct quotation would be permissible, while on .. others, 
• indirect quotation with attribution to his name would be satisfactory; · 
some·comments he restricted to background information whichthe 
reporters had to write under their own authority, and others were 
labeled entirely off the record and could not be used at all. 5 
In general, newsmen said that they felt indebted to Roosevelt 
for his understanding of the media and the demands upon them for news.:· 
He personally provided news and allowed considerable direct contact 
with the press through informal conferences. 
In contrast to Roosevelt's explicit instruction for which 
comments could be used in which way, Truman was not specific,.• and . 
then later he would blame reporters for misrepresentation of his 
conference statements. For example, at a November, 1951, news 
conference Truman responded to a question by stating that use of 
5nouglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), pp. 34-35. 
the atom bomb was "always under consideration.I' Headlines 
reporting the conference dropped the word 11 always.n The effect 
was overwhelming •. Prime _Minister Attlee flew to Washington t() 
. :,~consult the President; it is said that the de,ath of the 
press secretary, Charles Ross, was indirectly_ speeded up.6 .. 
While Trwnan blamed the media for . mishandling his statement, . 
porte:r5 claimed that.· Trwnan had time, as always, to .~ake 
• clear at .. the time he uttered any comment. The fault · 
\ ' . . - ··. :··. ' . : ·· .· ) 
in his inability to. foresee the impact of his words when 
reported by the mass media. 
Science Monitor put it that Truman was ''not 
general implication of the specific.'' 7 
Some writers have said that Truman felt persecuted by the press 
: ·, ·, . ' '. ... ·.· ... ·;· ____ ,, 
because after. years .• of adulation, critic ism was being 'directed ·~-£' .. ,/ .' 
him. For example, in a January, 1961, news conference, Truman· ,.•.,. 
·"i ···. •.· :-.-: 
asserted that not a single U.S. newspaper had printed his importanf ;i;., 
statement that he was ready · .. to > consult with congressional committees 
sent troops to Europe. . A check-up showed that thi~ ',' :; : i', :?> · 
particular criticism was not justified; all _of the press associat:io~.s . 
. ,·,. i ., _ _:<_•i ' 
·. and leading newspapers had ca~ried his statement. 8 
During a news conference near. the end . of his adnlinistra~i?i:1, .. 
Truman attacked the press for · being contro~leq_ by big business. 
',. ·. -.'._' /: 
6 ' llist:, pp. -37-:-39. 
?Ibid., p. 36. 
8James E. Pollard, The Presidents and the Press (Wash~ngton, 
D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964), PP• J7-38. : 
"Look at the advertising pages, if you don't believe it. 
always .been against President Roosevelt. It has always 
against me,, and if it was for me, I'd know I was wrong. u9 
a later conference, he warned reporters that he did not-like 
have_words put into his mouth and that he did not like to be mis-
interpreted. He claimed he did not ''give a hoot'' about newspaper 
comments onhim as long as the truth was printed. He warned of 
43 
danger ina_"one-party press in a two-party countrytt-obviously pe:r--
: 10 cei ving himself as a member or leader of the excluded party. _->.• 
Despite his personal feelings toward the press and news re-
presentatives, Truman continued holding news conference_s frequently,/, 
whenever he. felt circumstances.justified them, and submitted him-
self to freely asked questions. His belief in the public's right 
to know was apparent, especiallyduring the cold war when Korea 
and the United Nations were important issues. In his final news 
conference (January 15, 1953), Truman commented upon the importance,,' 
of communication between the president and the citizens 
This kind of news conference where reporters can ask any question····-
they can dream up--directly of the President of the United 
States-·-illustrates how strong and how vital our democracy is. 
There is no other country in the world where the.chief of 
state submits to such unlimited question; I know, too, from 
experience that it is not easy to stand up here•and try·to 
answer "off-the-cuff" on all kinds of questions without any 
advance notice. Perhaps succeeding Presidents will.be aple to 
9 ' lli2.•, P• 54. 
10This claim was made specific.in the 1952 campaigns for 
Stevenson. He said that only 10.3 percent of the 1, ?P9' daily 
newspapers supported the Democratic party (1948 figures), and cautioned 
Americans to compensate for the imbalanced presentation of news. New 
York Herald Tribune, Septe~ber 12, 1952, as cited by Pollard, p. 5r;;-
figure out improvements and safeguards in the procedure. 
I hope they will never cut out the direct line of1 communication between themselves and the people. 
Truman's remarks establish at least two important :concepts 
for Rosenau'stheory. First, the news conference is not only a 
means by which government can give out pre-planned information, 
it is also a part of the structure 
questioned; in other words, the press conference offers 
opportunity for two-way communication. The second concept 
draw from Truman's remarks is that the news 
ceived as a channel for communication between the president 
other government official) and the public. 
President Eisenhower picked up on Truman's suggestions and 
contributed to the form of meetings with the press. He permitted 
television cameras to record the conferences,.bringing his per-
sonality directly to the people. He allowed almost unlimited 
direct quotation of his replies to questions. To balance 
innovations, Press Secretary Hagerty maintained the right ito edit 
sound and film recordings of news conferences. The Administration · 
stressed .that· this was not "censorship;"· it was only a measure·.· 
for the "White House to remain .. in control of the spoken word of 
the.President."12 Although the changes in policy were ·received 
enthusiasm bymost media representatives, Edward R. Murrow 
cautioned that White House control might become too strict 
11New York Times, February 16,.1953, .as quoted iri Pollard? 
12columbus Dispatch, January 2, 1953,as quoted in Pollard, p. 78. 
J.he.Pre.si~ent might be forced to curb himself in his. contact 
......... 13 
with . the press · 
On the average, Eisenhower held conferences only a little 
than half< as often. ~sdid Truman,. and not quite a third 
. as often as Roosevelt. Eisenhower's total .is affected because in . 
his first eight months of office he, held only fourteen conferences; .'. 
in the. latter part of .his administration, health and trips abroad , , 
news· conferences. The following chart shows. a comparison : 
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President Eisenhower did not call a conference and then make 
frequent use of the phrase, "no comment." Instead, when there were .-. 
problems he did not want to discuss in the public eye, he did not 
hold a news conference. One reporter remarked on the Washington 
news page in Editor and Publisher: "The President departed from our 
midst neither liked nor ~isliked-but.pretty muchunknown.n15 
Press Secretary Hagerty held a number of press 
were important for communicating information to the public 
the President's ill health. Normally a press secretaryis 
daily link between the president and the press by supplementing 
president's limited appearances before media reporters. 
when the President was unavailable after his September, 
14Ib.d --2:.. •, P• 
15Ib.d -2:..•t P• 89. 
heart attack, Hagerty gave frequent and thorough news conferences· 
to soothe public worries about the President's health and the 
nation's politics. 
Hagerty arranged interviews with top government 
He arranged to have. the President's heart specialist 
in conference by newsmen. Many critics, however, said that 
overstepped his bounds as "provider of news". 
once Hagerty handed a visiting Cabinet member a statment to 
for the mass media microphones which said that the· President 
looking well. Actually, the visitor had not been in to see the 
President at that time. This led Douglass Cater to conclude that 
Hagertyhad used the mass media and press conferences to "distort 
the public image of the President.and the Presidency itself."16 
President John Kennedy's term coincided with improved. communica- · · 
tion facilities; as a politician he was sensitive .to the need 
for adequate press coverage. Because of those two factors, at least 
five significant changes were made in policy toward the media: 
1. Live telecasts and broadcasts of Presidential news conferences, 
2. Frequent exclusive interviews to supplement formal conferen<::e.s, 
3. Unusual intimacy with certain correspondents, including 
swimming in the White House pool, or dining in their homes, , 
4. Luncheons with groups of newspapermen-editors and publishers----
by individual states to .. discuss mutual problems .. and matters 
of public concern, and 
5.- A shift in scheduling news conferences mostly to afternoons 
so . that no morning session was £'7ld .between March 31, and the 
final one on November 14, .1963. ' 
16 Cater, p. 164. 
17 Pollard, pp. 95-96. 
Perhaps because of . the extensive supplementary.· encounters 
described above, Kennedy allowed.the presence of four hundred newsmen 
the.thousand.then accredited to attend formal conferences. This un---
usually large number caused some dissatisfaction. Journalist Hugh 
.Sidney pointed.out that.one problem of a massive newsiconference is . 
.. 
that it be~.omes necessary to stand up 8.!ld battle for attention. 
"Many good reporters.· are not necessarily good actors. Thus. the 
quiet kind of thoughtful . questioning that. really i~ the ,under- ·: 
pinning of this business is totally lost in the big p;ess conference .•~18 
President. Johnson .... seldom allowed more thansixtY representativel •. 
• • ! • 
at hiE> ·conferences with. newsmen,. both at .. the. White House< and• the 
Texas ranch. In addition, there.were at least four differences 
in approach: 
The new President was more folksy than his predecessor, 
He was more informal; formal news conferences were the· 
exception rather than the rule as they had been under 
Mr. Kennedy, 
• TheJohnsonnews conferences were much more frequent-
twenty-six in the first 182 days, and 
4. They were frequently given on such short noti19-as,little as five minutes-as to• seem almost impulsive. . . ' ... ·. , .. 
Some correspondents preferred the Johnson style because t.he~ · 
felt that in the atmosphere he· created, he was likely to ·. say more 
to.the press On the other hand, small bureaus often felt left 
of.the President's announcements because they did not/have the 
·personnel be on hand for all impromptu proceedings. The 
18Delbert McGuire, "Democracy's Confrontation: The Presidential 
Press Conference, I," Journalism Quarterly, XLIV (Winter, 1967), 641. 
19Pollard, p. 113 
news bureaus ·installed stand-by facilities in the White 
House_, which could be put into operation . for spur-of-the- ·· 
moment appearances. President Johnson requested television 
to explain himself and his policies frequently_. 
(August 1, ·1965) .showed that sixty-six percent of 
had heard or seen at least one Presidential pr~ss. conference 
< the first · six months of 1965.20 
Johnson strove to remain accessible to the press, and thus ;'<. · 
indirectly to the public. In fact, some of his advisers mentioned 
. ". ' . ·, ' ', ' ', · :.· .. :".<:": . .. .. ' .. ·:_\:_:>:/:·\ 
over-exposure as a potential problem, particularly as related tO S :' 
' . ; ,>< :-·, 
family affairs and his daughters' wedding plans. .. He wa~ ,,' sensi ~i ve) 
/1. ;_:_ 
i, to his press coverage and to the questions asked of him during : · 
press conferences. Some stories reflecting on him as a person, ·.·  .
unrelated .to public policy, botheredhim ·greatly-,-such as . the 
"human interest" stories about his fast driving and rough 
to his beagles. 
Early in his administration, Nixon appeared to .live 
.. campaign pro~se of having an "open administration.~' 
televised news conference only nine days after taking office; 
more .live .conferences were held February 6, March 4,.March 
April 18. May 22 he held an informal, non-quotable briefing,· 
Warren Burger's appointment. I , June 19 was ,another live ,news 
conference • .. July 25 was an informal non-quotable briefing in Guam\/ . 
20EJ..mer ,Cornwell, Jr., "The Johnson Press Relations Style" 
Journalism Quarterly, XLIII (Spring, 1966), 4-8 • . : < i <. .· ,. , 
on his .Asian policy. ... But · from then until late Septelllber, . he did 
not answe:r any question from the press. _ Newsmen had exp:r-es5ed ;? ' 
~'. } _( 
.their frustration that the President had not held a news conference 
,·, ,:•' .· '' . . ,•• ;·.,\ .,i_· ... :>,_··. :..:' . -_ .. ;• , : -: :'. .· -_ ' ·.:· . ·.' ·: , ', .· , ,. 
for three months, and pointed <;mt .that since Nixon's . aides. were 
not:r-egul,arly .available ... forquest~oning, the President .. himself_. was · 
. .. .:·.: . ·-·_:.·: ..... <>:•::;.·;:-, .·-- ··:." ..'":, '' 1 
th~ir only,authoritative source · on White House policies~ '_: _Robert 
Semple of :the Times News -?ervice, wrote that in the eyes of some 
. :o'bserverS there; was a _ , . 
growing and potentially damaging communications gap. He has 
withdrawn troops, cut the draft, and let the commentators _ do 
the interpreting • . - Many people here are confused by them ·· 
[Nixon's actions], and out of this confusion arises t2! 
ing demands for a public exchange with the President. , 
-Accordi:ng to some, Nixon's lack of contact with. the pr_ess :, 
through conferences reflects a negative attitude toward the press. 
'.,. : ~:_·,":t ·_ . . : ·. '<:' 
For example, · Edwin James, : executive editor of Broadcast Magazine · 
said that .Vice-President Agnew's November, 1969, speeches which , 
blasted several faults of mass media news were the . fruits of a · 
long-simme:ring attitude ,of the Nixon Administration toward the 
press. 22 A Presidential aide, Clark Mollenhoff said f'th~ speec_h 
'·· __ ·. •,· · ,·.· .. ·.·: :, _· ,_:·_ . .. :.:,,' -'. :, .:,i,; , 
was developed in the White House. _ It represents White House · 
'conc.ern a~:;t getting through to the public.,i23 . 
_ For Rosenau's theory of the f .our-step flow, this me~ns that 
involvedwill -affect the tone of communications about ) 
21Robert .B. Semple, , Jr., "White House Communications Gap" __ _ 
City Times, September 25, 1969, p. l?E. 
22 ,, ,, · - · 
, "Agnew's Complaint: The Trouble .with .TV," Newsweek, 
24, 1969, p. 90. 
2311TV Broadcast Criticism," Congressional Quarterly Weekly Repo~{. 
November 21, 1969, p. 2328. 
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the media and will affect the means by which the opinion-makers 
' -_ ' ' : ; ·.,: . ,., .. '' :·.:-;·:.' -.>) 
let their feelings be known. In other words, their feelings about:-, 
the medium will affect the type of response. given to a rhetorical 
'_,_ . ··, ___ ,-- _•:':_,,;"_,:i j 
exigence; their communication is affected by their. feelings about. · · 
the medium.> · 
In general, news conferences serve as one means by which 
, , , -- - , - .'i '. ': _·: -. , , , - . - , , ' ' , ' : - ; : -- ' , : : : , , - ' - --- -- , - ' : , ; , ,- ' •: , I : :' , , , :- • :.. ' ' , , , • , • - , : ' ' - - • 
government.opinion-makers·•···.·••Can .·. communicate indirectl;to•······the.pubiic, j 
., ·, . _· - ... _._,· ,· ... ·.· .. •··. - .. _- ,· ·,_.·' 
exerting their .. influence. as opinion-makers and providing j_nfo~t{JJ!> 
In addition, the press "forces" government into the position 
explaining public policy. As suggested previous.ly in. the . discussion\<:: 
of Truman's remarks,·• and. as. Douglass Cater wrote, the. press fills ,/ 
important gap in the U.S. political system-putting gov~rrnn~:r:,tt,i . 
. • on the spot. 24 Cater pointed out that in Britain, for .example, 
the press merely records periodic questioning directed. to. the .: 
cabinet by t.heir opposition party. The questions are • partisan, but.• 
they are responsible because the opposition realizes that.they may 
' ' ·,.•' -.·:, 
some day. be. i. n the policy-making position with the questions . directed. · 
-· . . . .. . . . ·_. ; . . '. : _.·-.. ·._ . ,·'.,._ ·- : ... : •.. .· _-. "i' .' ·>' . : _.,, .-·_. .' . ,' ,: ,·,'· : ·,.;_- :·; 
to them. In our country~ ·  there is no such means.· of the executive : · 
being questioned by. the opposite political party. Other branches , 
of government are not necessarily brought into the policy deba~es 
until after the fact. As Cater says, 
Congressmen must be content with the post mortem-:-a procedure 
that us:ually does little to rectify past errors of judgment 
and may even by endless re-examination of faits accomplis 
serve to hamstring present judgment. U.S. policy toward China, 
for ·example, .. has not been notably improved. by the ' constant 
24 . ·.· .. 
. · . Cater, pp. 148-154. 
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inquir~5s into why China fell to ~he Communists in .. the first :):\: place •. ,; 
Pier,re §aling~r, Kennedy's Press · Secretary,. claimed that the 
press conference . system. could not_ be . considered a substitute forthe. 
_ parliamen-tary .question period./; The ·_ prime minis-ter ~ust .~sw~r··· . .. ')'.\' 
questionsflrolll the, HouSe, of Common~' .• while .. the u ~s· if r~sid:~i ~;irf f ~{ ... ': .· 26 : . ,, . ··,· ·>;:_ . 
control over whether to hold press confere~ces or not. ,. :> eater's ·<<. 
·/-:.r;:, .: , , .. .. ,··: ..... .. < 
> ·1:, .•< analogy is .. not perfect; ney-ertheless, he ., is generally correct, 
' '"; :;·.'·i:,::/,; .. _. 
·· · 'because ,as . Salinger would agr-ee, . a p~esid~nt cannot put o:ff meeting·: 
' .: )·~>:·:·• 
the press jtoo long. Although he can control the timing of the · 
!. '~.: ,, ' ' ·, -\·' 
gathering~~- informal pressures operate· to ensure that he , does :soon ' ':f: 
, ariswer questions froII1 t,he press. 
,.·_ ... ,, 
. '.· ... · , '. 
Speec.hes and press conferences are surpassed by handouts .for .::.' :•; 
;' ·:-· .. :, ,::_.-:_: •, 
i~ovidini•: iriformationto the mass media> daily. _ A "handout" is . •· , ·"• 
, -i- _'_. :,. •,: :-._.;;; 
a n,ews release printed up and given to reporters . and wire. agencies. ·· 
As a continuous source of news for the press, .handouts are . considered · ·· 
., ,. . .:· :· -,_: _.-._• 
of public .affairs reporting. They are · generally ) 
used as "<?I'ientationll,material for, reporters, , and . provide the ; J.e-~d; ;_? 
. \. ! . ;·_ .. 
for further search for information. In other. words, a . reporter 1.s i . ' ,' . ·:- ) 1 ·- ' ' ' ' ' ' . 
knowledgei:~:f current affairs may,_begin :with the handouts, but would ?• 
' ' ' - . . . . . · ... I. ' ' . . ..·-·; _1 ,-_l 
· :• .· , 
not _. necessarily .end there, depending .. onhis own .and his editor's ·. , .;, 
standards / './ Part of . the reason for this approach i~ <that handouts ',-<r{ 
.·; ! 
are . one-si~ed, in general, with the infellt. of' makingknown sollle :CY,, 
opinion for publicity . __ fro!Il the government's .viewpoint, • .. :-,· · 
.; , - ·. -- , _ 1 : 
25Toid.·, p. 150. 
26 ·. , ( Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy NewYork: 
1966), P• · 55. 
/ ; .;. : , ; ;;· . 
52 _.  __ : .. ; ___ -.::_:_,_-:·.· :;> . : .. ·,:. 
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. --:·:,i 
A study .of . releases frolll the ' State and Health~ Educa.tion;:r:./·'. 
_and Welfare Departments .claimed __ that·government releases .could : 
be considered one aspect of news management. 27 < B/ coordin~ti~gi : 
• · . _:-._ ••.• 1 .. :·, _.- , -_.,:-_- \::-: __ -_·-- • ,- ._•i,' ',·;, ·· •·• 
publicit:y-._ i~to handouts, . the goyernment dete~nes _largely. t~~: 
' '" \. 
· manner _and ,timing of _the release. of information. · They ': can :~x~_r-ci~~ ;-
suppression of information by not producingria.ndouts; or_ w:he; __ :•}hey'." . 
. . ·_ : .. _:·. .. ··._ . . ;_':. _:- . . · . ,., :·:".;_-/ :· ·_,-~:,..· ·· · ·.: ·:<·:•-.:<: ·/,_\\_: ;_~:); ·, 
do · give a
1 
release they can . slant the information as::they see fit~ ·\\:· . - .- . ... . ' . . --:- --. -- . .. ,• 'I. ',:,•\ '.••,:.:· • ·, , '~ ;/) • 
°The author of the study .said .this points . up .the impo:rtance of_ the/t 
governmental inst'itutions in getting ,information on its way .: i~ th.;~·?: 
_f~ow: _to the public. 
The following .table makes ,it _apparent _th~t Wi1~t,e Ho1:1,se , releases 
' .. l • j -:~- :;: • • //<~;/(\'_:":{ , 
are an im;ortant sourc0of presidential. publicity in th~ Time~·. ::i\{ii 
.February and March of one year was selected from the terms of each 
, ,' . , . ' 
pr~sident . / Since 1962 · was necessarily used for Kennedy, the :fact : ) 
l - '. ·:, . , ·,'. ·.- ·; -~ t :•/\ ;• 
that it .was ·election year inay have some bearing uponthe ,data~ •.< .•.,. 
• > Roosevelt Truman · Eisenhower · Kennedy\' ·· 
(1935) •. (1945} (1957) (J.96?) , .:•j ·:• : 
- . ---- -. _ -_--_-___ - .. ,-- , 
Number press . releases issued 
Number to which · coverage 
'35 
was given 27 
Number given page one coverage . ,14 
Number. including test· of . 
release · · 20 
.Total Column inches · of coverage 766 
· .. Average column inches per .. 
release. , covered 
.·••._· 63 ··:.·58 
44 :· 
_17 
.--.. 154< ..:r .. ; 
. :t~l\, 
\ 27Edward Glick, "Press-Government Relationships: State and Health, 
· · Fiducation and Welfare Departments,0 Journalism Quarterly! XLJ:II ::: ·,. 
· (Spring, 1966), 53. >-: - •· : , ·· . .. · >:· · :·:-:'~-· :·:"; . 
:.:?,8E1mer Cornwell, Jr., .. P~esidential Leadership of Public Opinio~, ·-:·:pp_.:-:.: 
. 235-236. . ' . 
;·--:- :-.:/\-/_:, __ ::.-i'.'; •-·<:".:·:.;; . '· ·-·. .-':·\;'.,_:_/\-r_:.-: 
· .. · .·· . .. · .> ':< . . 
The . totals , of the figures above suggest ·. incr-easing involyement){ 
.• of}s~aU atJ;:. in co~catioil to th.e . public. .. The president . iS . 
; '.\ ' 
likely.to have .worded a .statemen~. or report only in important>cases, 
.:·.- . ·:.' ·. I ' .. ·. '.i ·.· '· .. ·_. .' . ·. : ·.:. i, .. ..... . ·: : . _·: .. · .. '. :·:. ,.· ... :. , .. : .. :.· . •· .. : : : i'.; . : . .: : , ·.·. ·•. . ·.:.··:. ·.  : . , : ·. . . ·. , . · . . , .. : ·' 
· because of sheer . volume. :•·/:; ... 
··<' 
'.Attitude toward the press also affects the nature .of hand~ :···  
··::,<."':-··.· .. ; ·,: 
::: 011ts f l. Theodore White's study of the 1960 presidential· campaign 
,~-., 
•• revealed ,what might b~ .. the. most .. qlear-c~t example ... of ,this .·somewhat 
:._ .. ,:-:· , .. ·, ·: :, ··. ·•:···· ,i :.:.- ··.::·• .. :· .. : . . ··.·,,·,: ::· · .. · 
{ .d{ff~ctilt\ ·;~~nomenonto' ''prove." ,\ According .. to . White, :· ~ixon ·.· .. ·· ' ; 
;.; . . . . •. _-. -:,_ ·-;··. ~- ;"· . ' . ' . ' . --- ... · .. --_ . '.- .. -_. : . . . . . , -~ . . . .. ,, 
.· restfitted hi~ handout~ S() .· .that the . pr~ss . would·)'haye to work''' 
,, ;hil~ :Kenn~py .gave out :~r~scripts··: with ·•. explana~ions.··· of ·h~s · . 
,• 
speeches a.5'soonas hecould. Nixon's failure to keep . :r1ewsmen •· · 
: informed ~aught up ·· with hi~, •. because .. f9r .. the .mass rned~a· to: be •·/}:. 
: a?le tO. . • iJformthe publicon co~plicated positions, ne~spie~· ··mu~t : 
·. first .be made.: to understand the issue ; and the Candidate's position 
· .. :,·,. .' ·. ·., .-. , ' · . . ·.:· . 
inirelation to the issue / ·. Nixon and his advisers once worked for 
. t~o .day5 on .a .:farm surplus speech without explaining . the sp.eecl1"\. 
·  content to .neviTs.men accompanying him. The night before it 
,··,.·.· __ -_ ' . . -. ', 
delivered, ,they were handed only the t!3xt of. the spe€3~.11 • . 
h;s complicaf€3d proposals, · reporters • w~.ote 
. · .. · : _·,:_ .' ._-.- •. ; ' ····.·. 
· .disseminatio~ very early the next morning. 
, ·foµr- priva~A .dispatche.s as: "illustrati~ns of what 
: · ·. > .. . ·· ·.·. 29 press feels· itself abused:" · ··. 
· · ',\ GUTHRIE CENTER, Iowa-Vice-President Nixon said · today · farmers 
should : eat .their way ·out of the ·surplus problem. · . , ; > · · 
:·> 
·.' 29Theodore· White, The Making of the President 1960 .. (New. Yo~~: . '. · 
Atheneum House, Inc., 1961, p. 312 and pp. 374-380. 
GUTHRIE CENTER," Iowa-Vice-President Nixon admitted today ·• 
that the farm problem was too big for the Republican Party; < 
to handle. He said that if elected President, he would · .. 
appoint Senator. Hubert H. Humphrey as Secretary of. Agriculture.·:•?J() 
· .and l~t h~m .wrestle with the pr<>b.lem... · · · :, · -
GUTHRIE CENTER/ Iowa-. Vice-President Nixon said. today that :;: .. 
farmers are < too blankety-blank greedy. He .. suggested they :r: • 
get w?at he called "honest jobs'' in urban industries/ , : .. <' 
•.· GUTHRfE ·· cENTER,~ irowa-Vice-President . Nixon today ic~lled . ori /, '. :> Pope John XXIII for guidance in finding a solution to <the ;:/,·::.: r 
troublesome farm problems · which have plagued Catholi~, Jew ·-.,/; 
and Pr-otes.tant alike. · · · · · · · ·.,/. 
Whit~:\analyzed the · situation as 
: If there were roots to the malice, they lay <up ahead in the .. · . 
plane carrying the candidate and his staff. . The candidatt3 .<1·>. 
and his staff had decided very early in the year that the,\ <:\ 
· pres5 was their enemy and that . they could rea35 American. . · ... people by. direct emotion only via tele~sion. · · · ·, · 
-· . . ·.1•·• 
,··,·· 
_ Another way in which government provides the press with ·copy i~ . 
·-~:.:-.:':_·./ . .':. ' ': :_ ' ' ·: :_·· . _:.:". ' ' ,: __ . __ ·:'. 'i/'.,· .. _:·· .. :',: 'i"<\·'·_··'·: < :: '_ ·:::·.-~;:,:: · .. ::::,:i , 
•·· by staging pseudo-events, or creating communication for the . purpose,.}: 
• • • . ·.. • . . _._ , . . . ·.-_ ' . -·. : • . i • I\. •. . -.;_./~.- .. :: 
of generating media Coverage · as a resp~nse to Some othe~ eVen~\.: : /ff'.7,'J·; 
" .. ~::::·.r:::-]; ;·_:- "i 
· · or pseudo-event. Senator McCarthy provided the most .· outstanding · iT>: · 
/:_-. -.: : ·•,·, : -_·. .·_.;::, :. ' •i ·,'i i: 
.< historical example. His appeal to the public was based entir-ely on: · 
\ 1. 
what made, public headlines. He did not set up a single · contempt <t ·, .: 
· .. :'i,.}/'.·.':. 
~itation that was sustained in , the courts. He did :a riot 'propose_i\ .. •, ; ' . _- -... :: . . ,, . ; . •'\/!~--\' . 
. a.ny new lc3.ws to deal with the Communis.t conspiracy h.e sa~d 7~ ,s~ed{/ .. : 
:: although ..... as :every congressman, .... he had· .• the ·,Oppo:rtunitYto ·.·.do SO. ii / , )(: 
He·. limited. ~is activities ,. to 0 alertinglf. America. He created news '.it;::·. 
:dr~atically. 
:t'f)i/ ·.\ 
He captured the attenti,on of .millions of Americans / /: . . 
;·_,-_ f; "?--::;·-
' . ·;,: ·:: -, 
' \\ According to Cater, many activities of Senate investigative ,_:,i 
committees .are geared to :the production .ofhecidlines • . The hearin.g ;'.:! 
•. ; _:._i,·_<.,,;_·i·':.:,: ".': ;,,._·/::'•;:j ';/ ,\?~-
P• 
is the "final act" in the dramawhi?h.may be.desi~ed 
.public attention, to alarm or allay, to enlighten, or yes, 
sometimesto obscure. 
The trial balloon and leak techniques 
the government · can respond to communication stimuli. 
be. called pseudo-events because they are generated for 
of publicity, with.the hope of generating a response, 
from the . attentive public and from other i opinion-makers. 
The trial balloon is not a common use of the press, 
is a subtle and important device at.times. 
balloon">as 11the calculated indiscretion that is designed to 
reactions \~ new. policy ideas. u32 . Alfred Kuhn. says that it is 
an unofficial release of information such that the top.· office:rs 
can deny any knowledge or responsibility if it is not well re-
ceiyed by . the public.33 It may appear in the mass 
or a statement from a lower governmental official, 
reaction before final action is taken. 
Background briefings have become· a.· breeding ground 
balloons, i, because by the . nature of the briefing, sources 
fidential· and are withheld ·.from .the. media. For example, 
,"Eisenhower Doctrine" for the defenseof the Middle.East 
31cohen, pp. 56-58. 
32Toid., P• 202. 
33A1fred Kuhn, The Stud of Societ 
(Homewood, Illinois The Dorsey.Press, 
mentioned by the President until it was .tested as trial balloon · 
at. a background dinner. Columnist James Reston perceived that 
~efense .of the Middle . East was on Secretary _Dulles' mind, and./.:\/:·'. 
'. ;_. 
· approached him with that observation. ? Reston' s suspicions· were\(· 
,··_· ''/: i:•· ', ! · . .;::-:.: 
confirmed, <an~ scr in his news column he · quoted only ~'/l r~lial,)~e'. 
source,." .. ".(In ;e;ponse .to .. this early/ release, Dulles i _n-yi~eq , a :: ·· 
-, small group of Washington correspondents to his home/:to · explai~>/ 
/!·:··,•,: ••;· . 
the plan.\ \ Reaction .in -the' resulting· columns , was .. fayprabJ.~ / ancf :·_so, -]i{t 
,, . 
the Executive · recommended the approach. Cohen pointed :·out a '. furtti'~r-·•: 
repercussi9n of the . Executive action; since Dulles gave ,newsmen · '. 
.. ' -. . 
· informa~~~~1 .three _days before· he put the proposal _--•~~--- •-•· 90,r1~re~~+?nc1i;( 
·, C ';:_ \. :;' 
. leaders, ·!'_it . was presumably. too late ·for ~he Congressmen to db,:x :·-;:, 
~ther t;aji acquiesce in the • widel; publicized polic~.;•~i. ~e{lie: } 
:' or not the :·policy-making response is given, the_fact .·relevant ' for ,\:! 
,•· • :: - • . _ · . c •., .. ·. , _ _ · .· ·,· -_ - , --· . :.-: -_ ,.:_ ,_, _- , -_.:>,:::.- •;- ,,', \ -::::,>·>•.-:-.;(;\.; 
Rosenau' s theory is that the balloon has been Sent up in ·respm1se '-: !: 
' .·•---_ _,_- .. '.. •• • :- ... • . • • ·: ._ - . 1_· • •. '. - _ :·_;:• 
,.•- , 
to.some e}dgence, and· in turn the balloon w:i.11 be cover_~d by the . 
' .:'.·• ,_ ,, •,:- ·,; 
mass media: and serve as an exigence for response from others . (~.e.~ · 
·,·. _ ;, .. _ : ._· .:_·:,· ,' :, .. 
· feedback to. ·_ the opinion-makers or decision-mak:ers) ._ 
• ' ·i. ·.·. ,·, 
i•' . 
·· · Bill Moyers · pointed:. out · that although reporters must. promise · 
• ' • • - • - J - • ._ ( -•; '• ,- • ,• I • • • --,-_- , • -,° , .','(, / .;_ , 
to quote . the man they. _ are ·talking. to or- even his ·agericy, ·- .. from>?[}::: 
• ' :, ·:. • ' ' ' __ -_:· -_ ' ' ",! ; .-:, _.- : ,·, ·, 1.::-· · .•. ;· -;·-..,:··.:r 
:_:-,,_::_'_,., ' ' ' ·. . -: '. ) 
background briefing, th.ey ,cancross-examine .the witness, i checkin~ .· 
V· . . . . - -- ·- . . . . ' - ·- - - - - : -'·· : , · .··. . ; . -. - : . "- .- . . · · .. ···. , . · . . . • . : - - - - :: \_i 
evidence with . other sources later, _ .and then · choos_e ,: the informatior1i".):/i; 
,·:, , (- -,:· -----:-'_-:•.\"i- .\:_ , . :· ·.· .· .· : · • .. --·_._-_:;_-_- :-- -< _·_ , ,. r -:--.---:/:-- ·• -{~__,,_. _ ·-.· .:._.··:-.:_:;,;_., . '.- .-_>·.·->/:<':-'._--:'.~?:/-
.-·- .\;-' 
that is reliable or purposeful as_ opposed to that which is -· self- "' ·:/r'. · . -·. ,--.:•- ·-: t·.=:i,\:-__ ! 
·-r 34coh~n, PP• 187-88. 
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· ~erving· propagandc9.. ~he danger of the practicE3, however,is that;-?.: 
.··i i11e~b1Ic .·official .. who ._finds ·a journalist 'willing .to co~~er~~ea.::\)\). 
can hide behind anonymity, whil~ the so-c~lled "informedso11:~~,st,.t;/:;\': 
conflict •'and caus~~ public confusion.} 5· For: example in 1953, :_;? ._( 
• Secreta3:Y ·of State Dul~es was the anonymous source.: for a . story /.·: 
; '.· ...... ,", < .::. ' -:': \·;:,'._: '. ", < :' .>•: i: ·_., .. :', . _•.;_: .: : -_ ':· .•'._-'-::· ... ,: :_ ·-... : . :.\," :".: ·_:·.': i ·'_'.· ,• ,._· - ;'' ':_ ·: 
-tha~ thE3_State Department was ·considering a Korean boundary_ settl~~-:i 
'. . . ·' .. . ' ' . 
•_._ment along the narrow part> ofthe _Korean . peninsulc1.' : ... The ·trial\: . :\ __ ; . • 
h/3.J.ioon Was shot down on Capitol Hi~].. Promptly ariother "informe; :1,) 
•. .· ' ' • • ' : ·: _· • ·c,· • ,' C. ,_·· • . ; ' . ·. . . . • -•.· .•. -· ;, • .. •,·. _. ·, · • •,, •"• • ,;;~<;/)•,.•, 
source'~- .from the White· House . denied that there was even any con-- .:!'{'t 
•·· sider~ti9n of a permanent di vision of Korea. The·. s~cor1f anonynio11s !: . 
solll'ce .-ia~ also Dulles;he had denied his own previ6~ss{ol'Y".:?f :l 
·:- ':_''·,' .,.. ., ' : ,: .. . _·.:.:)i· ::< ::-·.·: ... :,:·  
Alt11ough. the ·· rhetoric. .flowing, the _ ''news0 was. dealing on1i: :i~ :(x.-:: 
specu.:La~ion; it · .. wa_s . not reporting what ~. If all the stories : ·. 
were written accurately, .reflecting the mere speculation, it is · · 
; ' .· . . ·',.,;'· 1 
. . ., ! ;'' 
questionable_ whether readers · in the . public_ could straighten' out ;: ' 
i'', ·'. :-:. \ ·.- . ·• . ·. • 
; , . ·, 
October-November, 1969, speculation that Vice-President .ltgn~?( ::!' 
-, ,,.- .-~ ::· . 
was 0s p~alcing for '. Nixon" in hi9 reac~ion tq _· _the V~etm11n mor,~to:ri_~, \ 
is .actually questioning whether Agnew was sending up a trial balloori. 
,· 
for Nixon .to test -the public's stand. If in · fact Agnew's remarks''}' 
were __ ._ known · and/or planned· bythe President, they _would .sezye,·as a·:L: 
. :: _: . ,_._ ' ' • . . . -_ . ' ,. : : •.• -·' . . _._ J: :. •. ·•' . _-- _··::· ;. 
Moyers, "The _Press and Government: Whci' s Telling··_/ 
the Truth?" Speech given at the University .of Kansas, Ap:r-il .:29, 
1?68, pp. 17-19. 
36Ib-.d _2;_., P• ._ 22 • . 
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powerfulballoon.3T The President himself would not receive 
potential criticism, yet hecould almost be guaranteed some kind .,. 
of feedback from opinipn-leaders and .the public with such si'.;o~; .\( 
. words coming from the s~cond-ranking ·executive. 38 . . 
. . .. ; . . ,:;_:- : ·- . . _- . ·_ __ -- . '_ ,- {' 
The leak is another form of . unattributed news , that, is given //:' 
.' .. •. i .. •/•· -: .. ·• 
out for purposes beyond stric~ information-giving. . On the positiv~-
·• side, th~ .. ~eak can open the way for discussion and psychologic:~11~<,:\ 
prepare tlle public for governmental .action' in a cert~in/dire~tion,. (f: 
-, :: {~ ,-- '. ; 
But . on the negative side, just as the trial balloon, it can ' be! •··.· 
inaccurate since nobody takes responsibility for the statement.:•· 
' ';: ' ·... ,:: : · _'. -: c' '. :- · .. > ..... _· .. ' · 'J, ' ', i'.·: ·~ 
. For, ex~ple, the New York .Times front page headline .on. Marcl1/ 26, •' 
. ,_ ----.--.---,:,_ ·_-:< 
·· 1955, wa.s·t . Ui.S'~ EXPECTS CHINESE REDS TO ATTACK ISLES IN APRIL: .•.· 
WEIGHS ALL . OUT DEFENSE. Thr.ee days later, . in the same , position 
was . this·. c.ontradiction: . EISENHOWER SEES NO WAR NOW OVER . CHINESE . · 
.ISLES~39 . The similarity between the two reports is that neither 
one indicated who spoke for the "U.S." in the first .cas,e,, or for ,:/ 
"Eisenhowertl 
are contradictory reports on whether Agnew .was acting•.:  
as an agent. "Post-Moratorium Developments Stir ·Controversy,". · >;c::::s.,. 
· Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, October,24, : 1969, . p. 2052: '\::'·: , .. 
''A White House spokesman declined to comment on the VP' s condemnatio11 i
1
\· 
of the moratorium, but s_aid the VP had not conferred. with Mr_~ Nixon · 
before making the speech." other reports . claimed that one of Nixon's 
speech writers ·contributed to the speech, and, tha~ Nixon had .. proba.bly- .. . 
given his approval or encouragement. · · · , . .. · ·;-:; · . :,. . 
. 8 ·· .. ·•.· . ' / . . ' . ·. ' -· . :· >' <. 
J The sharpest attack on th~ moratorium came in Agnew's · Octob~r -:·•:: 
19 speech ,to a GOP fund-raising dinner: "If the moratorium had any . ,-
use whatever, it serve.d as an emotional purgative for those who feel 
.the need to cleanse .themselves of · their lack of ability . to offer •. 1a 
: constructive solution .to the problem. A spirit of national masochism 
· prevails, ·encouraged · by an effete corps of impudent snobs who ·characte.r~ 
· ize .themselves as intellectuals. _ It is in this setting · of dangerous '. 
over-simplification that the war in Vietnam achieves its · greatest .;: t,c' 
distortion." ~-, p. 2052. ·· 
.\ 39cater, p. 129. 
Anoth~,r ' author40 places the blame for these contradict,pry '. 
<.··,.,· ' .::.;,:.-_ -.. _. ;_·_ ', , ',,,•·.· ' 
reports upon /Eisenhower because he did not make clear which subordiri;£J~,i 
he , considered could speak for him. · The first headline was ,excited 
, i ·.- ·:.·· --C-. ;" _, • -;:,· · :: .. ··: ··:; - _' 
: '.:··• 
by ., A~iraLR,~bert ..• carney, .'Gh!ef ,oi'Nqv,al Operations, <w-ho :believec{/' 
tha.t:' ;ar .i~ :: Asia was imminent' and ., perh;ps even,desira.ble.·: His ·: 
-, ,·· ... ··_ ·_ ... _,:: .... ·:• ., 
'background\ briefing resulted in, the headline that caused even .. the 
_; .. : .·, ·: . . . . . ' .· ' ',. . . ' ; . . ·: . ·. ' .' .,. ." . .- .. . ··. ; . . .. ; ; . . .. ~--·: 
. Pres1dent to .bristle; Carney's word had been given th;color ;f/:) \ 
,___ . ·.•_- . ·,-; .-· - , : .. · -· ; ··. . . • : '· , .. -_ .. _. · . . ·. 1· . . :·:. -, __ : __ ";. . ;>'. -:· •:,.; :1 __ :;·;; 
"authority:'!: . and official smction. , The second headline resulted ). , 
; . · : . ::- ··. ,•_''. _;· ,: , , . ' . . : - .. ·. ' ' ._-, ... :, ,:_; •.' 
' from a back~round.briefing .with Hagerty held three night~ latJrf 
Again the media could quote only . a "reliable source" but govern- ,i · 
· ITle1!t offi.c~~ls had not .bee~ dragged in.t°.. open public conflict : witll::,.-,,/:' 
. ' ._ -, :,~. ~/:· --·; :-( :_ . ' 
one another. _ Eisenhower once stated that he had. trusted suborp.in.ate~ :,:::, 
who could occasionally ·leak news for purposes they •con.sid~7~d p;o·;;;!.·:\} 
But who was Eisenhower's ( or any government 
subordinate and . reliable source?., . ·i•.-: . . ,·-. 
In the· case above, the mass media was blamed for exciting .an '.: };:: 
· unfounded war scare. Public confusion over what was true was evident. ·' 
' .'. ·-.-·.·:_ .. ,·.' ,-. :_ :. ·.,; :,· . ' :_, • .. "·.· '.:_ ; ·, ' :... . . ·•·.· _·_,·,.:- ' .-, ; . '-,;,:··/:::. 
In the folJ..;wing case, another kind of response Can ~e iHustratec!lt.f• 
leaks were designed to use the media to put pressure , on somebody else.) i', 
It , is a strategic ,response by opinion-makers to a 
exigence that i!llerently creates another exigence to which respons~:,•./ 
In November of 1967, General Westmor~l~nd told reporters that hi'·; 
,( ,:I; ;• -• 
was ti deeply :• concerned" that the Cambodi,an port of Sihanoukville.· was \ > · 
· · ,. 40william L. Rivers, The Opinion Makers .. · (Boston: · · Beacon: Pre~s,>i 
1967}, pp~ . 146-147 .. . , . , -,, ·, .. 
" - :--<r;"--' 
' about to . become an important source of arms for Vietcong troops < ... 
in South Vietnam. He said that the .military .. was considering .' ;:·· 
contingency .Plans to quarantine the po:t:t • . "Some U.S. ,officials~• ./ 
was given as the source.•in news stories. Later, ' reporters .. r~ason~d{,:;.;: 
' ::-: ' . :·· _- ,' ' ... "', : 'i_ ·.· , . .... ..... ·: ·- -__ ' ' ,:.( /\: · 
. _-- - . . -: : '; ·- . ·: ' ' . -_. ,- . ·:-. ·: ·.·,-:- . 
that the leak was designed to put pressure on Cambodian Premier .. 
. '_- ', _: ' , ··.··."·_.. . ', .. ·._·._·. · .· : ' . ':: ';: .·_ ·.:·'_'.·_.:,;_\ -::-:·:. _ ·:,,-..:>:: ·., .-:/:.:i _ _-;;::.·. 
Sihanouk tocontrol .. arms ·.s~ipments and_ to. . spur international.'. · .·• 
action toward that same .~nd. · ·Billi Moyers·, ·who related this e~ample',():· 
·of the. leak/ stated, 
. '' :·. ;;:,:· .. :·. 
A worthwhil6 objective, no doubt; but was it necessary for:)<1• 
severaLreporters to deceive the public into thinking that ·; 
"some u:.s~ officials" rather than one in particular was ·· · 
considering such a significant. shift .. of policy? .. Did it not/ : 
occur to the reporters that the United States,. Gov.ernment ,., 
. has more effective and legitimate ways to get a message of /:· 
such import to Prince Sihanouk and to spur international .. .. · . < • 
action than , to compromise the boundary between an independent i · 
press and a government which always seeks 4"to make .tha~ ,: / press . an ally in furthering its policies? .· ·· ·:. ; i.( , ,. ·.• ;· 
Sometim~s government opinion-,makers leak information •. ~o • the );0} 
media, . and have the media become the "source" for the public?,. ·· (: 
before the official announcement of · General Hershey's , ·' 
the ~allowing a~i.cle appea,red · over the A~p'; . wires and 
in many ne~spapers nationwide: .· .. 
A Columbia Broadcasting System reporter says President Nixon 
preparing to retire Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, director ofJthe .' 
Selective Service System, within the next month. 
A White: House spokesman in Washington said · there was no such , ,.., ... , .......... , ... 
Newsman Dan Rather said Monday on the CBS Evening News with 
Walter Cronkite that Hershey would be replaced as part .' of , a . 
draft reform .plan "designed to defuse domestic .political · 
opposition to .the war.ff 
Douglass .Cater said that the leak, as it is 
41 . . 
. Moyers, p. 23. 
above, raises fundamentalquestions about .the nature of 
.· Granting ·.that government . opinion-makers .. will .respond to a . communication 
stimulus wllich will be reported to the public, does this mean that y·· · 
. the media. are under obligation. to report opinion-makers' attempts 
, • ·. - · ,· , ' '·, 1 . -_ -_ ·1 ·, , ,.;_ 
. ' -_,.- ·• __ : .. _·· ·.. ' . 
i to test p~blic . opinion or to. win suppo;t for some cause? Is mass 
media a tooli of government? Or is the newsman an intelligence .. 
. agent for . the public?: The problem with unattributecL news is that 
• newsmen do not know whether to interpret a government official's 
statement as "fact" or as an element of psychological warfare. 42 
Thus far we have seen how government opinion-makers provide : 
.:.. copy for the mass media by. giving speeches, holding press conferences,::< 
preparing handouts, and by letting out ·trial balloons and leaks 
mor.e, factor. of this aspect of the . government-media relationship · 
shouldbe mentioned-informal relatio.ns with press representatives. 
Not so much a technique for talking about hard data, ip.formal get-
. together$ s~t . a mood about current affairs which is. then_ reflected 
in the mass media. President Kennedy called frequent informal 
gatherings . with selected pressmen. Al though some felt his social. 
· flattery and . play to favorites wer~ indirect means of. news management, 
others pointed up the advantage of reporters' having easier. access .to 
the prime news source. With informal access, ther,e is less 
for inaccuracy in reporting. President Johnson was a . great 
the informal press gathering. Newsmen were invited to his Texas 
ranch and the President would talk about his position on public policies 
from a haystack podi'Wll or over a big .meal of bar-be-qued beef. 
42 . 
Cohen, P• 13$. 
Informal.contact with the press has.a service 
era of worry.that government decisions might be taken on the 
of whatever is "instantly.explainable" to media reporters 
Continuous informal relationships between top correspondents 
top government opinion-makers (at every level of government) 
complex issues time and opportunity to be understood. As 
newsmen take. advantage of the opportunity for in-depth ,,,,.,,--1°-. .. .,,+VQ.J..I.U..J. • .1..1.s:::.. 
of public issues, the coverage that government receives . 
tends to be more informed and accurate. That attitude is 
opinion-maker. He can open or close himself .. to the press 
continuing basis that puts· his. responses . to a rhetorical 
in context-in.the context of the complete issue and in the 
text of the opinion-maker's total position. 
Government Communicates an Image 
....... •··;• 
Americans carry in their· minds an image of their nation. They ; ?.' 
carry an image of their nation in contrast with. other nations.43 ..  And 
43Rostow calls the sum of these attitudes the "American national 
style," and gives an extensive survey of what images are popularly ,' 
held. The tradition of isolation was one result of the central image 
of avoiding entangling alliances abroad. Ingenuity, industry and 
abundance are still often part of the American's faith in a man's 
ability to make his destiny. Americans respond with.near-reverence 
to the terms "democracy" and "freedom," although in application there 
is divergence. Laws bring to. most Americans' . minds an expression of: , 
the people's will. From foreign nations, we generally want to be left 
sufficiently alone to enjoy our freedom and high standard of · living. · · ' · 
W';W'~ Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper, 
1960),. p. xix and Sheldon Appleton, United States Foreign Policy 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 36-67. < 
they carry an .image of their government. 44 Peop~e form their 
images on -the basis of "how they were.brought up," what their 
, parents and friends think, and whatever additional communications 
allow to enter· their:cognitive ,system? from mass . media, ' rumor, i etc. 
The part .of. this image-formation relevant to Rosenau's theory at 
· this stage is howthe government contributes · to its public / image 
b~ what it · communicates through the mass media. · We have already 
..  seen how the government responds to >communication stimuli by providing" 
the press with information. In so doing, government communicates. an 
image to the public. 
Certain long-range concepts about government may change only · 
once or twice in a person's lifetime, if at a11. · It :,is short~range \ 
images with which politicians and government opinion-makers are most 
often concerned in order to win over public favor 
their program. "I Like Ike" reflects a favorable short-range 
of the. warm~h and sincerity the public felt h~ ·communicated. 
for Nixon's attempts at withdrawal in Vietnam, 
insurmountable problems .in negotiation is a 
the Administration will probably strive for 
committed to Southeast Asia. 
Favorable short-range images are usually ,perceived _as essentic1l 
to the success of a government opinion-maker or his programs. As :.. . . .1 
•- mentioned previously, publicity may guide the development · of. a_ program.· · 
The point is that as government workers give out information, they . 
4ihrhe book cited in chapter two, Political Ideology, explains we11· , 
"what the common man believes," and probes into his image of government, _ .., 
democracy., etc. · Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The :. > _ . 
. MacMillan Company, 1962). Also, the following source provides a < ·:•:. · · ... 
philosophical discussion of images of political roles: -•-· Kenneth Boulding, 
_The -Image -(Arm Arbor: University _of Michigan, .·. 1961), pp. 103-114._ C < 
' · ' , ·, · : · ' ·.· ' 1" ,,, ' ,' ·., , ' ' ,· · ; :'· :_:_-., ::•- :, 
·_,simultaneously communicate an image. Thus, Rosenau's statement · · 
about opinion--mak~rs who·. assert their opinions <)!la subject . in c 
response .to · some communication_ stimulus, may:-be refined : to imply 
that as _government· responds, .they _· help .to create their. own _imag~·;:· 
• (for others , in government and for the public}. Just as in 
interpersonal. relations, \ the receiver of a message extr.acts not 
'.< ... :.,:·.:.:· '.·- .. .. ",.·.<;: _·' ·,:·.·... '_·. -•_-·_ ,:. ' 
only conte:mt, but also a ·· perception· of the . communic_ator .. / , Chapter 
two showed some of the ways government used_ the media to portray an .· 
intended image, as described above. However, by _their wordsand 
actions reported in the mass media, government opinion-makers al~o i'. 
~ommunicate . unintended . images. When , an intended . meaning from ' .. , · ·. 
the .• __ government evok,es ._ ,an opposite response in. the ' public, 'ther~ -is :>· 
.·a •·· boomerang . effect. . A prevalent image-unintended by· gov~rnment----/ 
:.; ' ,· ,, •', ·:: .. :, .--.. ,. : '• .·_ ... ·t: 
•. that is • of g;ave concern to government is the "credibility :gap.'.~ · 
, .. .. ,_- --. -- ·_.·- · . . . . - ·, .. . .· ' .. ' 
.It is >felt tha~ the government _issues some statements . to the _ public 
that are untrue, and the gap widens as the public questions the 
validity of more and more communications not knowing.which to believe. 
At the heart of the matter is that many governmerit statements ,):,::\:: :t-. 
_'_'·i\ "-_,-,·,. 
subject to oversimplification. in news .handling becau~e · ~f . : 
limited spa(?e and limited public interest. For _.·. example, . :in_' response 
: ' ·. :i ,:;_·. : \,:, <··,.· '. . .. 
a .. question on foreign _ troop commitments, it. is much mor~.' si_mp~e . 
. . to . report numbers than to always explain that ·"it is hoped" . the ·\:::; : /:, ·,··_ • ,. ! 
·· commitment · can be down to · such-and-such' "pending a . c~rtain · situation" ,/: : 
<: ·--:-::·~_ >>:·,: 
But unless it is done that way, }he statement 
can later be interpreted as lacking credibility. A recent issue . of .· > 
, Congressional Quarterly reported theLaos involvement_ in a ·way _ that >: 
. heightened/suggestion of a gap. The article . opened wit_h the 
following .two quotations: 45 
we .have .increased our assistance to the (South Vietnamese) 
: government, its _ logistics, and we have not sent .combat troops 
-there, although .training ·missions that we nave there have -
instructed that if they are · fired upon, they are of course 
, to fire back, to protect themselves, but we have not sent · · 
combat .troops in the generally understood sense of the 
-President Johil}i'. Kennect.y, Feb. ,_~4, 1962 • 
. . , - ___ :,.- . -_ .. _- , ' . -,_ ' 
We have_ been providing logistical support and some training · 
for the> neutralist government in order to avoid Laos falling' 
under Communist domination. Asfar .as American power -in Laos 
is concerned, there are none there ·at the present time on a 
combat .basis. 
-President Hi chard M. Nixon, . Sept 7 .. 26, .. 
·The Quarterly's coverage of PresidentKennedy's statement does 
.• not allow for circumstances to change, and for a man t9 adapt his /< 
strategy _tothe circumstance. In Bill Moyers' words, "Events make :: 
·. lies out 'of the best promises.•~46 In 1964, Pr~sident ·Johnson said '-':)) 
that he sought no wider war in Vietnam and that he would not have 
_ A,rner~can men doing the fighting for the Asians. When he widen~d > •/ 
·. ' .... 
· the war in'. 1965, · he was accused of breaking faith with the publ~c, , 
.° ''- ·:·. . :, · ·., 1· .. , 
and therefore of creating a credibility ' gap • . Again, ·\: his. hop~ ·'l,•:' ;\ii: 
'. ;" . . i ,·:•· t ,:_;--:;·_;''./<::', 
filled "promise'' had been given, and th~ public was not willing to 
let him change his mind over time. This attaches a · sense _.of · 
permanence to government response; this. must be realized so that 
• '· . . ·--.· .. ;: .. . 
government .will word statements in a way to _be reported by ithe medi~,,:: 
that reflects . an open mind, subject to change if circumstances >· 
450concern. Grows Over u~s'~I Commitment .in Laos, n 
Quarterly Weekly Report, . October 24, 1969, p. 2069 • 
.46Moyers, p.36. 
,::: 1: 
change without. creating a "credibility gap.ft · 
In addition to the effect of time on strategy, 
other factors .. adding. to the problem of•· credibility on what 
gather from mass media. First, "some things are simply 
for telling.on the time schedule an inquisitive press prefers 
Top government officials .must often resist 
until. they .. can b~ certain •. that. their words 
result. · But they should not wait too long, until 
become so massive as to make their 
credibility. In the Nixon example above, it 
persistentrefusal.to .answer explicity,about 
' activity in Laos that brought fears of. u:•sl~ 
the summer of 1969, press reports began coming from 
personnel were engaged in a clandestine war on ""'"'• ... ...... 
neutralist>government against North Vietnamese-backed 
September 26 news conference, Pres.ident Nixon acknowledged that 
d~-s~;' maintains aerial reconnaissance over Laos, 
do. have perhaps some other activities" which. he 
A new.Senate Foreign Relations. Subcommittee.was 
to the questions over intended Executive response. 
Second, policy-makers. must.often re~chconclusions 
conclusiveevidence.48 ·.• With the. benefit of hindsight, 
later·· analysis should ·reflect .. why .. decisions were made . 
. 47Ibid., - P• 35. 
48Ib.d 
--1;_·' P• 38. 
at the time. In other words, to lessen the credibility 
cooperative government-media effort. 
Credibility is a problem because of some governmental 
given .. in. good faith which circumstances. changed 
statements given to be deliberately misleading. 
an example of.the latter. After Khruschev's May 5, 1960, 
.that an American. reconnaissance plane had been shot .down, 
Aeronautics·and.Space.Administration responded by claiming that 
plane·. had wandered during a. flight collecting weather data. 
, Editorials·bemoaned Soviet cruelty for killing an unarrped pilot. 
days later, Khrushchey announced that. the plane was downed 1300 
miles into/Soviet territory and that the pilot was alive and had 
confessed·. that his mission was to photograph Russian military 
stallations. The U.S. government 
first, the State Department admitted. that their first explanation l:lad : · 
not been entirely accurate. Second, government and mass media bega~ 
to defend the spy mission, but saying that it was not authorized ,bY 
Washington officials. When the U-2 finally became a point of. pride 1 < 
(to show that we would fight Communism with its weapons), Eisenhower 
said that, yes, he was responsible for what had happened. At that 
I .·· •:,:•,•,:•·•••,\ ,·. . ••.r,:,:,•,,,•:_ , :_.;. : 
. time, even Americans backing his position took ,note.· of· the Administrcl.-
tion' s conflicting statements, realizing that only the. last version< 
was true. Lower officials took the blame for mistakes made in 
clandestine operations; yet in democracywhere .the.peoplesupposedly 
have information on what · their government· i.s doing, .the set of 
conflicting_statementswas clear.49 Inthe future, which 
statements would be believed? 
The Bay of Pigs incident is another good case study for 
grounds of. a credibility gap. Fourteen hundred Cuban exiles 
organized, trained, and supplied by the U.S. CIA in hopes of 
establishing a beachhead at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961 
project was kept almost entirely out of the mass media,,and 
did reach the New York Times, it was denied by top officials 
at the height of the invasion, reporters were.told that.five 
thousandpatriotic refugees were going into Cuba. 50. The 
was ·. designed to mislead•· the enemy by misleading everyone. 
Rosenau's theory, the credibility gap is importan\because 
it means>for government response: something happens to 
government responds; in doing anything, they contribute 
image; what they .do must not communicate the image of a 
tween themselves and the public. Thus, government's 
·which is relayed to the public through the mass media, 
adapted to/the medium so that their intended meaning 
communicated. Opinion-makers realize that voters depend upon 
media for seeing candidates . as they ''really are"; 51. 
49Appleton, pp. 248-51 and David Wise 
U-2 Affair (New York: Random House, 1962). 
50Toid., PP• 25a-274. 
51The Langs found in a 1956 study that viewers believe 
catch the "real" person-qualities of a familiar te:J,.evision face. 
They drew some conclusions on what about personalities 
ceive. Kurt and Gladys Lang, "The TV Personality in 
Public Opinion Quarterly, XX (Spring, 1956), p •. 103-111. 
and they dep~nd upon the media for some unders~anding :of 
Therefore, one means by which government can communicate the 
; .·~ --: --:•-_ :., ·:·i' ·.'.:, ' :. ·; -·.-._, -. . 
it intends to, is by learning to use. themedia effectively. 
Poli-ticians.·and opinion-makers in .government . ' 
increasingly aware of .the media of communication, : particularly teleyi,s~Qil• 
Over half. of .the. nation'S state governors employ personnel with back--?). 
~' I 
All,>top federal,O-: officials have:'. 
).-~vailabl~ i d~:;ect or •• indi; ~~t_ •••• counsel -uJ6~ communicatio~: through. _i.: ·- . 
the media. ' Poli~ical candidates at every level are .beginning t~ 
,;_ :, _• .·::··.",.·· .. - : , , _ :.:: : : • .. '·,",:.··.·· •'. - __ .-, _·, 
J .. employ-tfimage . specialists" .- who -• concentrate upon portraying _8: 
fayorab1.e,: ~rn~•ge . o,f the ca.11:didat~ to the public~ -
. _ ·. · Repercu~sions of this situation are being speculated and ques~i9I1ed~ 
···Questions such as the followingare being asked: . What effect d~es.. , .':./'.·· 
the medium have upon politics? · .Is there a new politictan? · What. ',; .. . y: 
>· effect does the medium have upon the public's image of government? 
The Selling of the President 1968 is a book written .to pop-
•·. lllarize th~ >notion that the television medium. ha_s an .effect ,upon •' ·.•) , 
i ;oiiti~~. 54} It shows how image .. specialists working f .or a . Cl3lldidate); ,: 
. ·: . ' ; ·_ , 
. can reveal only selected attributes of .a man that will .''sell'' him to \) 
the public Instead of a .candidate's position on public _poltcy, a .. ,:.-:: 
: .> 
mc:>re important factor . might be the temperature of the. TV .. studio : .. , ... 
which determines how sweaty the . candidate .will appear. :-: He . is fed : .,, .,! 
. words tha~ "offend nobodyfl when he has a heterogeneous,pational , 
audience. ". McGinniss' work gives popularity tohi_s notion of, the : 
52see 'chapter ·5. 
53 - · Baldwin, P• 152. 
54Joe McGi.nniss, The Selling of the President 1968 (New York: Tf ident _: 
Press, · 1969). 
70' 
importance of the medium to the message; .the following quotation 
from Cornwell is a more exacting statement .. of the role of. the image .. 
of political personalities in the electronic media:. 
In a crisis, the public will listen to the Chief Executive ... 
almost regardless of the elegance or inelegance of his prose 
and delivery. But in the long pull, television inexorably 
demands that. he be an effective and persuasive speaker, 
and be able at the same time to radiate·· confidence,· concern, 
warmth, and sincerity. Even if, as an individual, he had the 
potential to do all of this·•·· super la ti vely, he must. have .the< 
additional ability to find and concert effectively the 
talents of the numerous supporting cast which television just.<' 
as imperatively demands. No President, obviously, •·is likely 
to be able to act as his own specialist in .. the art and science · , 
'/,::i: of TV program production. He must .use intelligently and 
imaginatively the skills of others. And since no President 
can prepare his own script. unaided, he must be able .. to· recruit' 
and mesh the efforts of writers who·· can write prose that. will ;.: · 
be distinctly his in style and. ideas.. The ultimate test is. <i: 
his ability to do all of this, while at the same .. time enhancing· 
rather than blurring his individual image as.the •source 
of initiative and energizer of public policy. His individuality·, 
is a key asset which--must not b,5ome\submerged in .a collegial • · effort by hucksters and ghosts. ) ···•• >< . ··• . / . · ) 
Because opinion-makers' responses to communication stimuli·• are 
often "prepared and presented" .by mass media •. experts (for the opini911--
makers), there has been. a rapid growth of the study. of. public 
relations and what is ethical in the field. Anessay.by Charles 
SteinQerg established.that ethical public relations•operates 1:>etween · 
two disparate polarities. On the one hand, some philosophies, \such ·· 
;ii ' 
,as David. Riesman' s, .view the public as a vast lonely crowd that is 
,., . ·' \ 
0other-directed" by .the manipulation.,of. public relations .. men; 
independence of thought and action is .not valued by the public. · The{ 
implication of this view is that techniques are purposefullydesigI3:ed 
55cornwell, Presidential Leadership of· Public Opinion, p. ·· 294. :.r ·· 
the public image of politics 
On the· other .extreme is a philosophy which accepts 
· ·,.; . ' 
. . ·::·- \./(. -·-:-._:--· :.' 
techniques uncritically because whateve:r occurs ... is an inevitable 
. ' . ·. · .•.. ·'·. ..·· .. . · ... ·-:,,<· ., ·;_. '. ' 
concomitant of mass .communications ·in a .mass society. 
,.· .··.·,-. -_. __ ,:;c·-i : :_ . _- ·. -_ . ' . . . . 
,that the middle ground, and the most acceptable ground, is 
that publi,c relations techniques be examined criticaI.ly so 
ethical means are practiced; in this way, public . relations 
as a valuable ,c,atalyst ,to effective and ·accurate communication 
. ,,-,<> . ···. . 56 
the gov~rnment .. and the. public. 
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Reco~zing .the importance of. the medium, some writer~ have .· 
expressed concern that the medium is deciding who. is and who. is not 
eligible "political personality." · Take, for example, .this statement; . 
Most recently a new type of politician has begun to emerge. He 
is not in the"Inner Club." Rather he is a man versed in the 
· subtleties of appealing . beyond Congress directly to the mass 
audience. He knows the formula of the news release, the ., -· 
timing, the spoon-feeding necessities of the publicity drive • 
. , He is an artist at stealing the Monday morning headlines with ; 
the Sunday afternoon TV interview, twice gleaning the harvest · 
of a single effort. He may be actually quite unindustrious, 
but he is an expert at skimming the cream of public at ~7ntion whil~_ eschewing the thin milk of legislative drudgery • . · ·· •· ·•''. ': 
the answer is probably not found in an t' ex.tremelf 
position . such as the one stated above. Perhaps .. · the "new poli ticiantt 
an expert in politics as the"old politician," and his ability to 
handle the mass media or to choose good public relations advice is 
-.•i,._, : • 
simply in addition to his political expertise. There has always been , . 
some criterion relating to the individual's ability to communicate his ---- .. __ ' . ' --, . . ·-_ __ ·. . _.· ' 
56charles S. Steinberg, "Public Relations and· Mass . Communication,t' .' .: .· 
Mass Media and Communication, ed. Charles S. Steinberg (NewYork: . ·.·. , 
Hastings House, .1966), pp.401-7. 
: .. · 57c t 65 · · · ·. a er, ·• p. . • 
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ideas clearly and effectively. An elected or appointed officialhas 
always had to '~sell" himself by some means. Through the years, the > 
channels of communication by means of . which he · attempts ;to . do that . hav-~ ·•· 
.. - . 
changed. ~f may not be appropriate to say that . since a carl.didate must·:• . 
be .able to project himself over the mass media \hat this is any more 
negative a criterion than past eras have had; it may .. be just different. 
: "• '·; • '. _· , ·, 
As political. candidate in the days b~f ore Woodrow Wil~c;:n:~, :. physical 
stamina and ability to project one's personality in speeches were. 
portant criteria-how many hours could one withstand waving to 
people from t .he back of trains, and how many speeches could .. one . give .. to · 
maximize contact with the public. • Stamina or physical enduran~e. in:.tl}~s , 
. .._- .-,--- .;; .. ' . ·,, ·' 
context is . no .. more rational a criterion for selectio~<Qf ; •. presiden~·•}\ 
or congressman than ability to project well . in .the mass media. Whatever· 
· the channel of communication to the public, it has been import~t . : 




"The news and interpretation of an event are first carried 
by, say, a newspaper; this is then read and adapted by 
opinion-makers, who assert their opinions in speeches on 
the sub.ject that are reported by the press ••• ff 
Step two of the four-step flow ofcommunication involved the 
of government response to communication stimuli. Government opinion-mru,cers 
provide information for the press by giving.speeches, holding news confer-
ences, prov:i.ding press.releases and occasionally letting out trial balloons 
or leaks. When government responds to stimuli in those ways, it communi-
cates an image of itself as part of the "hardfacts" it attempts todissem-
inate to the public. The channels of communication opinion-makers employ 
to convey a favorable image to at.her government opinio~-makers ~d to the 
public run the gamut of what is technologically. available-inter-office·'-
memorandumsto public.speeches to television interviews. The use. of.mass 
media, oneof opinion-makers'.most important channels,is the aspect relevant 
to this thesis. It is virtually the only channel by which governmen~ 
heads .can speak directly :to the public on a mass scale. And, by cop.-
vention, the press is. one of the most influential ways government workers 
communicate among themselves, such as from a freshman congressman.to the 
chief executive. 
For the reasons above, the way mass media treats information it , 
prints ( or does not print) is important in the government-public 
communication process. This chapter-the third step in the four--step 
flow--deals with how the media communicate information fed by government or 
which they observe about government. To provide background understallding fpr 
the rest of. the chapter, Twill begin with a discussion of the roles of a 
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reporter, including how he perceives his own role. Second, this chapter 
deals with the "gatekeeper" theory which shows how a story can be:, :-'" 
changed as it moves down the line on its way to publication. Third;· 
this chapter looks at three distinct aspects of media treatmentto 
particular story-word choice, factors of omission, .and emphasis. 
A Reporter's.Roles 
Assuming that how a reporter perceives his role ultimately:affects 
the information available to the public, researchers are investigating mass 
media reporters' attitudes and perceptions of their jobs. 
their relationship to the government and_to the public? 
Bernard Cohen outlined reporters' formalviews_on their roles,·on 
the basis of extensive interviewing with Washington correspondents •. He 
· found that: most reporters distinguish two basic roles: the neutral 
role and the role as participant. 1 Neutral rolescan be subdivided into 
three parts, according to the correspondents' perceptions. 
(1) Mass media"Neutrally" informs the public about events 
·about people making the news. Reporters expressed the traditional 
view that their function is to give factuaLinformation so that the people 
can make their own judgmentsabout public affairs issues; thissuppor~s 
the classical notion that the public makes the decisions in democracy, and 
the more accurate the information they have available, the better _ 
they will make. However, when questioned more closely, reporters 
,·,,1 
recognized that classical view as only an "ideal;" actually, they 
said, the public in our democracy simply reacts to decisions 
1 Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 23-4L 
an elite~ · (More specifically, : 
of decisions. made by an elite.) 
to mass media reports 
\. (2) A .necessary part of . the news dissemination process 
, ;a;-, ··•,-_- __ .,--- .- ·, •.; .' . ,- • . _.·-. ' 
. ,.- · ._>--=· · ._: .· -__ - -,: _; '._ ; _ : . ·: .. ... ··:-·- ·• . . .-: -_ , _. ·. ·-.: ,. · . . -, -_ . 
. interpretation, · which they distinguish~d from 1teditorializing.1', 
' ; The latter is . imposing jud.gments of good or .• bad' upon ,news' .~hile 
; ".' •.' 
> interpret.ati6n is not an attempt to color the news, but simply 
·· to make, meaningful obser-vations, clarify, and organize :: t _he . m~ss 
.. of 
.-,,:., 
press generally perceived itself as being . useq ~s an 
Although most representatives did 
·, no;t,r~a~i.\y- ', admit· ..  to. being. used to the. detriment 
: :. porting for the public, they pointed out that it 
.,•. ,• ' ,' . .- · ·, · : -- ·, ,' .,,,· ... ·,.·:· 
. :: government opinion-maker with a policy to : sell provides the > reporter ··• · 
. with information and copy· he needs. 
The pressmen Cohen interviewed also saw themselves as particip~Ilts 
inthe policy-making process in .at least four ways. 
(1) News correspondents claim, usually wi.th pride, to .be re-
of the public. · In their direct contact with decision- · 
makers and opinion-makers, . they pose .· questions and challenges that 
account for .their public trust. This particular role .~rovides the 
1 ,-... . ·_ ' '\ 
• justification upon which newsmen build a liberating approach for • thei_I' : 
,· • . . . .. ·. i" · 
, ,:, 
participation in public affairs. · By .nl?rotecting the ·pul:>lic,n theyi'.({ :; 
' ··' . .. . ' .- , ·_ •· -. · , 
find both the sanction of traditional democratic theory and the blesstng · 
of modern theory on how public decisions actually take shape. In a :: . 
sense, ... newsmen adopt their own Burkean philosophy-acting as fr-ee agents, 
they pursue _their, own interpretation of :the public interest.~ 
(2) Criticizing government is a. recognized function of the press 
Regarding themselves as a fourth branch of government, newsmenview\one 
of their responsibilities as· "checking".theother three branches. This 
is the theory of the press that Fred Siebert labe.ls .• "libertarian.nf 
Reporters tell with pride of times when their stories.forced governmental 
reconsideration of policies; with a bit· of "Drew Pearson" in. many·• 
reporters,·. they relish exposure of government wrong-doing. 
(3) . The press is often an advocate .. of certain policy on 
pages andon every page. Advocacy in news columns is aimed 
public •and.for the policy-makers. 
(4) One step stronger than point "3" above, the. press also 
as policy-maker. Newsmen see themselves as actors in the policy-
making process, directly and openly attempting to influence 
the .decision-makers. The Alsops interpreted this role 
Sheer force of.circumstance has made the American press 
the only forum in which our national debate is carried on. 
It is mainly carried on in the news columns (or, as we hope, 
columnists·· dealing in facts), by the publication. and counter 
pu~lic~tion §f barrages of information Qni~ll sides of 
maJor. issue. ·. · •·• ·. < 
If the· aforementioned views· are the ba.ses upon which the 
Washington press thinks of .its role, they are the bases upon 
.are written and reported. Mitchell Charnley, 
what the.roles and responsibilities of . a reporter should be, 
should think of himself as. artist and craftsman, . inve,stigator 
the 
2Fred Siebert, R.C. Peterson.and·Wilbur Schramm, Four Theoriesof 
Press (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Pr-e-ss--l-9_5....,6 ... ),-.. -P--,•-•••·-51. 
3cohen, ·p. 41. 
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interpreter.t . However, studies _. of "ordinary" suburban . reporters reflect 
a ,different ·self-image. 
For ~x:ample, in . one suburban area, > the average . reporter was 
· contrained .by his limited images of self, role~ and community, or 
t + >~ords
0
o.f Robe~ J~~d,Was ua pr~soner of his . own P.erception of 
~ms:;f, hi: job and the news."{ Unlike. the Washington corresponden\s 
·. Cohen inte~~wed, Judd found men who were d~eply engrained in a 
·_ bureaucratic . world composed of employers, bosses, and co-workers; 
times . tradition, some~imes pressure made the reporters most highly 
coITIInitted t() the reportorial standards imposed by their boss •. '. In 
· other words, :·. the reporter's perception of his role was ln relation to his 
' ,_._. ___ .. . 
; .. . : -, 
·:_ boss (maintaining his job) rather than in relation to the government '\;: 
(participating in formation of policy) or in relation to. the public 
(~~p~es_enting or protecting -the . public) • 
. ,, -' · For the four-step flow theory, : the reporter's perception o~ his 
role is important because ,it influences what he reports and .how he reports 
itr If the reporter considers himself. "spokesman for the public, 
, ' ; 
he is likely .: to try to seek out · information that would help the public .in 
its demands for better government. · On the other hand, · if the reporter ,' · · 
·-\-·:-·-·.-·,.:_-._ :. ·::·.::· ...... · .. 
writes only ito meet his daily quota, he may not go much further in 
passing oninformation to the public than what the government had 
hat1ded him by press release or conference. How the 
4-mtchell V. Charnley, Reporting (Minn~apolis: 
MinnesotaPress, 1966). 
: ·, 5Robert P. Judd, "The Newspaper Reporter in a Suburban City,'' .. 
Journalism Quarterly, XX.XVIII (Winter, 1961), 37. . · ·· · . · 
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role in the government-public communication flow largely determine~ the 
information and opinions.to which the public will be exposed. 
Press-government relations, as touched upon in the previous . 
chapter, affects how the press treats. a story. Journalists such as Cater 
and Cohen established that most·Washington.correspondents find an 
appropriate balance both in principle and practice between the public's 
·: .·. i', :_ .. ··_::,;,;.:_: :'.;; 
right to know(i.e., their right to expose) and the government's right 
t d t t . . . t 6 o con uc some opera ions in priva e. Stili, .· there·. are very practical 
questions about the relationship remaining. For. example, "is absolutely 
nothing to be printed about clandestine plans by the President tomount 
an illegal invasion of Bay of Pigs in. Cuba .. forfear of interfering wit.h 
the· President I s option· to humiliate the country? Are the 
denied information about Presidential options that. will involve 
a way they have to finance andfight?"7 If the answer to those questions 
'·:·,-- __ -·.·.:_.:··:'''.''. 
is yes, the following statement by Arthur Sylvester (whom Shawcalled 
Secretary McNamara's flackman) must.also·have sometruth: "News is, 
part of th<3 weaponry of international diplomacy, and the results .' 
justify the methods we use." 8 
In commenting upon the press-government relationship, Walter Lippmann 
cautioned that we should separate terms such as ttmanaged news,11 
"deyeption,n "lying," etc. Deception.in the nation's self-interest may 
occasionally occur, while deliberate lying in reporting is rare. Managed 
6Markel discusses in detail when and why the press must ask itself 
whether to remain silent in the national interest.• Lester Markel.,tf'Marl~ge-
ment' of News," Saturday Review, February 9, 1963, pp~ 50~51+. . · < 
7 James Heston, ''The Press, the President and Foreign Policy," Foreign 
Affairs, XLIV (July, 1966), 553-573. 
8 Robert M. Shaw, "The Danger of Getting Used to Lies, 0 Vital Speeches, 
XXXII (March 15, 1966), 332. 
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•- -• . . -.. ' ._, -· . .. 
((neJ~} / he ., said, \ is. impos:~ible to avoid; ·.his. ;xpJ.a.nation of<~ti; ··i.s·• a •··.• ·good 
,_,·- ·.• - , .-
.tie~:iri with th~ rest of this chapter • 
. ·. It is . naj_;Ei )o • Supp6se t!i1t f~ public affairS there .. is 
thing as ohe . genuine, historically accurate version. Because 
i, the raw facts are indigestible, news has tobe and will be 
managed. It. will be .selected, · played up or down, clarified, 
sometimes obfuscated, emphasized-sometimes for good reas~ns, 
·sometimes for bad reasons, sometimes for no reason at .all. 
reporter interprets his duty and howhe reports the story 
' .-.· . _" .. _,_ ,:.·_--. · _:... ; . .· , 
.its ohly a snialL '. part :~:r the total picture. ·Wheri a stocy leaves the hands 
:' 'of -a reporter~ it may be changed four or five or more times before · it . 
reaches the mass media. The story undergoes further selection all the 
,•, ' . 
way down the line, competing with other stories 
_- ;··_- .' 
_. stories that make their way into the media have survived a lengthy 
. chain of individuals who .could .have om:itted them or changed them at 
point. This is known as the "gatekeeper11 process. Gatekeeper studies 
:are usually empirical, .·· systematic examinations of the behavior of those 
persons who control the fate .of news stories at various points in. the 
,' process, lO including at least the reporter, wire service editor, copy-
. • . 
:r-eaders, translators, . city editor and edit.or of the p~per or produ.cer of 
·the · news broadcast. · Four men-· Lewin, White, McNelly, · and Bass-have 
; contributed to the development and refining of the theory. 
Social psychologist Kurt Lewin originated the gatekeeper concept 
during World War II to explain how food came to reach thefamily table 
9walter Lippmann, "Managed News," Newsweek, Apri1 •15, 1963 p. 23. 
·ktri~ .M~~:a~~:!:~~~~~n:~e=~i!~r!11~~~=w~:r=~=~ ~~~t,i~:oz~~~d~~~iety, 
Free Press, 1964), p. 174. . . 
Food does not move by its own impetus. Entering or not · entering 
.a channel and moving from one section of a channel. is effected by 
a "gatekeeper." The ·" gatr1:re.gions'~ a~e gC>~erned >e.ither by · impart,ia}~i, rules or by a gatekeeper. ·•· ·· · · · · ·· · · 
, .. ·. · .· ' . ·_ ·- ... , 
Lewin suggested that his findings would apply not onlYto a ~food 
!·•-.· : ' · ., :- .... ··:<-· .. ·:._·.:... . ·;·: ·-: .·. · -- ...... ·_·:. :-•" >i-:,'_-,: : ·:.': :· _ : .- :_- ;"_'; __ :. , _-_-- . ·.:.:,:,_ :: .-· .. _.,.· 
chain but\ al~6 to the traveling of .· a . news 1 tern throu~h, certain : 
communication .channelsin .• a group. 12 Wllen. David ManIJ'.hig .White picked · 
• - • . - • , • I 
.i . up thenoti(}n, ' ~e appli,ed >the theory to the large groups of people · .. tt,U. 
if 1[01 ved ir getting •the /tory •• of .an evert communicatt~; fr~~ r~PmeI'J~~ 
public through the mass. media. 13 White. explained the theory as fo11~w5: 
. Thus a story is transmitted from on6 gatekeeper after. another iri.'.(<. :: 
the · cha.in of communications. · .From reporter to rewrite man, .thrmigh'."\ 
bureau chief to "state" file editors· at various press association (>' · 
< offices, the process of choosing and discarding is continuously · · · 
taking place. And finally we come.to our last gatekeeper. This ,is 
the man who is usually known .as the wire . editor on the nonmetro- <i'· 
· ~oli tan .:1ewspaper • . l~e .. has p~arge er ~he .· selection .?.f /.11ationa+. :~~S: ~: 
international news. . .. . . . . . ·. > . .. _ , . . ... ·· • : _., <': ... .: -
,::•::;,-:-' . ,,,··;, 
In White's 1949 study, he >found ·a cooperative edi~or who ·saved :. 111::\ 
• his unused wire copy for a week, making brief notation. on · each story 
12Ibfd.:, P• 187. 
13When .White made the transfer, he changed Lewin's n.otion from '.'.: : 
•, one referring to the gatekeepers within .a family unit (i.e., "in a · i:i.·/ 
group") to ), one referring to the long chain of gatekeepers before · .. ;.:: 
news reaches the family. A true transfer would not have gone beyond):. 
a market . analysis of the family news-obtaining pattern. Abraham -·· ·· · 
Z~ 1 Bass, 0Refining the 'Gatekeeper' Concept: A UN Radio Case Study,~! 
Journalism Quarterly, XLVI (Spring, 1969), 71. · .!;_ 
14navid Manning White, "The Gatekeeper: 
· Selection of.News," Dexter and White,: p. 163. 
Study. in th~ 
:·--,,. _. .:.·· .• :·- ' .--_.- _-. . 
not .used. In 1966/>Paul Snider replicated White's study. 
>,( ._.'. : . -___ ·.:. ' , ·. ·,: .,_·,: . . ·-.:- .:>.>::·._ ,:,- >. _-:_ . -_,·,:.. . " .· :_ . .. ···< 
had ._ the sa.niJ ·: editor--s;;enf~~n years later-save•-• unuseJ copy and 
'.~~e illCltation ~n eB.c~ ~to!Y t hy{t,.i;~I1ot . used~ 15 
: :.: ·. - - _ - . . .. ----: "; 
/ ,,;,' 
John McNelly "extend.ed' the application::of White's gateke~pe~ . 
<:<theory to in"t~rilational stor:i.~s (iricl11ding both stories -~bout other 
} riat:ions and a.bout the U.S. that · are sent ~broaci.)16 He tr~ced the ··_ 
.... passage o'r a story >from the repo'rter. at the event through various .. 
' . 
. ,wire ·service editors to the telegraph editor to the· reader~ ·. All 
:, r.:1iong the way, :··people are deciding whethef ~:r:- not ·· to let/ it ·through; 
,_.:·._., . ·-: ' .·.:_:· . ·.'.:.. :· '-:.:· ... ·: . : . ' : .. _· .. _:· .. ·.' ' _··. i'::.· . . .,,,. . ., , ;··:· ·. ,· ·.· •' ·. ( ' - ,_' 
.>&nd when it is let through, they ·contribut~ t~ its forill and substance, 
,,: revamp •it for a be,tter ·play in certain other; countries; "they 
translate it, '• and they censor. Before the story even i;~-~ches the 
·. foreign wire service . office, editorial selection, transl~tion, error, 
' -·, ·,. _, , ,',' : ·· · .,·, 
bias, censorship, andtrarismissiondifficulties are introduced; 
(:,thus, McNelly···concluded that: the most importaht gatekeeping is 
::<before news reaches the wire. editor of a news~aper. 
: and explanation of gatekeepers in the flow i ·s on the 
Abraham Bass has refined the theories of White and McNelly 
_ because _ he felt that -White's attention to .the local telegr~ph editor 
'. _·, -.. -_. 
·.should be focused instead at the central wire agency editOr, and that 
r:McNelly should differentiate more highly the varying functional roles 
of the various -newsmen and of the public. Bass came up with what he' ' 
15 > - ·: Paul 'B. Snider, "Mr. Gates Revisited: A 1966 Version of the 
1949 Case ~tudy," Journalism Quarterly, XLIV (Autumn, 1967), 4J.9. 
16John T. ·McNelly, "Intermediary Comrnurrl.~ators in the International 
: Flow of. News," Journalism Quarterly, XXXVI (Winter, 1959), 23-27. 
Gatekeepers in •the International Flow 
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From.: Journalism QuarterlK, XXXVI (Winter, 1959), p. 25. 
'.° has\· called a . 0 doubie-action internal riewsflow" 
:';1o~•proce~~·•·.·· .. iiito· two isegments ivlith different 
tdia:gfam .. of' the -•' rlow )is·ishowri<orr the following' page . -) 
News ' ga,thering is the 'i'irst -part (or the ' proc'ess, 
>I3~s;~ This _ . . refers to activity .of 
\~'arieditor .or bureau chieff who col.leC:t information 
)iews copy. On ·a national scale{ this . is the role of 
·\ ocal .:rep6rte~~ headed by··_ a 
:r~tru~ture. · The ',second part of the · process is news_ processing, 
>-:f•~fers ·•to chkiges internaltb the news· iterA as it is handled: and 
,', adapted. It ; consists of copy ::~di ting, 'translating and' modifying 
:io~arneeds,· heavily or lightly -a~. policy di~tat'es, tO prepare a 
· unified · package of news that is ready Tor · distribution to the ,: public. 
\ ·,: , · ', .. · ', ·,i ·• ·. . . . ' . '.:: '', • . . :·. · .. •• , " ' ' ' ' · .. · ·. · . .. . ·,· · . ~rhe consumer /public is_ outsidi the news operation, accordlr1g., t() 
,: :_. . . 
because it is outside the press and deals only with the 
-the. news operation. 
·,· ., ,· . 
-: Quite an amount of research has been collected~- regarding "''"'~ ...... 
-treatment in the news gathering and news processing stages. 
::cl!ldwriters ~re the first gatekeepers that .affect what is :reported 
and how it is co~unicated. We have already discussed t,he ~eporler's 
'· self-perceptions· which serve as ·the base from which he shapes the news. 
Depending upon '. the type of reporter referred to, there 
answered questions about his activity. Is he a passive gatekeeper 
·who merely accepts and complies with his editor's instructions? 
the only demand he places upon himself reflected in this.statement: 
-17 -Bass, pp. 69-72. 
.<-: Dbtib1e-Actfon Internal Newsflow 
:_: ·--::-; :i· . .-:_-- ' ::--. __ :·. ·::<:-- .· -_ .-_ .' 
Ga:tek'eepers that Gather and Process News :' 
:.-, ;• :·:'·;~:~~~~:1~:o ~w1c±~c~it/h6~·~::t~:~:.at~~{:rti~e.~I:;\~::··itte~:.~~~··:~~ih;;o~~!oi:-io~'·<;,:/'; {?}:t:: 
'} •.': and · unify . the . items into the "completed product"-a newspaper •or ·a news broadcast-that is deliver- ,/ '..': ,:.'<-,). : .. · .. able to the public. Doth of these functionally different steps internal to the institutions of The Press , :// · ::;,-,. •_::. ;_::;:.:;have sub-steps where the generalized tasks ai:e lm~le~cntcd. News gatherers and news processors maY it/· 
\ \. belong . to the same or . corpo;ately . different . orga1~1zat1ons_. , News . processors may . re~cive _"news copy'' . ,:. ·•. , . , 1, L .:.!!2:1:..Y~ews gatherers . . .. · .. . · .. ... , .•. ... ::,.~ _  ._,,. .. ,.,,, . ·-· ·-·'·-·-·.· ----· ·  ... . ~ ...;....-'---'~~ ~ .. ... ; · .··. :.::...; . v> · i 
• . Journalism Quarterly, XLVI >(Spring; :1969},: p • 
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.::"If it looks good,>i-t isgood -enough. .to get i ~~st our editor'~ gate."18 . 
:> <( • > . . ·.. . . .. · ' • • • \ . / •••• . ' 
>Leo Rosten' s survey of newsmen in the 1930' s showed them.- slanting 
>~heir stories~ to please their employers because they would be altered._ 
: ' anyway. • Ov-e;: 'r:tfty-fi ve percent indicated I that .: they had. ;had. stories . 
i'\ cti.t down, . played down, and. omitted because of policy reasons •19 
Suchan environment would breed passive gatekeeping. 
Or ·is the reporter a more active gatekeeper who 
. . . ··:' ,. . . _-
editor's choices? . 'rn the {960' s Rosten asked . th~;-same 
l( questions he had asked three decades before. Less than teri' percent 
. feplied ·thataithough···their orders were tobe objective, •··•· ·· tha.t "they 
hb\-1 th~ · bo~s actually wanted the . stories played • . ·0n1y seven 
percent said that ·their stories had ·been played down, cut, or killed 
"·> ··. ,< 20 
for policy reasons. The reporters whom this survey represents accurate-
... :,.· ' _. 
0: ly are allo~ed by their job's structure to write as they wish and 
'· be their own gatekeepers. 
McNelly said that one purpose of his study of .gatekeepers in 
was to contribute to progress in clearing away obstacles 
a free flow. Hopefully, a recognition of purposive and other errors 
·in the gathering of news will be minimized when scholars call 
attention to their existence. 
National wire services are another step in the gatekeeper process. 
•. What makes it over the wire has survived a series of gatekeepers. 
18Judd, p. 40. 
19william L. Rivers, The Opinion Makers (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1967), pp. 174-175. 
20Ib.d _2:..•, P• 178. 
However, inmeasuring the importance of.national wire 
against production problems for determining what gets 
production is a grea~er factor. In a study. of twenty 
afternoondailies where,wire content was.the greatest 
newspaper content, criteria.such as the following were most 
in. determining which articles appeared: 
early. the. story· wa.s filed, closing times and wire service 
In.his studies of a local editor, White found that 
stories from all sources could be divided into two categories: 
1) rejecting the incident as unworthyof being reported and 
from among.several reports of the same event for reasons such 
indicated above. In the replicated study, seventeen years 
unused copy with notations. of why each story.was not 
consistent response. The main changes were that the 
wire service, had abetterbalanced news.report, 
human interest stories. 
press. is. m?:re concerned with '.'hardlf news; both the.· wire 
: the editor\produced better balanced products in 1966.· 
gatekeeping approac~ was the same in 1949 and 1966; he 
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in broad categories, but did not try to. fill any real or ..J..1u,;;1.F,.J .. .1.J.v•u 
quotas for·. any particular category to .achieve balance. 
:Editors. of national magazines also serve as 
case study.ofCharles.Mohr, an experienced White 
21Robert Jones, Verling Troldahl, and J.K. Hvistendahl, 
Selection Patterns from a State TTS Wire," Journalism·Quarterly, 
XXXVIII (Winter, 1961), 303-312. Also Guido H. Stempel III, "How 
Newspapers Use the Associated Press Afternoon A-Wire," Journalism · 
Quarterly, XLI (Summer, 1964), 380-384. 
: . . 
>for Time illustrates that :point. Mohr fil~dreports from 
l'()r ~onths /isJowing thai t~; • Diem goveI'lllllent was shaky and that U. 
( South,. Vietnamese ,.efforts were not faring well. : But, ·w~en Mohr'~ 
; : · ,'. .·.;' ,• ,_., ··.• ,, .. . • .•,I .·· ,• •,' ' ; 
._, reports apP,~ared.:in print, tl1ey had been twisted .to indicate _that > 
,-_• -.;·-·;- -_ .. _·::·( .-_ ,· ,i-_. . •- : ; 
J?fem ,w;swinnln~! -. The .Managing Editor disregarded Mohr'S appeals, 
:_:; and began t,~ cpunter flatly any statements against . Diem_. · Next 
he published an attack against Vietnam . correspondents. · The only .... , 
• .._. . . -c • . . • '. • . . . • • • •• •• • • : • • • - : - , 
,· . .· . . . . . - _ ·_. . ·, 
·superior Editor. who could have overruled the article before being 
pu~~ished! was called i~· as . soorl ::Possible; h~ recommended that ..• . 
a _correctiv£;; story be published instead of allowing Mohr to resign • 
. . - Iioweyer, · the "corrective" _ version also went through the Managing 
,;?• .. ; ,- :· 
) '.; Mitor; s edit basket again so that when the . story appea~ed, Mohr , 
< •• d 22 ·· resigne • > 
A_l967, study investigating ·eighty-eight purposive communicators~ . 
important questions about what types of stories editor.s . ----. 
publication. The study measured a purposive communicator,'s < 
placing news in the media by by-passing all gatekeepers 
Contrary to expectation, tpe successful,..:? (· 
agents' own. news judgments were · ~loser. to the editors' · values than ,_:: :";::::: 
' ' 
were the agents' perceptions of the. editors' values. · Actual agree-
ment in judgments and values was therefore more closely ,linked to . 
· success in placing news than was accuracy of perception. · Furthermore,: 
' ' , . 
.' the researcher found evidence to justify his. conclusion that · what 
.··. ' . ,, ·_ ,. _. ', 
makes it ·by gatekeepers is more closely determined by situational · 
.- _.-,-,,·; · 
,.-. ' . 
•1c_· ·, 
factors and actual agreement ( or disagreement in the Mohr study) · · · 
on journalistic values than by overt public relations activity, 
including maintenance of extensive face-to-face contact. 23 
88. 
Publisher activity is yet another part of the chain of gate- .· 
24 keepers. Some significant conclusions reached in a 1967 study · · 
of publishers' influence on news content were: (1) the larger the 
newspaper circulation, the less active was the publisher in news 
direction; (2) publisher activity was higher in areas that might 
affect the newspaper's revenue; 25 (3) there was less prevalent 
activity in use or non-use of news than in content or display; 
(4) less than one-fourth of the publishers were judged by their 
managing editors as inactive in the newsroom ("seldom" ·or "never" · 
active). 
In reporting opinion-makers' assertions about public affairs, 
the way the media reports the story will determine the message · 
the public receives. All of the people involved in the gatekeeper 
process play a part in determining what news will be 
how it will be reported. 
One final point-this chapter has spoken largely of the 
and newspapermen. Once Franklin Roosevelt wrote this to the 
President of North Carolina University after noting the odds the 
Administration faced in getting a certain story past the hostile 
23Phillip J. Tichenor, "Predicting a Source's Success in Placing. 
News in the Media," Journalism ·Quarterly, XLIV (Spring, 1967), 32-42. 
·-. . : ' 
24navid R. Bowers, "A Report on Activity by Publishers in Directing 
Newsroom Decisions," Journalism Quarterly, XLIV(Spring, 1967), 43-52. 
25However, a case study of the Medicare issue did not indicate that 
the way a gatekeeper perceives public opinion alters his behavior. Lewis 
Donohew, "Newspaper Gatekeepers and Forces in the News Channel" Public •· 
Opinion Quarterly, XXXI (Spring, 1967), 61-67. 
I wish the advent of television could be 
What· the President meant is 'clear-that he could 
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in which~ could regulate the news he wanted the public 
Ingeneral, however, today the gatekeepers operating for 
. ' ' 
similarly operating in radio and television. Those 
news are probably even more .active because less can 
Roosevelt was probably 
projections, because a presidential address would be 
receive complete live coverage of almost any news 
from government opinion-makers 
in1~er1ue:u for dissemination in the mass media are put on tape which 
allotment given to that particular 
as .. determined. by all the gatekeepers. 
gatekeeper theory shows how stories are passed from one 
. . ' . . . 
to ariother in the chain .of communication. At each of its 
points, it is either passed on or deleted from further 
If it is passed on, anything done to it will affect 
of its influence on public opinion. Gatekeepers _in the news 
stage can alter a story in three ways: omission, word choice, 
26 
This last part of the chapter will cover those three 
. of media treatment. They . are important to the flow theory 
they ·show how a gatekeeper's biases influence media content 
Cornwell Elmer, Jr., Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion 
(Bloomington: . Indiana University Press, 1965), p. 256. 
and therefore affect the information mediated to the public. 
First, .. any gatekeeper along the channel of news-flow can 
a story or part of a story to<remove it from further flow. 
question of who cuts out stories is in part a reflection of the 
culture and.political system. Newspapers in Communist 
for example, print only stories that have 
gatekeeper. As·• the arm of government extended . to 
press is contro}led and :regulated because .of the government's 
desire to control 0reality.n27 
governments do not function as a gatekeeper other than in the 
general sense.of supplying the media with some information 
withholding other information from nationwide publicity. 28 
An.e:x:ample of omission can best illustrate how public 
is affected. One such example involved the Topeka, Kansas __ _ 
Journal, which with its Republican editorial bias, omitted 
publication a Drew • Pearson column. which complimented the 
Governor of Kansas on his. trip to South America. 
have gone unnoticed, had the column not been 
editors, some of whom encouragedits being offered 
advertisement. When it was reprinted in the Pictorial Times29 
27 George Gerbner, "Press Perspectives in World Communism, •i 
Journalism Quarterly, XXXVIII (Summer, 1961),• 313-322. 
28There are limited exceptions. Since 1924, there has been a city-
owned radio station (AM-FM) and television station in New York. Saul 
Scher, "An Old City Hall Tradition: New York's Mayors and WNYC," 
Journal of Broadcasting, X (Spring, 1966), 137-144. 
29The Pictorial Times is a paper established in Topeka a few years 
ago to offer a different perspective on city news .and.to provide 
competition for the Stauffer Publications which owns the city's·. two 
newspapers, ~.commerical VHF-TV. station, and one of four radio<s~citions. 
' C' . ) \··•· 'f ( !; ~~q7?~Ji!'~Cl~et~oihsf-'t 
,they/; en :'more• pu , t 'I;• i ... ::,.,(, .. ·< . i .:'i . 9:re~ :>.A w~ys/t1Place?Newsfsfot1e's:;i>epfotingU:: 
,,.,.~;'.~::•l\'·~,.~~t{l1!'.tt~1t{6,~#~k~~ilt',}i, ii~[itlttlif lilf !lli~lit!~~ 
~PP.~~ . .. i'IDHE'iTOPEKA'; ST.A:.TE-t JOURNAE· "f-~.1J:?.~~l~§.~}l1::_;)~U° },,~t9,;.;~.~:N.Wtitclt;,Ten~';}r.Q/':" 
1, -p~q}A,F.,;IU~~Rf ir'/wis,,·loFFEREi>':'\A§ ·~:',, ;.'·.pi( •, ,t:p~ic(~_9c_~~#.f ~::go~:~?#ig~ 'i@~~tJ:1:.ifili~·,r~). 
,·,n' ,b' ,· 'lt'·/ ·l (, ;, •,t:>•I,,;, ' ;;i:· r . ',.·· ,1'\i •,l:•1,_, .,,,,,·,,,,t •. ' ., ,\ rBuried'•In'Back ''p' a.' ''e' · . .,1,11, I :, ·'" rt, , l_, :, •r,~ · Y· uese s~me,.n.ansas boosters;.:_-:0z1:: :· ., ,, .. . : . . g , s.,~11:1£ :•: , -,,-.'.:·· , :·; , .J;: :· ,) ,, . ,,:h ;" t',• :~-.'.-;i•,f~/· '.;••:,, 7". ; 1' • ~' ' "·, \ '\, \ ,', "1" • ~-!,,;:.:·~',ff?, :' .~f!'>'s~' ' . \ ,, ' ~;,f ·.J . ' 1ft ,' I; ,i' ; I • ' t~·, i~~-. : \}\t/· ,,,,_ £ 1 :~ : 1v1 , n . I .i :1, :"iW:fl~~
1
.,N{~s.11s9) ~~ockingiabouHhis ;' ar-: ·i,· -1'.t ·i,•, ::\~~.Ji:'., }>,. ¥~~;j-~,~~:1t1~{{ ;,•_:you) ~~v~,; e~el;' , ·.worked:1orr~:: oxL, dol~niii?,~ ' ''i'' '~ ' ' r;, ; tile '· io~'~i ' ;di· • ~{Qi'.\ ' l ;,H;;. :· ):; -', .. '. ·:·.,1t' (:)N~q?~ . 'enligl'i~~n~d .; :mantigem~iit i'i(and'.'. this]" lia:ck ··:,  
• ! .. i'. • , • • , 1 1 \ , , \ 1 , , • 1 i • .. ¥ J. • • -1. • , .. ' t 1 1 I , 1 ._! ,1 f'IJ"i 1 " t re ! A ' • 1 , J \, 5 ' ,. 1 • • , rr.~lirjeJ:JoJIBN ,, ·~v/ ~~fit\ td'·:~~ ':• · ·:k/ '· '·(·'.·~·.,· .... , ,~~pror~~~ .. :Jofc,. ~~~ .:' P~RO~tt~t:si·_:of both_._ these ,· 
\~ir-iiiii}r't6~:;  ~·rit~J't~pitl~u~N•?;iftf:~ii~ '~ijtetfilli , f :::- , ', : 'i :~w.sp~per§\in'.;:4;y~~: foqg\·'.fiihe:,, 6;}, then·:· yo~·'
1
can,;;,-





: 1/,, ':1•• '• I'' ( '> , ,, 1/1 •. ,. ,, Y
1
•. , , , :q; ,,, ( ~ 1, . . ,,'\ 1 ., ·1 •., ri ,,1 , "· ,: .,'• , ' ,,,r;: • ,,, /i i ... ,;, ·,.•, . ', , , , , .. ,,,:•,•• 
Ji~:.'.:S#r~:ii;ot,:;'tliat,· ~ru i" · · yourr'~'readirig /wet ;_:y . ~R~rs. ~g_·. ~ve~\1 ih~ ·~ country/;l;~;·but was denied :, :: 
'rii~~tfW{ihiidJ~i(a~ufn~~vspaper~~'\>Jt. (:.-l·:,;J~-~~?~-~-_q{t;-.~·J~e,·p~9p~e,.whc;(w.i?utd_;~.~\riiisthite~est~ci;::,the'\r: 
\,i; j . 1• ~ •;~' '• :• l ~ 1,'- ~ • \ I , ,f•~•\,' > ' 1,•,, ,,l ., ..... ,~,1•:~ - , J\ 1,,\ ,\rl lr/'n : •fl\ ;,"~\ 1• -. ~~,, 4 1• 1,:~t '-~f' #,,~ ... •~r:1 ~ •' f1:'!,, ,._ ~f ~' •.;,, 1\t-/ ~ 7 -[~ ,•1• •:'J.\ -'.! 
fl earson ·wrote''iwhat',-'we 'would 'c'a11'' 0•,', '1 non·~1r,\l; ,, ,,,.,, .~~ns 0J.:Kansas.·),;1){1i>:tf;\"· ·~; :l~· ,'i_tt>l;' ';: ',, '.•' ,',~U.,~';' , ,., , ,,. \'' ""{' '" f \, 'l I' '14'. •'' ,,• r • , I , ' , 1 ' " , !, ', ,. ' '> •» ·',I' '-·', "•' •" ,,<•, ,>, t• ,l , ' ~tti~~µ;·;,non;poiffic'~i'.a~ti~le:about::'iio,~:09~e~~:-: I;: .·:·~, .~,~~·, :V~y~f~~ Yt·; .w~ have: a 'schooi·: '~ 
,,t,;,. ,'~j%:~1tlifg1;:'qf{ Kafui~lh~tr':riiade;1~ \j~( fu~·;;r:::· (\ , 'i;, .. .;~J,burnaH~'rrii}·§au~~ i th~_' ',W~l~~i:'-Allen White':~ 
f',,~p~s •: #i.1/spiitti}A:~~-i:'ic'a:,;~ith1',h~:-_'i1tt1e/publii1\'.·/ .;\::f ?~'.~~~~ol, ' 1!-r!'r:;; th_Ef;)>I?xt.~~-.:i~e~s:~ni that .:old',~Blll :.'·. 
!.,,1 ' \i l{" ·,,~. " - •'; ir.~',._'l.., ' ·1 ;;. ... ,/in· •" .._-lP ,i.~ ~~ ' ,~."1 : . ,,, -... }I.:~' , ~ ~,. r11 t:i;_ ; )t l; 111w' •t 'i ' lff') t .. ' · 1 1-,, ; l , ... ,, ·, ".~.}. ' :~ - I • , - \ 
~zed;';Hrip}{)hatf/ did·: 'Goverrit,r :: •Roekefeller:r.:·::•;\}/:.1:·rP·r':t.,, , .. 8. 'Y~5 ,_' 0,~~,-/ 0~ inatlon'~\·.most ·,·reknown ,, · 
.~, ~ , J\ ~,-' r1; ~. t,,.l ,l~n /~n --·,,,~1 '\.' ) '' \'' ,., ,~ . \,'" !"~• , )) I ,1i 1' ~,_1, 1/·\1,\·~,,t- dit .. lbli '' ' .- ', ,' ·, .--'-· •[6: ' ,{: ', ,•·. ( t:,.:,, r,< .. , •• , ·• .;, ' 'I' ~J~ct, tn_ere:we·reno,riotsinQde'monstratiotis~1/ r: ·: /, :·:··:·,:'"}:' ,Rr-Pu,,' ,,sh~t:'~•:, • ~,-: :" ,' t /_i ~:. ;:•, '· t:)·?Y ,' ; '/· .:'/ . / '. ; 
~' ~~~~bS:J.;~P)M)J!f ~iS. :'ili~II~~ .Wt~t:!4~~er¥M\:,. :; ;;, , ;''f.:ftd ,,eYc~ry;lt~!i W1iiJr~~;:; ~ou;~r e~itof; i()/ , 
.f~~;:~}~1~{)11:ij~~f s trtp·-~~s 1 ~un; ·: :/.->.:: J t~.i'\'•' Ne~~P,,~fo;Ha~l:' -~, F,~.~~ /':'-~~-i~ver.y ti~e: :;.' ri .by"such.:activities; ~--·."::-•M1JII '•.:,.:·!/ ,·!•{,. :1/;U. ::!,,_,, .,,,:: .. '(~~~.;~·,,Kans~s n1e\Yspap~r,\ , fraternity ., gathers· to- , 
r ,t: ~·,,. ,• . •·",,• ··• ,:• , ._. ..• , . - ,· • ,, .•. ·,/r ,,l .~:i-, ,.':; •'•1.t ! . , , .. ,, ,:, ,1,. •, 1 • .•, . , ,·.· ~..;, - r , . '. • ,, ,,<,1 , , ,.,,. .. ' . " , .' ' ; ., 
enerally;i(\the:•~whQle :,incident provecf' that?'a:i>~:·· :/.': :;•t·!·tfg~~er in;·the::~ame 'of ."objectivitt'· .. l 'someone :: 
,-, ,, ·, ,,i •, ,,,, ·, ,:"• •,,,v •\•:,•¾'/ ',, , ", ,, . ,, , .. ,·,, ,, ,, ,, , ,.'! ·,: -/'•,:''•!,.,.:, ,. "·. -1 .. ,•,":,~1.,, · ,, · ,•· .'\·· · .,
1,, v. •,' •. ,· , . • 
·.~ -9unt:ri·.}P~J$er-'~hi.' like t Robert n'oekfug.: .. ,whorr ,' 1·,'. •,' il~9.,irt the., hE:rd,·' ~f." j~~~na1,1suc,\:jackasses' Which 
}Yoi(#~~~\ii~~ i,~~,jh~ ~iT~f ~l~e,,i>f, <;!1WltrJ\:.) i.l:'.\'i :!~,¥.;~eStitw?J ~~:,\'~p~~e,r.~ .. is.'.~~ii 't~ be. ~ri. 4n~;. 
~~ple~r' ,:m~de\ a\.\ much; I bigger, \hit (with :_',south ~\' ·:,: ':• ~:;\:, ,\.~.P~~t~g.,: ·J?~at~t~de~-- a,bout: 'Kansas_t: great ' news- ,' 
~e~i~µ~'cfli~H?m~~·~·-1)~dr;~fotifr1cli6by.'ztocti~if:'>.\\/:{i :11:~~~P~*· h~~~t.ag·~~;~ahd;~ha~.'~ciat':newspapermen:' let/• '. whti\voillijij!t.'Jt~~i(~hiciif~'ncr'bi t ;@u1~'l'::Jt'.?:~·:g/_,•;,vi:eJii 'ar~ 'today/6'~ca'.u~iot:itii;,;:f.': •;iJ(i , l.:ij?;.•;,:i.} i . i ' 
, , , ' "' •,,1 ,' ;r i,,1':\;' ,;•,' ,,i,,,,;,,1".,1, .. ,,,'.J•.~,j•. • '1 ',,', .,l ,.\ . ., ,,,' ''t ,,.,,,; (tj\ it/<',V \ •,1 ,,• , . . \ ' . ' _;,,:;,.-. ,,, , ' 1 " , , ,• r, •• ,;-, ·,,• ', •,••~ -,,; , • : ,. •,{, \~·,,,J\, ,'.\ '•-';;;),':' ,'\: ! . 
f•,\i,:,J,:{,);\~ 1-~~~~h,_up_ tQ J._,plow • .. , ,~;;t'.'.'r.'i·l-'' ' ~-:}::0il1%:L11..\ · ), ¼;i;-·l:.,','.•1·; :.-::-) :\l ~µuam :1·-~1~~n ;WJ:Ute,,; WO\lld :·spin 'like, a' top'. ::/t\~;:r? ; -~(~vWt;·~g~tHnllwi~}ft,~t~~t sf6r·t:¥~~~\:,:_ .~;<,)·{ i~ {1r;,1 ~is ~ ·~~y~) ii ;'he, 'cotiii(s~~,\ ~haf passes 'for . 
·:/Jf:',(:f,, ,ot(:-wrote :th~}~oiuhin','.'(w'''h1cit~·er,'Yr' ec' om\'; me,'n' d:~..,- :\, '/i;::q·.:: i:Jo#naU.sm'._' in :'Kansas 'i'newsp\{p'·er"~ ·t.,;,.,.iay".· :T· he' y ', 
1"• ·
1
, ,• ,.,-, ,. ~, ,.,. I ... , ,, ,, ,, •. ' 'I \ ,' I , ' ,,. ' '<',·• ., ' •/ . , ' , •'I ,, U'U , " 
i-:<1:\i\:n rr;;f~~~~~~d ~nlHJ·'t-~trinr~kP·ea'.~1~gby·orevJP~~~;·ty·;_i/·f.•:{\.:'~- ,~v~. ~.~~~~~·--~·~.'.g*ouii;·oi-ar~hatc, ·ne~r~s1iht
1
ed · 
·:-f :.;i_:,,:. :;{$,hn~~ '~pe'cialp~'rhiii11~~ in,,t6d~y's1PICiTORIAL:·1·· !''1.:,'.,' \,:r:",psy~hologicali:vi,t°L1ngt6vi~>·\ ,ifueffectiv~~- ~elf~'; 
';tiii}'i\'Pz#~),' ii!id' li~:~ei\f;'.~ t~t~~lii{.tihte;. fb·; kliri~a'.sj''. • \ '} \ :5.er:V,~g, '' dol13:1',i~~b.tiig/ Jras(teS; '. in:iW.ged 
··.lj:,;'}·.,; )tbts•'~~llin~: 1t"tcdhe1r:'£tt,nti~n ' f,·:4?·.',"/( ~·:,: ·,:: r'?.•,',•.:,.')X/:";~·~~·;\ye ·said; _, 1>yj vhaffa1( be~fh~•·,c1~s~rih'ed'/~ ' ' 
' ,/\( ,, •< , ' , I' , ' , • ,. , ,'" • •, . • · ', •,' , ' 1 ' • •:f(.' ,I ," • , ,r 1 ' , '' ,, • . 'I , , . , , , , . , 
<tr ,i,r.Dµ~ ,• .~olumn\ w~s ·:,promptly kllled•, /;,1 1>~,.rTH~ : .". ·.\:,.,. ~.,h~rd of J~u~~~~stic jaclcas·ses~J,·>\,iiir~ .. 1 ,.:,::•,,· .: . : '. , 
' ", ' .. , ... , 1
1
" '-1•, ..: ·· ;'" , · • , •~ -·• . ,.71',' ~ - ,'' ,'.· ,p\''' . ,,, , , ,,, ,,,,, ' ,'l'r' ' ,' · ,•i•J ' ; ' ' r ,:,. _ . . , 
·::,-\,•. i, , . .9;1.'~KA: ~. S'J; A ,:PE\'JOURNAL 'editc>1~s( 'aiidi·,a1scV : :,:,.' -, .)~· ·: \•,rf f.~ere . is ho~~:;+:~. ~<?W~v~r-Nj~ck:a'.sses fca:nnot:: · 
.,,r, ' >J1•(' i ''>', '«• . , ' , I ' • ' ' ,,,. , d , th' · <-• 1 ' ,, ', ,,, , ,,, '/ , , , ,, ·, "I r , •, 
:,c:,:J.. 111. 1.he :·,,)state~si;:r1,·1a;rgest·,1<laily··news a er!•\THE· .: · . ··: ..;t·~pro uce eir .ownkind~.irY::,:· ... :··::s::,,;,:.· ·:,:tr.t .- ' ·,.r 
i ::,[\::~ ,: :i(;1fifai~li4#ibE~BEAC9~:Y,i.iJ.:,; JJii,i:J,;L ,.:! . \ ,: ;. ' '. /,~ti.1)H !)!Ji !if nJ.~itJ)~' ~;?tHKir~Vli::r{l~~f :,: ,: '. 
92, i}·· 
carried the large headline: "YOU DIDN'T SEE .THIS ••• THIS COLUMN WAS 
'KILLED.' This explanation accompanied the column: 
Although the State Journal subscribes to this nationally dis-
tributed columnist, this one column-dated August ;•4-_._ was not · 
published until August 23, one day after space for this ad · ·  
waspurchased. Kansans gained new stature with Governor 
Dockings's South American trade mission. We believe Kansans 
should beallowedtoread all viewpoints. 
Beneath the _ colurnn in larger type were the words ,."Paid .for by 
Kansas Boosters!" On the preceding_page is 
It offers some interesting commentary on howmassmedia 
up a man" not supported politically on every page-not •just 
editorial page. 
Just as omission of . public affairs informat,ion _affects the public's 
,.,·' ... ,,-· ... ' 
image of reality, so does word choice affect the image obtained from) •. 
mass media. Examples from the period of yellow journ~lism point up .the ·. 
extreme reflection of editors' biases in media content~ 
The decade of . the 1890' s is known as the period of "yellow 
· journalis~''/ when mass media assumed a major role in the process of ;i'.: 
psychologi9a~ preparation for war. Gatekeepers altered_ media 
. , · . . ·, .. ' 
. content to make the message fit their desire. Scholarlyanalys~s 
of the -country's newspapers at that time show that several were n
1
ot.' · 
. content to get ahold of leaks and trial balloons (etc • .); they · ' -·,: 
. manufactured.them, and treated the "real" news 'in a way that a.roused 
the greatest potential effect upon readers. For example Hearst's 
New York Journal aroused interest in an imprisoned Cuban girlwhom i 
the edito~sclaimed h~d committed only·the "crime" of. defending .herself 
against the approaches of a Spanish officer. Under orders, a 
Journal reporter freedher from her cell and smuggled her into 
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the United States. These headlines resulted: "AN AMERICAN. NEWSPAPER 
ACCOMPLISHES AT A SINGLE STROKE WHAT THE RED TAPE OF DIPLOMACY 
FAILED UTTERLY.TO BRING ABOUT IN MANY MONTHS~"3o Public interest 
was high; while leaders of other nations cabled congratulations, 
the Governor of Missouri suggested that the. Hearst Journal send 
five hundred of its reporters and free the entire island. 
In other words, the editoriaLstand of the newspaper carried 
over overtly to the news pages. The stories coming in over the wires 
were selected.and altered so that their content would.be 
with the editors' biases. During the dec.ade of the yellow press, this 
selection. of. news was done overtly and consciously. With the passing ·• 
of time, one could say that media content is now chosen with a more 
deliberate intent at presenting "editorially-balanced" news.31 
Nevertheless, as long as people write.and select news to report, human 
biases and preferences are unavoidable. As.Ben Bagdikian.stated about 
the reporter, 
In a very real sense, no reporter can be objective. If he could, .·. · 
he would go crazy because he can see more things.than he can 
possibly report. The selection of what story is goin§2to. be covered and what elements highlighted are subjective. 
30New York Journal, October 10, 1897, p. 1, as quoted in Thomas. 
A. Bailey, A Di lomatic Histo of the American Peo le (New York: · 
Appleton-Century-Cro_fts, Inc., 1958 , p. 454. 
31The .. following two sources put limitation upon the concept 
of balance, the first pointing out the liberal quality of this press 
era, and the second pointing out the dangers of wire reporters work-
ing too closely with private industry: Harold Taylor, ''On the Slanting 
of the News," National Review, XVI (June, 1964) 489-490. Richard L. 
Tobin, "Straws of an Ill. Wind," Saturday Review, July 13, 1963, pp. 41-42. 
32"Is the Press Biased?" Newsweek, September 16, 1968, p. 67.· 
The specific words a gatekeeper chooses for stories affects 
media content. 33 Under Truman, when the Consumer Price Index rose 
to ·183.8, ·•• .reported, .''Never in U.S.· history .had the cost 
living been so high." Under Eisenhower, when the Index rose 
192 .• 3, the C same maga~ine reported, ''The. U .s. is more prosper-ous 
than ever· before.II When Trumai1 refused .to . say whether he would . 
; " . . , · . .. . ' ., 
run for re-election in 1952, Time wrote that he was ''deliberately 
, ·· •',•, ··::·-.··., ·- · ;·,·.-· · _ ,_ · ·:· ·-.. ;·,·.- :.· :" , 
mysterious<: •. ••, • a stale joke." But Eisenhower, }'adroitly fielded · 
the questions." Truman's travels abroad were .commented .upon: 
"0ffi<!ially, ;, the trip will be billed as non-political, '.an ancient. 
94 .'e 
, ' --~_: ·:-:) i 
. ,.,.~:-·. 
device wherebya P~esident can pay his expenses from his $40,000 .. . 
. . ' .· _,' . . 
travel allowance instead of from the party treasury~'' But Eisenhower's 
' . 
travels were defended: "From time to time, a President of ~he United . 
States mu~{ :\ ravel . around. the country. ,,34 A study . of the . ~agazine' ~.:r::/·; 
, ... . . ' ., ._,_ ,_.. _- -: -._. - ' • ! 
'._..: ,··. ,· ..<.·.·::. . _-·· .-_-:.: : ', ' ·,_," ' ,' . ; 
coverage of Truman, _Ike, . and Kennnedy included this s-tatement: "Time 
has· no/Tacts. : It is the popularization of these facts, the constant\.' 
: · ·-·.: - ,: .. · 
'weaving into ·semi-fic~ionalizedlanguage patterns andpreferential :, 
, ·. . . . · .. 35 
tre.atment of news subjects. With regard to~ and the three ·· 
,, , ' ."·,.-.:·,:':' ·'!.·.:·: ·:•-,,; 
-.·· " , ,: :·,·;;•; 
Presidents., . stereotypes can be seen to · emerge after reading the news. / 
·-:.-;· ·.-. . : ._.:-_; : __ ,_·:_;,., 
and noting the way words are used, biases. are revealed, ·, and edi torial:i.zing ·-.· 
: .>"./, . .... ,, .·.·, ·:-·-: 
• occurs. In • a~tuality, happy, smiling, friendly Eisenhower we1,s prob~l>ly , ·:::: 
.· :·:·\\', : 
/;:.'/<':, : i 
33 A researcher must be cautioned a.gainst creating examples of .'.·. , •. 
"bias" in hi.s zest for discovering just that; taking examples out of/ · 
context can do injury ·to the author's intent. 
3~vers, p. 112., 
35John C. Merrill, "How~ Stereotyped Three U.S. Presidents, 11 
Journalism Quarterly, XLII (Autumn, 1965), 563-?l. 
,;; ·, ....... ·:· 
. ', _· ·:•.,:' '; _.-:<·.:).: ·:::'\:' ··. ·: .. · . ,,' 
notresponsible for development 
he was.characterized or·stereotyped. Ill-at-ease, .grumbling, 
Truman was not responsible for all evil-doing, as he was 
stereotyped. 
Choice of words in two articles can put across the same "facts," 
·- -• 
arid yet give the reader or listener a very.· different impression 
:reality. Consider two accounts of the same demonstration that begin 
this.way: "Ameager fourth of the total student body appeared •• 
,, ·_ ,_, ... _ .. _--_.-_,_- _·. ·,·,_.. ' ·_-_,- ·.•· ... ·_. _- --.. ,::_, 
"Over one--fourth of the·students rebelliously cut classes.and marched 
··.:'.,·:·.::::-:>< ,'-> ,::':·;•_''. /:_,"\ _- ; ,;_·,· • 
. over campus, disrupting. • •. ·• • " Or contrast one television• channel 
which reportsthe demonstration by going to classrooms where·the 
majority of students are discussing control of dissent in democracy, 
another·. television·· channel which reports the same event by 
showing the march at its peak. 
Bias toward personalities in.the news can 
comparison between two editors' interpretations of an APiWirephoto 
·" ' . 
two months after the death of John Kennedy, showing Jackie Kennedy 
and her'sister. leaving a club after dining with Marlon Brando and his 
manager. The San Francisco Newscall-Bulletin ended a three-sentence 
caption this way: "The women left alone, with Brando and Englund de-
parting a few minutes later." The reader was allowed to read in 
whatever he imagined. Washington Post captioned the picture this way: 
"The foursome was·discussing plans for the second annual Joseph P. 
Kennedy International Awards Dinner."36 Community suspicions can be 
36Rivers, p. 186. 
reflected and nourished. in local editors' wordchoices What 
people in San Francisco and Kansas City know or suspect about Jackie 
~d Marlon is largely dependerit on how localmass media interprets 
story or caption the picture. 
Another important use of words is in the headlines f this 
aspect is covered in the next section devoted to emphasis achieved 
, .. ;_ .. · .. ··· •• ·.·:··-_· ,: ,_·• .. · 
in headline treatment. 
third category of media treatment is·. emphasis. 
story presented in the total news picture to emphasize its 
. . -· ,, 
Andwhat· aspects of the story.are highlighted? 
few Americans watch· and read news stories · in depth or compare .,,.~,"'"'""* 
from among the. many news sources, the parts· of a story that 
out" and almost grab the reader are the ones that will have a ........ ........ .., . ..., 
at entering his cognition. There are at least five important aspects 
to the question of emphasis: repetition of the story, placement of 
.the· story, headline characteristics, accompanying pictures, and 
cartoons. 
The electronic media have made repetition of a story important. 
While people·take daily papers to read articles when they have time, 
they can hear the broadcast of a radio or television news story only 
when it is given over the air~ they are tuned in to the broadcast. 
Early morning news is usually repeated at noon, and sometimes it is 
rebroadcast until sign-off time. The assumption is that at of 
those times, the listener will have the opportunity to hear any 
particular major story. This sort of repetition does not occur, 
·without having its effects upon the news. In a day's time there is 
: > < '' ... ·,, ·.. < .'. > < > \ ·, .. < ' ' '.• ) . i< / i 
a/smaller quantity o·f news~ut forth-both in terms of 
. ~&/individual item length/ The selection--out 
;;••.,., '. 
: on a minimal number of stories per day so that those few stories 
. i~et<maximum attention. Furthermore, the. scope of subjects·. and 
-~vent~ co-v-e;ed is lessen~d f;om the potential·· there could _  b8 if new 
>items were•· covered each time. 
Secondly, placement of the story is crucial to its emphasis. 
;_.,·,:·· ··:> ',:,: ;: "<" :· -:, ':' ,·., ., .:.·, -·. ' 
The ·.k~y positiorl for ne\'is is of course the upper right-hand corner 
of the front page. Next rank stories on the upper-right and upper-left. 
of the inner pages. Last •in order in terms·or emphasis a.re stories 
near.the center-fold and toward the bottom of the pages. Display 
has been found tobe a better predictor'of readership than subject 
matter or style of writing.37 Persons who glance throughfthe paper 
'and o;er th8 front page are most likely to catch the stories placed 
in the more strategic places mentioned. Even the person who reads 
. a·. paperthor6ughly will·· be likely to place the greatest ern~hasis on 
events that he thinks the paper gave highest merit also. 
A third factor is the emphasis the story obtains from its headline 
Sometimes the reader stops with the headline, thinking of it as a capsule 
·of the story, in which he then need not further involve himself. 
The decade of yellow journalism is again a good gauge for establish-
ing the importance of this aspect of media treatment. Meredith and 
David Berg wrote that there are three components to a catchy headline: 
size, simplicity, and clear organization.38 In each case, they related 
37Richard Powers and Bryant Kearl, "Readability and Display as 
Readership Predictors," Journalism Quarterl:y:, XLV (Spring, 1968), 117. 
38Meredith W. Berg and David M. Berg, "The Rhetoric of War 
Preparation: The New York Press.in 1898," Journalism Quarterl:y:, XLV 
(Winter, 1968), 657-658. . 
the t;eatment' by the World tel' that by the J ournaL -, In th~ --: time 'period 
.: studied (1898), the World limited its headlines to three -arid a half ,':: 
b;eritimeters ith{i~ the ' Journ~1 •--·_· achieved a -maximum of fou/:~imes ith;t··: 
¢iz~; th;O~gh~1i one el1tire ~b~th (ApriJ./iiS9$) the ·· 1ie~Ji~I1e; 11:J~;t; . 
' ' ' 
went below eight and three quarters centim~ters. -The J61i~al's 
_headlines w~re ~- part ' of 'their sensationalistic }appeal. " '_Wh.:ibh 'appr~ach 
was selected made a 'difference in what the public knew about public 
<affairs and how-important they thought 
Size wa~ only a 'part of the total app~l1. · Simplicity was 
They would attemJt only a si~~].~- idea stated '. _,\ .· 
as ;irnply as. possible, or a multi-headline would emphasize one -- theme. 
' . . · -•··•.• 
For example, ,: the April 1 headline had five sep~rate top{cs unit~d .by···:: 
. .· . , _· .· ... 
ten centimet~; high (equivaJ.ent to twelve lines of doii~i~-sp~ced :\, : 
' ' 
'.',• typing onthis page) -"WAR" .·in the middle of the group. 
. . . ' . 
Clarity .:in organization of headlines by the techniqu~ •'of subordi--
>-- : ' -, ' -- -· ; .,-_. ••-• ' ---· ' ;: ' ' .' 
>nation became 'important at that time. The 'Journal useci '.m~· levels 
headlines, .while its competitors-as most newspapers today-· used 
-, two •. · As the "topic level" decreased 
'headline writer or editor), the type decreased in size and ·the 
: :':· . ::_·-- •. : _--.-- I 
\ of emphasis the ·reader registered would probably decrease. 
' Berg stated, "This 'funneling' technique helps the reade: to assimilate 
::,'.the paper's ideas in the same rank of importanc~- which it 
-~ve ,the~.039 -Research on reader comprehension, · however, 
. subheads to convey little information and to be either not read or 
39Toid., p. 658. -
' -·-- ,~- '. ( ,:··, ; ·:. · ·::.., ·, · ' ·.·;_,. . .( 
/·:;rJa.d so 'quickly>th~t theyhave little effect• 
:, " ~2ientj_fic , k~t~f es ./of i;e~deri ~;e·•. movement .: a:r-~-·being.·· used 
{, the ;~~de~' sC '~tf'en.tiori to subheads inan ~ff~rt to 'learn 
' .. _: .t. ; ·,. \ ···-~,' !. ·. ·; , 
·/f th~ effect of ; headline treatment on -the ·reader~ .. ·. 
···,· , '' 
.'? Headlines a.re .the ·· most researched component of 
',:·•.;:·:< .::-,--;.;,/ \ :_.:.·, .;·.:,. ::<.·:<·: ' .::: :. ; :.•':·,,:···.:;·: _· .. :·>:·.·:)· -·.- .. · .... ' ' . ,;- '. ·: : ' ·.·.': .. : .,: ,' ,' .' 
·.A\1965arti6le' on basicconcepts in newspape:r- design proposed that 
,:>:):;:., _-: .-·' .· <·.. .. : · .. 
n~w-s ·should be . arranged so "readers know at a glance whtch are the < . 
::• ··-: . .. 
imp~ri,ant sf cries. f14l , Hearst's , most lasti~g contribution. to journalism 
. . . ··: . . , ·, .··.: ,'. ' : , : <- : .,-... -:.: 
perhaps ,how-to us'611eadli;es t 'o accom;:Lish the abo;~ · 'goal. 
In &dditiotito size, simplicity and clarity, anoth~r'- element 
,•"'.• :" ; •· ; 
:-.. ,.,. ·._•._.::· ; 
article content to·the reader-word -choice. 
. . . . - . ' • · -·•., .. · - -- .. . ' 
was discussed previously to indicate its. effect upon message content; <i 
' >in a headline, each individual word probably . has more eff ect?Jpon mor~ ' 
\people. 42 In run-of-the-mill everyday operations, headlines are 
worded by persons whose main goal is to fit the space all'owed." 
Sometimes heads from publicity releases 
-the newspaper employee words a headline 
He is pressed for time. 
. headlines to catch people's attention by grammatical ~~tricks." 
Consider, for example, the effect of word choice on :these 
reporting the same event: "U.S. MISSTIE DETECTOR LAUNCHED;" 
: , 40 J .K. Hvistendahl, "The Effects of Subheads on Reader Comprehension," , 
Journalism Quarterly, XLV (Spring, 196$), 123-125. 
41Jack z. Sissors, "Some New Concepts of Newspaper Design," 
Journalism Quarterly, XLII (Spring, 1965), 237. . 
4~adio _and television news broadcasters usually give c~lorless 
briefs of the news items that will follow an advertisement; other-
wise, word choice is important to the electronic media only in the · 
content of .the broadcast. 
f'ONE. TON ,WHALE AMOK AT KEW •043 ( Readers or. persons just glancing 
.•· their papers would have very different impressions of the event 
the two headlines. 
Headlines-----frequently the only source of•. front page ·.news··• for 
'.,, ' ', ' ·:::·:: ' •· __ .:_:_:: ·, :: ': ,' -_ ' ,, . ; _'. ''' '-'-c__ ,- _-' ·,, 
' people-can· be\very misleading by what.·.·th~Y .. do not say aboiitth~ 
article.·/. In ..• other words,.•.·theYcannot .accurately reflectthe\.entire 
story. A study of New York Times revealed cases of misleading head- · 
. lines which portrayed an inadequate treatment·of facts, and.in the· 
opinion of the researcher reflected. faulty editorial judgment.·• on 
what should· have been emphasized as ''significant.ff The August 28, ·1966, 
front page contained fourteen column inches (with a continuation of 
;thirteen inches) headed by: "54% in Ohio Poll Assert U.S. Role in 
: ·. War· Is Mistake." There was a sub-head also: "Nation Too Deeply 
Involved, Majority in Congressional District Study Declare." In 
actuality, ·one Representative,·Charles Mosher, had mailed a questionnaire 
130, 541 families in his district. He received a 3. 5 percent ""'0 ;1-,,.,..rn 
Of those, 54.4 percent (2500) gave the headline response. 
line thus reflected "truth" about a poll not sampling "Ohio," and 
representative of even one district.44 
' In the same study, it was found what this July 10, headline 
actually meant: "Johnson Policies Disenchant Iowa." The sub-head 
stated: "Bellwether County Shows He Would Lose Election Now.n· The 
· Sample had been of one precinct in one county. . The sample consisted 
43Nicholas Tucker, Understanding the Mass Media (Great Britain: 
Cambridge Press, 1966),.p. 36. The comparison is of the London Times 
· and Daily Sketch. 
44aerhart D. Wiebe, "The New.York Times and Public Opinion Research: 
Criticism," Journalism Quarterly, XLIV (Winter, .1967), 654-655. · 
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of ·. the first fifty people willing to express their views. ·. •. While 
/ the headline would tell people one thing, the whole story behind the 
>:headline could :: communicate . something very different. 45 What these • 
: ~xamples mean :is that headline treatment, which is inhe~ent 
,:' ;:< I , 
•· mass media,< IleCessarily emphasizes · the highlight of a ··• story : ( as 
. ' ' ,:,· . ·. ,'. 
.'.:- ~irceived by: the· headline ·writer) or simple .:figures that are not 
:::,;'~pace-consuming to report., or ,t,he action and dramatic highlights 
;,-which might · cause the reader to follow up the headline by reading 
article. It gives a limited picture of news, and in so :doing 
emphasizes sorne things at , the expense of others. 
Another deviceutilized ,by the ,mass media -for emphasis is 
pictorial art-pictures, drawings, and cartoons. 
they attract even the lazy readers, and on television they highlight 
the words the announcer is uttering. After the "Maine" incident -in 
,-1898, newspapers began to use drawings to help convey certain editorial , · 
, positions. An example of the Journal's vivid use of drawings was 
the February 17 issue, showing what was alleged to be an accurate 
three-quarter-size drawing of the torpedo hole in the "Maine." · 
. _,: . ·- ; ·: 
--Pictures of wounded men in wartime or hungry/ bloated children -abroad-, 
in peacetime have become common media treatment. 
Malcolm Browne, an experienced reporter, wrote on the nature of 
>Vietnam correspondence after three years of the war. He said that most 
of the important concepts about the war that would put it in perspective 
for Americans are difficult to capture inworcis and are 'generally not 
__ "interesting" for everyday-reading. Water shortage, for example, , is 
45Ib.d i • , - P• 657. 
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'Often the most far-reaching "event" in a day in Vietnam--outranking, ., 
battles fought that day. Vietnam does not lend itself to ·simple 
numerical reporting, according to Browne. Instead, what had the mo~t 
effect on Americans about Vietnam is pictures. Browne said that the 
widely publicized picture he took 'of Buddhist Quang Due committing 
suicide by burning himself to death was the initial means of focusing 
world attention·on the Buddhist campaign. "Had a Western newsman 
;·,' .•_·,.· ' 
with a camera not been present at Quang Due's suicide, history might•· 
,have taken· a different turn. 046 When Henry Cabot Lodge was called 
in to see President Kennedy about becoming ambassador, the'President 
had the picture on his desk. Buddhist leaders made huge color 
enlargements and carried them at the heads of processions Clergy-
men in America reprinted the picture in the New York Times and Washington 
over the caption: "We too protest." 
The picture had the impact in the above example. Is it· a general·; 
rule that pictures, and artwork, with their advantage of being dramatic, 
can lend emphasis to almost any cause? Another way in which that question 
has been tested is by asking what effect art work showing the pro side 
in a two-sided message would have. Contrary to the hypothes~s, the 
effect was· not to make the message appear more pro. Instead,·. the study 
•·suggested that graphic art increases the weight of a message in one 
or more of the following·ways: improvement of comprehension; gaining 
,· attention; • providing cues about author intent. 47 Bill Mauldin once 
46MalcolmW. Browne, "Vietnam Reporting: Three Years of Crisis," 
Columbia Journalism Review, IV (Fall, 1964), 7. 
47In the ~ords of the author, it was found that increasing iconicity 
{resemblance between a pictorial symbol and its referent) of a pro 
argument in a two-sided message did not make the message appear more pro. 
Hugh Culbertson, "The Effect of Art Work on Perceived Writer Stand," 
Journalism Quarterly, XLVI (Summer, 1969), 294. 
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:_commented uporl. 'the second of those effects: "We've got. his on 
'<:,.- '·.··, .·:.::-_·-_ .. _.-',.· .. _, 
th~matt~r, ·and what he does about it next is his own business." 
Noting that statement, Brinkman asked in his study if the graphic 
'_,·.· .. ··· _:·,,.:_ .·, 
arts could not do more than call one's attention to a matter. He 
found that when cartoons were used editorials, it was most 
:·::/:· ,: ' '' '' . ,- ' '' :>·_ ' . : ::>: .. :::.: 
_possible to b.ring about••· reversion and conversion of opirtl611s. 48 
,, 
However/ LeRoy·. Carl. found in a . study ·of editorial . cartoons, 
:the intended cornrnentary ·about public affairs was often not communicated 
successfully to the mass public because of the many forces at work 
"scrambling" .the cartoonist's intended meaning, including ability of 
the receiver to see analogies, and his knowledge of current events. 
Those limitations upon the effectiveness of 
', '•::·.·: •, '; 
communicating to the public should be borne in mind; nevertheless, 
examples of effectiveness of cornrnunication·can ·easily be found. In 
·addition.to the Quang Due picture, how the press treated Castro shows 
its ability to create an "image" of people and events by means of 
pictures, cartoons, and news cornrnentary·emphasizing certain points. 
Castro was a good newspaper target because of the_ease with which he 
could be depicted as a comic character. At first, newspapers reported 
that he was not a Communist; nor was he seeking aid from the U.S. 
Pictures and text were widely publicized of his placing wreath at 
the Lincoln Memorial and shaking hands with Russian Ambassador to 
Washington, accompanied by the headline, "They Just Shake Hands in the 
48nel Brinkman, "Do &litorial Cartoons and Editorials Change 
Opinion?" Journalism Quarterly, XLV (Winter, 1968), 724. 
Usual Way~tf. (April 19 Chicago Tribune)49 
to reflect a different image. The media over-emphasized Cuban 
officials' .visits to Communist countries, accompanied bY anti-
.··American· statements. De-emphasized were social and · economic 
,·,, __ -.. _ ..<' 
>, changes of. the revolution which would have imparted deeper under-
·standing Cuban problems. However, when U.S.-owned property 
involved in economic breakdowns, the incident generally passed 
;,gatekeepers.· By mid-1959, the dominant image 
· ·· with Castro's harassment. Selection .. of stories and· treatment 
it powerfully In the short time span of a few months. As Brinkman's 
study suggested, conversion could be,· and was, obtained by 
pictorial arts and editorial news emphasis in concert. 
relations between Cuba and the U.S. government became reality 
' -. . ; ·, 
reading.public; furthermore, the blame was placed squareiyupon 
Castro and his officials by the press and therefore by the public. 
The voice over electronic media can act like the written headline 
in determining for the listener what is important. Some commentators, 
such as Paul Harvey, are known for overt vocal inflections to emphasize 
and give it shades of meaning. Most news broadcasts, however, 
are products of encouraged vocal monotony so that the individual 
announcer does not color the news. But does not that technique also 
emphasize news in a certain way? By putting all the news reports 
in the same vocal quality, some persons maintain that crimes, riots 
49Michael J. Francis, "The U.S. Press and Castro: Study in 
Declining Relations," Journalism Quarterly, XLIV (Summer, 1967), 261. 
·,.·_._- , 
;_·, . ·'- ,. . ··\. 1 • 
<' and ·disasters receive the same degree of approval as "good" 
' -'.· .. ,· ... 
. this is . the case, communicates to some p;e>plean 
\ acce~t~c~ o; 'appr~val or recb:gni tion of the ·· "bad." 
;'.Thurber< said, it gives the "listener the spooky feeling that the . . . . 
·\:deaths of; ~cot~:; of persons in an air ·• crash are not more .important 
. : ' · · : / : .·  · .· . · ... · · . · · ··• . · .··. 50 .•. than· a new . candy bar or brand • of coffee." 
The following quotation from Lester Markel of the New York Times 
/is used to conclude .because it shows the relationship of the three 
parts of this chapter, which he calls three judgments, · within the 
',, ·:.·: · ' .· ' ' _ . .- ·. -_-_, .. -,.. ' ' 
,·general framework of the gatekeeper theory. 
The ·reporter, the most objective reporter, collects fifty 
facts. Out of the fifty he selects twelve to include in his 
·· story ( there is such a thing as space limitation). Thus 
.. he discards thirty-eight. This is Judgment · Number One. 
· Then the reporter or editor decides which of the facts shall 
be the .· first paragraph of the story, thus emphasizing one 
fact above the other eleven. This is Judgment Number Two. 
Then the editor decides whether.the story shall be placed 
on Page One or Page Twelve; on Page One it will command 
. many times the attention it would on Page Twelve. This is 
Judgment Number Three. 
This so-called factual presentation is thus subjected to 
three5~udgments, all of them most humanly and most ungodly made. · . . ·.. .•. · 
50Rivers, p. 103. 
51Ibid., p. 43. 
CHAPrER 5 
Opinion-Leaders' Influence 
. "The news : and interpretation ·:o·f an event are first carried by, 
say, a newspaper; this is then read and adapted by opim.on-
makers, who assert their opinion in speeches on the subject 
that are reported by the press and thereupon ·picked up by 
'opinion leaders' in the general public who in turn pass on · 
their opinions through word-of-mouth." 
In this final step of the four-step theory, mass communication 
, is linked to the social processes of informat,ion and opiriion diffusich'l. 
' , . .. . .. ':.· 
Political messag~s do not terminate their flow once they have been · 
, ' 
· carried in the mass media. They are carried from the mass media to 
opinion-leaders to the . public. This chapter will include dis·cussions · 
·or who the opinion-leaders are, the two-step flow theory, and possible ·· 
revisions of the two-step theory in light of new evidence 
opinion-leaders' role in the process of news and 
Opinion-Leaders 
There are two kinds of influence upon opinion. 
c prestige, which is. :1nfluence from persons who occupy positions 
·. power and prominence in society. The other is by personal in-
fluence, which is not the exclusive possession 
·group in society, but found at all levels. 1 
Prestige is wielded through access to the formal channels of 
' ,· ·, .. 
mass comrnunic&tion ~rfrom a particular role a person Pfays. The 
formal leaders of society can use their prestige to influence 'others--
1u.s. Information Service, "Prestige, Personal Infiuence; and · 
Opinion," The Process and Effects of Mass .Communication, ed. Wilbur · 
Schramm (Urbana: University . of Illinois Press, .1954), . p~ 402. 
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goii~I'IlIIlehtofficials, business and labor leaders, clergymen, school 
:•-,,-_.; 
: officials,· etc. Personal influence, on the other hand,\:is more a 
,_, ·. 
:function' of who influences whom in face-to-face contacts. Most 
:\:·· ':· .: '··,· :· .: ' ·• :· -_ : ' ' : ·_• ,:·_ .. _:'; ' . ·_ -:·:: : :· .i-:. . ( _·,:_.-:/.: 
/pe~ple · influence other~ •·with their · opinions on some topic at· some time; 
!: ,._:;_',._ .•- .. :.·• 
. opini.6n-leaders are those persons who "exert such personal · influence 
upon:thos~ iround them ·rather 'steadily with regard to decisions'in at 
least one area•of life."2 Opinion-leaders are looked upon by others 
as persons with sound advice, which should be listened to and 
followed. It .. ·is important. to note that opinion-leaders may or may 
not be the persons with prestige, as described above. 
of the occupation·aperson happens to hold, his personal•influence 
·based on the reliance people have for information and opinions 
.from him because of certain personal traits. What is true for 
business-that influence does not necessarily follow the formal . 
pattern of authority designated in an organization chart-is also true 
. . . 
for society. In addition to this informal quality of opinion-leadership, 
it is specialized. Divergence of opinion between those persons with 
"authority" according to theorganization chart and those persons 
with personal influence among the workers in the exampl~ cited, 
points up this quality of specialization. The business workers 
would probably accept their formal leaders' opinions on job-related 
,matters, while they would accept others' advice on matters they 
define as outside that sphere of influence. The men we look to for 
advice on fashion are not necessarily the same men we look to for 
opinions on Vietnam. 
·:108 
Our' concern is with opinion-leaders v1hose influence::is felt . 
ori public affairs. Still,·· there is some specialization.> The man 
one relies or/ for information and opinions about city hall is not 
necessarily the same person relied.on for opinions about our.foreign -
policy. The 'Illan . we might judge knowledgeable on bureau.cratic structllre. , 
may. not have•·• the same reputation for knowledge · about diplomacy. i The 
·,: ;:_ -,: -, ' -.: .. >:· . ---• _-__ ·' · .. ·' ·: . . '._·; , 
. ;degree of ,specialization may vary with the level of. sop~istication 
. . 
information the followers have. Within the family unit,'.the·male 
head may influence others on public affairs issues, while the 
· · woman has more influence on domestic affairs. Opinion-leaders 
exist in evecysocial stratum and in every subculture of 
society. 'Therefore, although the subject matter determines 
opinion-leader to some extent,·· this is modified by the fact 
<people still like to talk to others and form their opinions 
persons "like themselves." The opinion-leader is therefore 
,_ .. , 
usually informed and emulated, and still accesible to the 
With this understanding of. who the opinion-leaders·· are, 
'','· .··,,_.-, 
should ask where they get their.information. 
Rosenau's statement, their greatest source of information is the mass 
media. Their interest in public affairs is manifest.in their 
reading and listening habits. They expose themselves to more mass 
media information, 4 ·to more different kinds of mass media information, 
3Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: :i An Up-to-Date 
Report on the Hypothesis," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXI (Spring, 1957),74. 
4Toid., P• 76. -
5u.s. Information Service, p. 408. 
. . . 
'and 'tbrriore qu~lity media as opposed to popular media than ·other 
. __ ,,-__ -,iii·. "6 
members of society. 
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Combinea. · with their increased reception of mass medic1 inform~tion, 
. ··.• opi~b~-'ieader~i\end to have ·· more. personal" contacts for spreading 
.,<\ ,heir •- ideas in : discussion-than the average person. 
: ···•\,:ornedia, op:i.~on-leaders generally report mo;e -often th;.{ they · seek 
Similarly, otherpeople 
· 'initiate discussions with them and then they .talce on~ -active 
. .. ' _ _ - . 
rather than .passive role. That is, - the opinion-leader i~i not an : 
")< .. ,•.--•-•·· •·· . -• _ . -.-. < :' 
:agitatorwho .neceSsarilytries to arouse discussion and action; 
. _ . v· · s 
- instead, .other people urge him to express his views to them. 
-·; ·•··-· 
.. :, ,,.-· , .-A study of civil .defense agencies suggested that opinion- : 
. . . 
•.a:-· leaders should accurately be called "heavy communicators." They · 
/_':_' i/):)-:-_·.::,·.= .. :- . ,·_. ,·, · .. _ ..... ·._· .. :i_ ......... 
:,) act as both .lea.ders and seekers of public , affairs information, and are \ . 
. •' . . ' 
' ' f· ' 
:,_likely tO be asked for their opinions. · Persons who originated . civil 
\; .. defense material .- in mass . media also sought out the greatest . amount of 
.,:':- i{nformation\m that topic from the mass media. 9 The implication in 
:,, 
studies such as this one is that _opinion-leaders seek out information' 
•· and opinions from the mass media, and are more influence~ by that 
\ ;:information than the mass public (i.e., the mass public needs opinion-
to tell them what they should believe): ·A-study of 
6James N. Rosenau, . Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: 
_. ,_ Random House, 1961), pp. 81-83. 
7 Katz, p. 76. 
8 ·•, 
U.S. Information Service, p. 408. 
• - ,_ 9verling · Troldahl and others, "Public Affairs Information: · Seeking 
·rrom Expert Institutionalized Sources," Journalism Quarterly, XLII 
(Summer, 1965), 403-409. . 
i ·· . .· , 
: · the diffusion ' of opinion on a new brand of · a ; familiar food 
.:; )reduct confirmed that implication; it showed that opinion-lead:~~ ·.:-:. 
,: .. •.•.; •_.: · . _ _:. • L - i 
i .were more influenced by the impersonal source of communication · ::< · · 
:; ;_ · .... · . · . _ .. - '> ·. " · · . .·. · < ·. . . ·.• .. ·. · 10 · · . , · . . ._··•·•.···.• · . 
_< (mass ·media) than were the followers. However~ another study ·: \· 
, . .. ' . . . ' 
':: i!l.vestigatirig the same question came up with data that wouldnot 
\'•, 
•! .corrl'irm that ;esult. Verling Troldahl ''injected" written messages 
.< .:- . _·. :, .- - .. ,_. --, ' ·. . 
. ~hat contra.dieted common opinions into a complex social system bi. a '' 
;monthly country agricultural newspaper. When followers :in.itiated . 
kdvice fro~Opim.on-leaders, it was traced by questioning subscribers. 
The· authors · hypothesized that · opinion-leaders would change their .:>· 
··: opinions · jus~ _on the basis of what they had read in the mass media, • 
i: while followers would need opinion-leaders to influence . any 
attitudinal change~ The pattern of responses made the resear~hers
0 
·• 
conclude that media exposure alon~ did not induce 
. in the :opinion-lead.ers. Bot·h opinfcm-leaders and 
. . 
prior beliefs were contrary to the opinions in the ·experimental newspaper 
message ·were likely to seek advice from others, particularly a 
f . . 1· . t d. ll pro essiona in erme iary. . . .,_c:. • • .. 
• ···c··.-. ' 
.. : In · view of -conflicting evidence at this stage of·; ~search, 
·the question is, what can be verified about the opinion-leader. 
is ·_ known that he obtains more quality information from the mass 
: . .: ··' : ·, ·, 
media than the average person, and that he is more relied upon for 
·. : .. ·--.:·:' .. ,·· __ -.-.-_·. _· ' ' 
opinions tha11other persons. This is to say that on certain subjects 
lO Johan Arndt, "A Test of the Two-Step Flow in Diffusion of a 
New Product, 0 Journalism Quarterly, XLV (Autumn, 1968), 457-65. 
11verling Troldahl, "A Field Test oa A Modified 'Two-Step Flow 
of Communication'," Public Opinion Quarterly, XXX(Winter, 1966-67), 
609-22. 
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' ,• . i' . ' '· --~ :- . . : . ':·-: - .. ·. ; 
F11e :~l>t~ins .more .. than ' just u;;plar informatiori,n and he influences other 
'\ t~ople with whom hecomes .into direct contact on those ·subjects. ' 
-,---' 
Two-Step Flow ·. Theory 
' . . . . . ' 
The farilo11s study of' Erie County votirig in 1940 yielded a . 
(:;_hypothes'rs which iS called the "two-step flow of communication." 
. .. • ideas often flow .!£2!!! radio and print !!.2 the opinion lf2ders 
,_
1 
.• - • and .!£2!!! them to the less active sections of the population. 
, ,,'•, 1 In his fi.eld test of the · theory, Johan Arndt 
'.:..-·•.,:· . . :: .. ' . ' , _-_· '_ ·. 
forxnlllation 'C>f the hypothesis: 
} Messa.ges •(information) flow from impersonal sources 
'.: media) to the opinion leaders-the first step. . • \ . · 
·2) The opinion-leaders influence the nonleaders (who ·are less 
:' ;'. affected by the 3:~personal sources) by means · of . word-of-mouth- ·_ 
.the second step. . .· ...  · , . 
This two-step flow theory is a way of organizing information 
· . mentioned in the last >section of this chapter, that opinion-leaders 
.· -,_._. . . . . ' . -· 
are more kxposed to the mass media than nonle~ders · and °tha.t t .hey · 
communic~t~ their information and opinions to the nonle~d~rs.14 
At the time of the formulation of this theory, it was called the 
' '' 
"rkdiscovery of people" becaU:se it placed people communicating by _ 
···.: word-of-mouth between the mass media and the mass public. Knowing 
\' !':::• · .. :- _: _ .... ·: • ·.· ._··._' 
·, that this ' communication takes place, the 'question is, what, influence 
12 . · · · · 
Paul F.Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and HazelGaudet, The 
',; People's Choice, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press;,-I'948), 
·p. 151. 
lJ Arndt, p. 457. 
14Also ·see the following sourcewhich can. be credited for . popuiarizing 
the two-step flow theory: Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld (editors), -.· · 
: Personal Influence: The Part Pla ed b Pea le in the Flow of Mass 
· ·communications New York: The Free Press, 1955. 
does the opinion-leader have . over the public. 
In · answer to that question, Katz found that the people an 
o~inion-leade; is most likely to influence ,belong to -their same . . 
. . 
. . 
primary · group, and · they are :likely to be more influentia]_Cm those 
persons thanthe mass media.15 By the nature of their face-tO-:face 
contact, opinion-leaders can exert social pressure upon an .. :i.~dirld11al t 
·so that he will . conform to the group's way, and they cai1serv~ a'.< 
·social support for him. The opinion ·1eader' s influence -over the mass · 
. public has limitations; particularly, it is clear that opinion--
leaders and mass media interact to some extent in influencing the 
. public. But what do the media do . that > limits opirri.on..:..ieaders' . 
influence? :. A political science textbook explains it this way: ' · 
The .interested .public ordinarily looks to the media define 
policy problems and to formulate means of dealing with them • . 
, Which of the alternatives presented individual members of the 
public may then choose to favor is likely to depend more upon 
personal .value preferences, group memberships, and other 
factors than upon the policy recommendations of the media. _ .· 
For an overwhelming majority of the people, the media represent · 
their only link with ·the concrete realities of international 
affairs. The media-a?d the leaders they often quote-are 
· therefore much more potent in determining what the people wit~ 
: ·think about than in .dictating what they will think about it. 
·This suggests at least one function of the mass media that 
operates .directly · for the public, by-passing the opinion-leaders · in 
the chain. In view of the recent access the mass public has gained 
' to all the : channels of mass media, : it is appropriate to question 
whether the role of the ·opinion-leader has been modified 
15 · .· · . Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication," p. 
16sheldon App{etori, United States Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 196$), p. 297. 
:fo~ulation' of ,the theory. Radio has become so widespre~d that 
. i,~;~t famllies have two or more radios in their homes in a.ddi tion 
::, '·\ • .- : . ' .-. --:, .· .. ·. ·. ' _', ,·:. : -_ ' .. -~ . -: 
"' the car/radios. ·. Television has become almost a family '_'necessity." 
-Newspapers . a~d' news m~gazines are present in most homes ·and offices. 
People' ·~ a~cess to . mass media has increased so greatly tha.t . the 
>role of face-to-face communication must be questioned. 
} people' s \ a.ccess to : mass media·, we must still ask whether they 
; -~-- :: : . '. -/~-- ;_· :- ' .- . 
influenced by the media. 
/·1 ' ·, , 
Seven studies after the assassination of President 
' round.that pe~son-to-person communication was ·the most important 
'means of communicating the· ·riews of the event'. l? Two of .. those . studies 
, . . . . . . _ . .. . 
also found that personaf contacts are the most-. import~t·_: means .· 
·dissemin~ting information about very unimportant ·ma.tters; but 
, · ·:· ' ' !"; :·_ ·.-. 
between the greatest and the least important news, is the majority 
_·_-. /' 'i. 8 
-of the news which is communicated primarily by the mass· media. 1 
. _·_ , • . ·_ .,• 
But '. just because _the mass media· was the channel for dis§emin~tio~ ·-
news, does that mean that the media influenced public opinion? 
Revisions of the Two-Step Flow 
··.-:···:·... . - , 
There is no clear-cut · answer to the question posed above. ·. -There 
·are at least three possible hypotheses that are potential answers to 
. 17stephen Spitzer,''Mass Media vs. Personal Sources Information 
:About -the Presidential Assassination: A Corriparison of Six Investigations," 
' Journal of Broadcasting, VIII (Winter, 1964-65), 45-54. >. Also see footnote 18. · 
18Richard J. Hill -and .Charles Bonjean, "News Diffusion: A Test of 
the Regularity Hypothesis," Journalism Quarterly, XLI (Summer, 1964), 
336-42. and Bradley s. Greenberg, "Person-to-Person Communication in the 
Diffusion of News Events," Journalism Quarterly, XLI (Autumn, 1964), 
· 489-94-
114: 
; ._· ... ' .. · .. ·· .'.·'"•,;:_.'·,. ,' ·.· .·· .·.:_·•::· ... , .. ,' :. ' ' ' '', ··.,.··."· <·:·· 
·:the "new" role of opinion-leaders: (1) There occurs a·by-passing 
of the opinion-leader, ·whereby the mass public receives its information 
and .is influenced by -rnass media; (2) The easy-access ofinedia ' allows 
., more people -to · be well-informed, and therefore has increased the 
.-number of opinion-leaders in society; or (3} There 
.. , ..... ·,,'.,', :,,-.··:·,.·_ . 
: in the ' two-step flow pattern, but now the publ,ic picks upbeliefs 
_ from · opinion~ieaders· and low-quality ("popular'') 
mass 
\ · ':· · ' ' ,. ,· . ': , ·.···•,' ;. ' ' .... ' 
The first ' hypothesis reCeives its foundation from theories that 
and ·interriational events are "personal experiences" because · 
of the media'' s 'speed in making the public aware of public a.ff airs •19 
In spreading interpretations and opinions about events so quickly, 
:< there is no opportunity for opinion-leaders to interject their 
opinions by face_;_to-face contact before the public has heard the 
news, interpreted it, and placed some value judgments onit. 
The second hypothesis maintains that the role of opi1:Jion-
leaders is stilLto influence nonleaders by word-of-mouth, but that 
·the easy-access ·of media information allows more people .to assume 
-·role of opinion-leader. There is evidence of greater numbers of 
citizens coming into the "attentive publictf. With the prevalence 
of mass me.dia, ' the opinion-leader's function is to screen out 
19James N. Rosenau, The Attentive Public and Foreign Policy 
(New Jersey: Princeton University, 1968), p.15. 
20rbid., pp. 12 and 25-46. 
·· ·· specialized inf6rmation :·for ·a particlilar audience. 21 With so 
" 
potential areas in which to specialize, great numbers ofpeople 
' ' ' -,. -_ ,. 
nscreen out information" which influences other people in that one field. 
,, .·· . · .. '• ,' ,, 
• .. There has been some research .· and some confinnation of the third 
·hypothesis-that the public picks up only low-quality ihf~rmation .and 
. cl!l ·i~age of political :events and people in the news from 'the mass 
:'. :_·_-:· . ._:-;:_:_ . . ' ' . 
:,:Jn~di~, which j_r ~upplemented by infonnation from opinion-leaders 
· influences · beli~f and behavior. 22 The meaning is that although . 
-' broadcast media provide the first impact of most news stories, the major 
' . 
. . flow of influence and reinforcement is through personal channels. 
Deutschmann and Danielson came up with what they called a Katz and 
Lazarsfeld hypothesis .to be .applied with caution and qualification: 
Initial mass media information on important events goes directly 
to people and on the whole is not relayed to any great extent. 
2. People talk about news learned on the media • 
. 3. Opinion leaders do supplementary relaying of information. The 
relay function and reinforcement function exist simultaneously •••• 23 
Experimentation by DeFleur and Larsen also supports this third 
hypothesis. By tracing pathways of communication after leaflet droppings, 
21Pye distinguished the role of opinion-leaders in modern American 
society from the role in traditional societies. In a traditional system, 
they add to limited information available to the general public. · "The 
skill of opinion-leaders was not one of sorting out specialized information, 
but of piecing together clues and elaborating, if not embroidering, upon 
the scant infonnation shared possibly by all present." Lucian W. Pye (ed.), 
Communications and Political Develo ment (Princeton, New Jersey: · · 
Princeton University Press, 19 3, p. 28. 
22.rroldahl, "A Field Test," p. 611. . 
23Paul Deutschmann and Wayne Danielson, "Diffusion. of Knowledge of the 
Major New Story," Journalism Quarterly, XXXVII (Summer, 1960), 355. 
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theY confirmed their belief that effectiveness of the mass communication 
actdepends on the degreeto which the media are linked to inter-
personal networks of communication. 24 Furthermore, theyTound that 
the central function·· of mass media is more one of reinforcement of 
existing individual and cultural practices rather than one of 
·. conversion to • new behaviors. 25 While mass media operates con~er-v;tively 
on attitudes and tendsto·preserve the status·quo, opinion-leaders 
': ,,- ·. ' ' ·. .· . '. ·.-_ . . . :·: . ': '_:'. ' . . -_ ' _-. ': ·_. ·•·i_.:_ ,::_<,_: .·· <:'_ ':' 
,can :bring influence to. bear upon the public. that can bring about 
shift in attitude by direct face-to-face contact. Again, belief 
and behavior. is ·affected by opinion-leaders, while the·· mass media only 
reinforce existing images. 
2~elvinL. DeFleur and Otto N. Larsen, The Flow of Information 
New York: Harper, 1958), p. 31. 
25Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
CHAPrER 6 
Summary and' Conclusions 
/ No~ that : each ~t;pof Rosenau ~s flow theory has been' developed, ' 
. . . . . ' 
>I have several .observations to make about the theory itself and 
.<' about furth;; :·;esearch that could be done to gain a better under-
.• ..... ·.• _-:-,_, :-· __ - .. ::-,.•',·' ,': 
,., standing of 'the role of government and the mass ; media iri 'influencing 
public opinion~ . Specifically, I will cover the 'following : items in , 
>this chapter: . (1) a summary of the four-step flow of communication; 
t (2) cineval11.atibn ofthe theory's potential use; (3) an enumeration 
, .. . , 
· of limits of the theory and of the treatment I have given:· the subject;!{ 
(4) an invitation to further .research. 
Four-Step Flow of Communication 
An Event, . . 
Pseudo-eve'nt, 
or Media .Report 
Opinion-
Leaders ,__ _____ _, 





Picked up by 
Re 
four-step process traces an event from its occurrence to its 
. reaching the public. The first step established how opinion-makers 
;are stimulated to communicate . in response to the reality created for 
.·them by communications they have received from mass media. Opinion-
makers use the media to obtain images about events and pseudo-events 
.: and to communicate their own image which will become a part of "reality"-
117 
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even though it may consist of reports or pseudo-events that were 
done for purposes of ·publicity-which becomes the basis upon which 
further communication is stimulated. Rhetoric stimulates more rhetoric 
and is an.· exigence for response from opinion-makers. 
Government opinion-makers respond to the event or media reports 
by preparing information for mass media reporters· that says what 
they want•to.ha.ve communicated on to the public. But in so doing, 
unintended messages can creep in. For example,if people perceive 
that government is intentionally misleading them by telling them one 
thing and by later behaving differently, a credibility gap will 
develop. People tend to distrust every message when they feel 
are misled from what is real; government is now suffering from the 
effects of this gap. In an effort to avoid these unintended messages, 
·government opinion-makers are likely to work with image specialists 
so that they use the media to show what they want to in the most 
accurate ·or·· believable manner. It is important to government opinion-
makers that they be able to achieve a favorable image·because the 
mass media are the only channels by which they can speak directly 
to the public (or to opinion-leaders in the general public) on. a 
mass·scale. For that reason, not only how government presents its· 
information, but also how the media treat · the information·. is important 
in determining what the public ultimately "knows" about government 
The gatekeeper theory of the third step of the flow points up 
all the crucial "gates" at which a story can be omitted, changed, or 
passed on. . Regardless of what is done to the story, its content is 
affected. There are examples of points of view being omitted in the 
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. . . 
media, which ihereby limits what the public has an opportunity t,o 
\, know. Words that are used have the potential for creating a certain 
· image within readers and listeners. Selectivity of words can instill 
' ; . ·, . . .·•.· > .. _:_, ' ·-
.' a one-sided or limited perspective of reality. Consciously or 
unconsciously, an editor can make words reflect his own biases to . 
such an -• extent ': that content is twisted • . Content is also . affected· 
. by how each gatekeeper determines to emphasize a story (in the total 
paper, on .a page, size of headline, etc.) and how to emphasize element~ 
:within the story (what information he puts in the first paragraph~ 
what is highlighted in the headline, what is the "tone" _of the 
headline, etc.) • . 
The mass public comes into direct contact with a very limited 
> amount of information from popular media. That information gives 
cues as to what is "current" and influences what they talk about. 
, Opinion-leaders, who have more ·extensive contact with mass and 
and specialized media, relay their opinions on to members of the · 
mass public with whom they are in direct face-to-face contact. 
Apparently they influence the public on what to think about 
!the popular issues, and have strong influence on people's beliefs 
and behavior. 
· Value of the Theory 
With the addition of data and explanation to Rosenau's pre-
· theory, it serves as a workable model for explaining government-
public communication. The concepts and data that this thesis offers 
insupport (and modification) of the theory, make the four-step flow 
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a useful .. tool for understanding public communication. 
The four-step flow theory should be of use to the teacher who 
is seeking an organizational framework for the vast quantity·of 
information relating to public communication. The theory should 
help him explain many concepts, such• as the ones explored in this 
•· · , 
thesis, by placing them within a meaningful context; · each concept' 
cantake on greater significance to the student when it 
in relationship to other·concepts (or to the "whole"). 
understood 
This theory should be of value to the critic of public communication 
because he can use its overall structure as a base from which to 
extract certain notions of the process for criticism. In effect, 
the process of political communication could be criticized from the 
perspective of the four-step flow. Any part, or all of government-
public communication could be focused upon by utilizing the framework 
of the theory. The theory gives a critic a unique perspective for 
examining any part of government or media influence upon public opinion 
by showing him the relationship of the parts; for example, he would 
see clearly that criticism of media treatment would also have 
effect upon both the nature of government response to the media and 
upon the kind of information made available to opinion-leaders in the 
public. 
In addition to serving as a tool for various kinds of investigations, 
the theory is . useful to any member of the public, to tell him the 
nature of things he can know about his government. It tells.· him 
that most of his general beliefs about government are what opinion-
leaders tell him that they_know from what they have heard from the 
121 
mass media,/.which reflects the Journalists' perceptions ·of what the 
government means and what it does in respons6to some event. 
Hopefully, by/showing a member of . the .·· public the degree i to. which his 
beliefs are ."removed" from the decision-makers and opinion-makers 
in.society, he.:willwork toward accurate,open communication ......... - .... ,..... 
e'ach•\step•ofthe··.flow. Furthermore,• it is•.·hoped'that·when the 
;.,,... ·:·:··.:·,:, 
·government opinion-makers realize the importance of an accurate 
.theywill also strive for influence upon public opinion.to be mediated 
. . ' 
to/the public accurately by all concerned.at each step along the flow. 
And certainlythe role of the journalist or.media specialist must be 
reconsidered in light of that person's influence upon what information 
and opinions reach the public media. In other words, ··this theory 
should give insight on the political communications process to 
persons other than "academic" theorists; it should also have meaning 
for anyone involved at any level of the four steps, particularly in 
seeing his relationship to the whole communication process. 
Limitations 
In·attempting to find a theory to explain governrnent--media-public 
communication,! employed a limited approach to Rosenau's pre-
theory; I limited the theory to communications about or by government. 
This need not be the case. A four-step flow theory could also explain 
communications from·any opinion-maker in response to any event that 
is then picked up by the mass media, mediated to the public by an 
opinion-leader, etc. This theory applied to "revolutionary rhetoric" 
or "black rhetoric" might bring new insight into understanding what 
·happens to the ·origina1 '·opinion-make'rs' comm~cations ,wheri (if) 
' they finally '. reach the · general public. 
. . \·. . ,' 
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In working with Rosenau's pre-theory, I have felt that it ·would 
be a better explanation of the total communication process if it were 
' ,·· . -. 
. -.-_:: :- . . ' 
to include more than a one-way flow from government to the public. -
In actuality, once opinions and information have influenced the 
public, . the communication flow is not · always concluded.· - Some;.. 
times the public will become .sufficiently aroused to fe~d back opinion 
to the opiniori-ieade;s to be relayed to decision-makers' . or some-
times they wi11 ·. attempt directly to influence decision-makers~ 
' . ' . . 
There is also f eedbaclc .' from opinion-leaders to government 
.· makers, which is not directly mentioned in Rosenau' s 
. ' 
Specifically, i would suggest incorporating feedback aspects of · the 
' ' : ,, ' ' 1 
: Westley and MacLean model of communication. 
way flow, / characterizing the nature of influence that flows back to 
the gover11IJlent, the complete process of government-public· communication 
i would be accounted for in the theory. 
' ·-, 
' .- .··_ ' . - , ·.,.- , .. 
· studying this two-way communication flow is suggested by several 
sources in this thesis. A model such as the following is based upon 
' Rosenau's theory, but ·is expanded to include feedback mechanisms 
(indicated ,by<two-way arrows) and po~sible by-passing of the opinion-
·1eader for certain kinds of information. 
1 ·.·-. ' ,,, ' .•.. ,. ' . 
· Bruce Westley and Malcolm MacLean, Jr., "A Conceptual Model 
for Communication Research," Journalism Quarterly, XXXIV (Winter, 
1957), 31-5. 
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·There are other limitations that should be mentioned in regard 
to the theory :which have to -do with research available for- supporting 
'/ (or rejecting) the four-step flow theory. Although there are 
"limitations" to conclusions that can be drawn now, I hope that they 
will be thought of more as areas for expanding research. 
Further Research 
Even at the end of this thesis, ·the term "influence" is not 
completely clear. - From the flow theory, we have a "feel" for 
-the fact -that influence is · exerted upon the public _by the mass 
_ . media and by _-- government. But we do not know the nature of the 
influence. Does the mass media instill an image of government in 
the mind of the viewer that can be articulated meaningfully? Does 
· · an image have -any "influence" upon a person's behavior? 
From chapter two, we received a concept of exigence, broadened 
from Bitzer's original use of the term to refer to the specific aspect 
of a communication situation that stimulates a specific response. We -
found how rhetoric can be an exigence for.further rhetoric. It 
would be worthwhile to investigate other things that serve as an 
exigence. For example, is there something about publicity 
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·consciousness which guides an opinion-maker to begin the communication 
/ flow· in response to nothing, but in a desire·· for self-expression. If 
so, is some special media treatment desirable? 
From the third chapter, I believe there is an ethical question 
need of further exploration. To what·extent should the government 
put forth an f'appearance" that is designed to protect the 
interest? How much influence should government exert over 
media to control their image and indirectly to control the 
'people can know about~ Aristotelian concern for "appearance" 
versus "reality" is applicable to this ethical·question. 
Also in chapter three, we saw how the government uses the mass 
media ·. to respond to stimuli. A relevant point which needs 
research is what effect the media have on ·government. Does the 
medium employed alter the content of an opinion-maker's message 
the extent that the meaning of the message is altered in' some 
significant way? Does the medium of television encourage "appearance" 
rather than "reality" in public communication? Does the knowledge of 
availability of mass media alter what the government says or does in 
any way? 
The research behind the chapter on media treatment contained 
many inferences that such factors as headline size have an effect 
upon the public. Just what is the nature of that effect? Eye 
movement studies are underway to determine what people pay attention 
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a newspaper or on · television; but I would like tO see follow-
research ollwhat difference it makes to an individual whether 
his eyes happen to focus on a certain word in a headline .: or not. 
:: How much influence does a headline have upon a person's beliefs 
:. opinions about ·· government? Does not an opinion-leader have a 
. ' ' ' . ' 
· broad enough ~ampli~g of information so that he can "see · through" 
media treatment? 
In the :last chapter three hypotheses were proposed · 
: the influence of opinion-leaders on the public versus influence 
· mass media on the public. The few sources cited represent most 
the research that has been done on those important ideas; further 
research is necessary to find just what types of data people pick 
, up from the media and how that relates to what they · rely ·. on . from 
:their .primary group associations and from opinion-leaders in the 
community. 
There are at least two remaining shortcomings in the research 
.· done on opinion-leaders. First, part of the research on opinion-
leaders is based on the assumption that they are more responsive 
to the media than are members of the mass public. If this is · so, 
the concept >should be clarified. Why are they more "media-gullible?" 
Is it because people are more influenced by authoritative information, 
: and that is the type of info·rmation opinion-leaders get · from specialized 
media in contrast to the non-·specialized reports most people get from 
mass media? , Or is it because of some "follower" nature inherent 
within the mass public, that they need people to influence them in 
dire~t face~t~face contact ·~n what .is right . for them to ;believe? 
Second, only two major field studies have been conducted of the 
two-step flow theory; many more will be necessary in order.to detennine 
just what . is the role of opinion-leaders in' influencing cithers~ As 
the theory is tested more and more in the field, it can be modified 
as necessary to bring it closer to an explanation of what•. actually 
in the public communication process. 
In general, a theory should explain human behavior with 
toward predictin.g the outcome Rosenau's approach fulfills this 
expectation in a very sweeping sense. By looking at a particular 
government response to some exigence, and by examining the flow pattern 
it.will follow, it is possible to predict the potential effect it 
will have upon ·public opinion •. 
And finally, I· should conclude by pointing out that this 
step flow theory opens up more research questions than it answers. 
Perhaps it.can serve as an "exigence" for producing similar theories 
on the role of government and the mass media in influencing public 
·. opinion. But whatever this development of Rosenau' s pre-theory 
does accomplish, I hope that by organizing all the information into 
a meaningful flow pattern, it will point up specific topics for 
concentrated research effort, while putting ideas about what 
influences public opinion into context. 
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